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ABSTRACT
RISK BASED MODELS FOR THE OPTIMIZATION OF OIL
AND GAS SUPPLY CHAIN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
By
Kingsley Oseloka Achebe
The oil and gas sector faces a broad array of risks and uncertainties, affecting short- and
long-term planning, and causing adverse effects in the energy sector. To predict and
minimize them, risk based supply chain models were developed for the oil and gas supply
chain critical infrastructure.
First, the events and activities were categorized as short term and long term, and
their risk ratings derived, by analyzing data from past events and site visits. The result
showed that events like the Israel – Arab war, successful hurricane, and production
increase or decrease, had a risk rating of approximately 7.
Second, network reliability and connectivity were analyzed using the risk based
minimum cut-set model, and its associated algorithms and simulation, for tactical and
short term planning. The impact of link failures, due to the risk and risk ratings associated
with certain events and activities determined above, which can affect each sourcedemand pair (i.e., from the crude storage tank to the refinery or from the refinery to the
product storage tank) of the network or the whole network, were determined. The result
showed that for a real world petroleum supply chain network like the Petrobas (Brazil),
this model could identify critical nodes/links in the supply chain network(s) that can be
severely affected by failure.
Third, a risk based LP Supply Chain Model (SCM) was developed, and used to
analyze the supply chain (SC), for strategic and long term scenarios. The average

expected risk ratings obtained above was used as one of the constraints in simulating
different risk scenarios. It was also used to forecast their likely impact on the supply
chain, and to come up with alternative ways to manage/minimize risk. The study showed
that for a generalized oil and gas supply chain like the Gulf coast area of the US, a very
critical (in terms of risk rating), and very severe (in terms of duration) event at the crude
source - like crisis in Nigeria or Iraq, occurring during the fall season could likely cause
an approximately 35% drop/loss in production of the supply chain. The study also
showed that other events like a refinery explosion/fire, tank leak/crack, or pipeline
fire/attack that is also very critical and severe, occurring during the fall season, could also
lead to an approximately 40% loss/drop in production of the supply chain.
Last, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Model Based Vulnerability Analysis
(MBVA) were carried out on the supply chain, to determine whether each source-demand
pair analyzed, failed or not, due to the likely impact of any event/threat scenario analyzed
above. The analysis were also carried out to show how scarce resources can be allocated
for optimum results in protecting these oil and gas supply chain nodes/links from failure.
Using the supply chain (SC) of the Gulf coast area as a case study, the result of the
simulation showed that investing at least $200 million to provide Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) in the Gulf coast area, can lower vulnerability to as little as 11%, and
prevent the potential for huge price increase on the consumers in particular, and the
economy in general.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

History and Background

The oil and gas industry is principally a Supply Chain Management (SCM) industry,
which involves the management of all steps in the delivery of a product or service to
consumers. It consists of exploration, drilling, operation of pipelines, and operation of
refineries for the production of fuel, plastics, and so on. Trunk line or “transmission
pipes” are the arterials that deliver refined products such as gasoline and aviation fuel to
terminals at various locations. Distribution refers to the sale and delivery of these
products to consumers from storage terminals. In their work, Forrest and Oettli (2003)
found out that most of the oil industry still operates its planning, central engineering,
upstream operations, and refining, supply, and transportation units as complete separate
entities. In view of this, systematic methods for efficiently managing the oil and gas
supply chain as one continuous unit must be exploited, viz - a - viz the risks and
vulnerabilities that are inherent in each supply chain unit/node.
A wide range of optimization models have been proposed in the oil and gas
supply chains, often without taking the inherent risks and vulnerabilities from events,
different routes and supply chain units/nodes into consideration. These uncertainties and
risks often interrupt the supply chain operations, causing significant adverse effects in the
energy sector. It is important to develop risk based optimization models using the oil and
gas/ refinery critical infrastructure supply chain operations, to predict, reduce or mitigate
the impact of these uncertainties in the oil and gas critical infrastructure supply chain.
The need for this important research work is based on the fact that studies (Lewis, 2006)
1

2
have shown that oil and gas will remain the most consumed energy for the foreseeable
future (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Past, present and future energy consumption in the United States: Petroleum
and Natural Gas will remain as the most consumed energy for the foreseeable future.
Source: Lewis (2006).

1.2

Objectives

The objectives of this work are:
To analyze existing supply chain models and :

•
i.

develop a risk model that will be used to categorize and derive the various
types of risks from analyzing the impacts of prior events on the oil and gas
supply chain and subsequently derive their ratings from the weighted risk.

ii.

develop a risk based SCM that will include:
o a risk based network reliability analysis model using the modified
minimum cut-set method to locate critical links/nodes in the network
whose failure from some of events, activities and threats we analyzed
their risk ratings in (i) above, will severely affect the supply chain
networks

3
o a risk based Linear Programming (LP) Supply Chain Model (SCM) for
strategic and tactical planning in the oil and gas SCM, by using the risk
ratings obtained above to simulate different scenarios and alternatives, so
as to get and incorporate the likely impact of these events and activities
in (i) above on the critical/links/nodes identified in (ii (a)) above on the
SC.
iii.

Finally, develop a Fault Tree and Model Based Vulnerability Analysis (FTA
and MBVA) models that will be used to show how scarce resources can be
allocated for optimum result in hardening/protecting these oil and gas SC
nodes/links from failure because of the likely impacts of some of the events
and threats analyzed above.

•

To manage and minimize /eliminate instability in the oil and gas critical
infrastructure.

•

To make the industry more resilient.
The models can be applied also to other critical infrastructure supply chains, by

varying the variables. These comprehensive yet easy-to-use models can be easily used by
executives, risk/supply chain/production managers, transportation and logistics personnel,
suppliers and regulators, academicians and students.

4
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Current Research

Current approaches to managing risks and uncertainties in the oil and gas critical
infrastructure supply chains are mostly reactive, employing re-routing of supply and
rationing. These lead to increased prices and negative impact on economic activity due to
lack of resiliency. The existing models to our knowledge only deal with stream flow rates
and not the demand and supply aspects, and do not take into consideration the inherent
risks and vulnerabilities from events, different routes, various sources and individual
supply chain units.
Abdel-Malek, Kullpattaranirum, and Nanthavanil (2005) modeled the supply
chain to assess the growth of the internet as one of today’s main business
communications tools as a series of tandem queues to estimate the lead time spent at each
level of the chain. Micheletto, Carvalho and Pinto (2008) came up with a mathematical
programming model that is applied to the operational planning of the utility plant of an
oil refinery, where a Mixed Integer Linear Problem (MILP) model is formulated to
determine the operational configuration of the plant by minimizing utility costs, and
identifying steam losses as well as inefficient units by comparing the optimal solutions
with the current operation. Neiro and Pinto (2004) went further to present a general
framework for modeling petroleum supply chains, by considering the individual supply
chain units as a continuous entity, where the decision variables include stream flow rates,
properties,

operational

variables,

and

inventory,

4

and

facilities

assignment.

5
Thomas and Griffin (1996) work in the area of Supply Chain Management (SCM)
can be classified in three categories: buyer – vendor, production–distribution and
inventory–distribution coordination. The authors present an extensive literature review
for each category. The work by Vidal and Goetschalckx (1997) presented a review of
mixed integer problems (MIP) that focuses on the identification of the relevant factors
included in formulations of the chain or its subsystems and also highlights solution
methodologies.
Bok, Grossmann, and Park (2000) developed an application that will be used in
the optimization of continuous flexible process networks. Their modeling considers
intermittent deliveries, production shortfalls, delivery delays, inventory profiles and job
changeovers. They introduced a bi-level solution methodology that can be used to reduce
computational expense. Zhuo, Cheng, and Hua (2000) used a Goal programming method
to solve the multi-objective optimization problem, and came up with a supply chain
model that involves conflicting decisions in the objective function. Perea, Grossmann,
Ydstie, and Tahmassebi (2000) and Perea-López, Grossmann, and Ydstie (2001) present
an approach that is capable of capturing the dynamic behavior of the supply chain by
modeling flow of materials and information within the supply chain. Information is
considered as perturbation of a system control whereas material flows are considered to
be control variables. Therefore, this approach is able to react on time and to coordinate
the whole supply chain for changing demand and inherent risk conditions. Similarly,
Ydstie, Coffey, and Read (2003) apply concepts from dynamics and control in the
management of highly distributed supply chains. Important aspects of the supply chain
problem are captured in a graph representation, such as topology, transportation,

6
shipping/receiving and market conditions, assembly/disassembly, storage of assets,
forecasting and performance evaluation. Song, Bok, Park, and Park (2002) developed a
design problem of multi - product, multi-echelon supply chain. Transportation cost is
treated as a continuous piecewise linear function of the distance and a discontinuous
piecewise linear function of the transportation volume, whereas installation costs are
expressed as a function of the capacity. Feord, Jakeman, and Shah (2002) work proposed
a network model whose main objective is to decide which orders should be met, delayed
or not to be delivered.
The work by Sear (1993) was probably the first to address the supply chain
management in the context of an oil company. The author developed a linear
programming network model for planning the logistics of a downstream oil company.
The model involves crude oil purchase and transportation, processing of products and
transportation, and depot operation. While, Escudero, Quintana, and Salmeron (1999),
went further to propose an LP model that handles the supply, transformation and
distribution of an oil company that accounts for uncertainties in supply costs, demands
and product prices. Dempster, Pedron, Medova, Scott, and Sembos (2000) applied a
stochastic programming approach to planning problems for a consortium of oil
companies. First, a deterministic multiperiod linear programming model is developed for
supply, production and distribution. The deterministic model is then used as a basis for
implementing a stochastic programming formulation with uncertainty in product
demands and spot supply costs. Lasschuit and Thijssen (2003) pointed out how the
petrochemical supply chain is organized and stress important issues that must be taken
into account when formulating a model for the oil and chemical industry.
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Important developments of subsystems of the petroleum supply chain can be
found in the literature. Iyer, Grossmann, Vasantharajan, and Cullick (1998) developed a
multiperiod MILP for planning and scheduling of offshore oil field infrastructure
investments and operations. The nonlinear reservoir behavior is handled with piecewise
linear approximation functions. A sequential decomposition technique is applied. Van
den Heever and Grossmann (2000) presented a nonlinear model for oilfield infrastructure
that involves design and planning decisions. The authors consider non-linear reservoir
behavior. A logic-based model is proposed that is solved with a bi-level decomposition
technique. This technique aggregates time periods for the design problem and
subsequently disaggregates them for the planning sub-problem. Van den Heever,
Grossmann, Vasantharaan, and Edwards (2000) addressed the design and planning of
offshore oilfield infrastructure focusing on business rules. A disjunctive model capable to
deal with the increased order of magnitude due to the business rules is proposed.
Ierapetritou, Floudas, Vasantharaan, and Cullick (1999) studied the optimal location of
vertical wells for a given reservoir property map. The problem is formulated as a large
scale MILP and solved by a decomposition technique that relies on quality cut
constraints. Kosmidis, Perkins, and Pistikopoulos (2002) described an MILP formulation
for the well allocation and operation of integrated gas-oil systems whereas Barnes, Linke,
and Kokossis (2002) focused on the production design of offshore platforms.
Cheng and Duran (2003) focused on the crude oil worldwide transportation based
on the statement that this element of the petroleum supply chain is the central logistics
that links the upstream and downstream functions, playing a crucial role in the global
supply chain management in the oil industry.
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At another level of the supply chain, Lee, Pinto, Grossmann, and Park (1996)
concentrated on the short-term scheduling of crude oil supply for a single refinery. Más
and Pinto (2003) and Magalhães and Shah (2003) focus on the crude oil supply
scheduling. The former developed a detailed MILP formulation comprised of tankers,
piers, storage tanks, substations and refineries, whereas the latter addresses a scheduling
problem composed of a terminal, a pipeline, a refinery crude storage area and its crude
units. Pinto, Joly, and Moro (2000) and Pinto and Moro (2000) focused on the refinery
operations. The former work focuses on production scheduling for several specific areas
in a refinery such as crude oil, fuel oil, asphalt and LPG whereas the latter addresses a
nonlinear production planning. Jia and Ierapetritou (2003) concentrate on the short-term
scheduling of refinery operations. Crude oil unloading and blending, production unit
operations and product blending and delivery are first solved as independent problems.
Each sub-system is modeled based on a continuous time formulation. Integration of the
three sub-systems is then accomplished by applying heuristic based Lagrangean
decomposition. Wenkai and Hui (2003) studied similar problem to that addressed by Jia
and Ierapetritou (2003) and propose a new modeling technique and solution strategy to
schedule crude oil unloading and storage. At the refinery level, units such as crude
distillation unit and fluidized-bed catalytic cracking were modeled and a new analytical
method was proposed to provide additional information for intermediate streams inside
the refinery.
Ponnambalam, Vannelli, and Woo (1992) developed an approach that combines
the simplex method for linear programming with an interior point method for solving a
multiperiod planning model in the oil refinery industry. Still at the production planning
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level, Liu and Sahinidis (1997) presented a fuzzy programming approach for solving a
petrochemical complex problem involving uncertainty in model parameters. Bok, Lee,
and Park (1998) addressed the problem of long-range capacity expansion planning for a
petrochemical industry. Deschmukh (2007) designed a model for a decision support
system for supply chain risk management.
Ross (2000) formulated a planning supply network model on the petroleum
distribution downstream segment. Resource allocation such as distribution centers (new
and existing) and vehicles is managed in order to maximize profit. Delivery cost is
determined depending on the geographic zone, trip cost, order frequency and travel
distance for each customer. Iakovou (2001) proposed a model that focuses on the
maritime transportation of petroleum products considering a set of transport modalities.
One of the main objectives of this work was to take into account the risks of oil spill
incidents. Magatão, Arruda, and Neves (2002) propose an MILP approach to aid the
decision-making process to schedule commodities on pipeline systems. On the product
storage level, Stebel, Arruda, Fabro, and Rodrigues (2002) present a model involving the
decision making process on storage operations of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
Lababidi, Ahmed, Alatqi and Al-Enzi (2004), developed an optimization model
for the SC of a petrochemical company operating under uncertain operating and
economic conditions, by first developing and testing a deterministic model, and,
subsequently introducing uncertainties in key parameters like, demands, market prices,
raw material costs, and production yield. The authors came to a conclusion that
uncertainties have a dramatic effect on the planning decisions of the petrochemical SC.
Applequist, Pekny and Reklaitis (2000), presented a new metric for evaluating, design
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and planning in chemical manufacturing SC in which there are significant elements of
uncertainty and risks. Guillen, Mele, Bagajewcz, Espuna and Puigjaner (2005),
considered the design and retrofit problem of a SC consisting of several production
plants, warehouses and markets, with their associated distribution systems, under
uncertainties, while also noting the profit over the time horizon and resulting demand
satisfaction. Santoso, Ahmed, Goetschalckx and Shapiro (2005), in their work proposed a
stochastic programming model and solution algorithm for solving SC network design
problems of a realistic scale, to quickly compute high quality solutions to large-scale
stochastic SC design problems with a huge number of scenarios. Peidro, Mula, Poler and
Lario (2009), in their work carried out a review of the literature related to SC under
uncertainty, to come up with a starting framework to model uncertainty in SC by
applying quantitative approaches. Al-Othman, Lababidi, Alatqi and Al-Shayji (2008),
developed a stochastic planning model to study the impact of uncertainty on the supply
chain, by performing a sensitivity analysis in market demands and prices of different
commodities at ±20% deviation. Stadtler (2005) studied the essence of SCM and
advanced planning from two conceptual frameworks; as a SC planning matrix and then,
looking at the software that can be used for SC advanced planning, and then outlining the
main short comings in SCM. Philpott and Everett (2001) developed a SC optimization
model for Fletcher Challenge Paper Australasia (FCPA), known as Paper Industry Value
Optimization (PIVOT). This model which is a large MIP model was used to find the
optimal allocation of supplier to mill, product to paper machine, and paper machine to
customer relations, and subsequently providing significant economic benefits to the
company. Jung, Blau, Pekny, Reklaitis and Eversdyk (2004), in their work focused on
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determining the safety stock level that can be used to meet a desired level of customer
satisfaction by using a simulation based optimization approach. They proposed the use of
deterministic planning and scheduling models which incorporate safety stock levels as a
means of accommodating demand uncertainties in routine operation. Xu and Zhai (2009),
in their paper considered a two- stage supply chain coordination problem that focused on
the fuzziness aspect of demand uncertainty, by investigating the optimization of the
vertically integrated two-stage SC, that is, under perfect coordination, and noncoordination, and came up with the conclusion that expected SC profit is greater in the
coordinated condition than the non-coordinated condition. Petrovic, Roy and Petrovic
(1998), in their work described the fuzzy modeling and simulation of a SC in an uncertain
environment as the first step in developing a decision support system. Cheng and Lee
(2004) developed a MINLP model to deal with the multiple incommensurable goals for a
multi-echelon SC network with uncertain market demands and product prices. The
authors modeled the uncertain market demands as a number of discrete scenarios with
known probabilities.
Urso, Colpo and Sheble (2006) discussed the need for the integration of process
and security systems for oil production platforms, pipelines, and terminals in an oil and
gas supply chain. Pitty, Li, Adhitya, Srinivasan and Karimi (2008) demonstrated that a
dynamic model of an integrated supply chain can serve as a valuable quantitative tool that
aids in decision making in refinery supply chains. Kleindorfer and Saad (2005) in their
work provided a conceptual framework that reflects the joint activities of risk assessment
and risk mitigation that are fundamental to disruption risk management in supply chains.
Yu, Zeng and Zhao (2009) in their work focused on evaluating the impacts of supply
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disruption risks by comparing the choice between single and dual sourcing methods in a
two-stage supply Chain (SC) with a non-stationary and price sensitive demand. Chopra
and Sodhi (2004) analyzed how to manage, analyze and neutralize supply chain risks
across the entire supply chain in a rapidly changing environment, and recommended a
powerful ‘what if?’ team exercise called stress testing to identify potential weak links in
the chain and then select best ways of mitigating them. Adhitya, Srinivasan and Karimi
(2007) developed a causal model called the composite-operations graph, to capture the
cause-and-effect among all the variables in supply chain operation and then using a
rectification graph which captures all possible options to overcome these disruptions.
Julka, Karimi and Srinivasan (2002) proposed an agent based framework for refinery
supply chain decision support systems (DSSs) that will be used to integrate all the
decision making processes of a refinery, by interfacing with other systems in place, and
be able to assist different departments concurrently in responding to changes in policies,
exogenous events and plant modifications.
In conclusion, to our knowledge, current approaches to managing risks and
uncertainties in the oil and gas critical infrastructure supply chains are mostly reactive,
employing re-routing of supply and rationing. These lead to increased prices and negative
impact on economic activity due to lack of resiliency. The existing models to our
knowledge do not take the inherent risks and vulnerabilities from, events, different
routes, various sources and individual supply chain units/nodes into consideration.
However, logic-based approaches have shown potential to efficiently model and solve
large systems without reducing problem complexity (Neiro and Pinto, 2004; Vecchietti
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and Grossman, 2000; Van den Heever and Grossman, 1999; Turkay and Grossman,
1996).

2.2

Risk and Vulnerability

The oil and gas supply chain as illustrated in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, shows that crude
oil from a well head or international sources is transported to a refinery by a pipeline
system or boat. The refinery converts the crude into refined products, which in turn are
transmitted over long distance to terminals, where they are stored. Then a distribution
network of pipelines, trucks, and so on delivers the product to consumers.

Figure 2.1 General oil and gas supply chain.
Source: Neiro and Pinto (2004).
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Figure 2.2 Simplified oil and gas supply chain.
Source: Lewis (2006).

Figure 2.3 Simplified oil and gas supply chain.
Source: Lewis (2006).

The vast miles of US pipelines shown in Figures 2.4 to 2.6 below are monitored
by various SCADA systems that report anomalies such as leaks and broken component.
Major decisions during production planning include, individual product levels for each
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product to meet consumer requirements, as well as operating conditions for each refinery
in the network, as well as product and crude transportation scheduling, inventory and
management, while making sure that the level of risks/ vulnerabilities is lowered to the
level that will ensure acceptable optimum production.

Figure 2.4 Petroleum pipeline network of North America.
Source: Lewis (2006).

Figure 2.5 Crude oil pipelines.
Source: Lewis (2006).
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Figure 2.6 Refined oil pipelines.
Source: Lewis (2006).

The vulnerability assessment methods require analysis of a manufacturing
process’s response to a terrorist attack. However, the methodologies do not include other
causes of failure like natural disasters and man - made causes, and also lack of
maintenance and perceived neglects of government for basic infrastructural needs like
pipe borne water, electricity, healthcare, roads e.t.c., and attacks by local militants where
the oil is being explored, example of the latter scenario is Nigeria, the sixth biggest oil
producer in the world and Africa’s biggest oil producer, where it is reported that the
country’s production level has dropped below 60% of its expected OPEC quota due to the
actions of the local militants, and also Iraq.
2.2.1 Pipeline
Until recently, the pipeline industry has been preoccupied primarily with environmental,
safety and maintenance issues. Beyond occasional cases of vandalism, the human factor
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was hardly perceived as a threat to the world’s vast web of oil and gas pipelines, which,
all told, carry roughly half of the world’s oil and most of its natural gas.
All this has changed since the 9-11 attack in the US. With the threat of terrorism
looming, pipeline operators in the industrialized world have taken action to prevent
terrorism from harming energy infrastructure. Although these have made the pipeline
system in places like North America and Europe relatively secure, since most U.S. oil
and a growing portion of its natural gas come from abroad, our energy system cannot be
protected unless similar security measures are applied at the generating points of oil and
gas in the Middle East, the Former USSR, Africa and Latin America.
Pipelines are very easily sabotaged. A simple explosive device can put a critical
section of pipelines out of operation for weeks. This is why pipeline sabotage has become
the weapon of choice of the insurgents in Iraq. It is estimated that pipeline sabotage costs
the Iraq people more than $10 billion in oil revenues – and helped to undermine the Iraq
re-construction project and subsequently affected the pump price of gasoline to
consumers.
In December 2004, Sudanese rebels attacked an oil field, killing 15 people.
Chechen guerrillas fighting to sever themselves from Russia are going after the country’s
gigantic pipeline web of roughly 31,000 miles. Russia is the world’s second largest oil
exporter and 40% of its revenue is derived from oil. There is no better way for the
Chechens to hurt the Russian economy than hindering Russia’s capability to export
crude. In 2004, pipelines were blown up in Volograd, Dageastan, Stavrolpol as well as in
and around Moscow.
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In India, a separatist rebel group called United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
which fights for independence for the oil rich Assam state, has taken responsibility for a
number of pipeline attacks. Assam is the source of some 15% of India’s onshore crude oil
production and, as the country’s oil demand grows, the implications of disruption of the
flow of oil from there will become increasingly noticeable.
In Southeast Turkey, Kurdish guerrillas belonging to the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) have staged a campaign of bomb attacks on an oil pipeline.
In Columbia, terrorist groups, primarily the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Columbia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have attacked the 480-mile
Cano Limon Covenas oil pipelines so many times that it became known as “the flute”.
Nigeria, who is the 4th largest supplier of crude oil to North America (which
includes US), loses between 200,000 – 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) (i.e. 10 – 15% of
their total production) to criminal gangs.
Terrorists have also indicated interest in the nearly completed 1,000 mile BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, slated to transport 1 million barrels of oil a day from the
Caspian Sea to Western markets through the Turkish port of Ceyhan.
Another problematic area in the pipeline’s path is Georgia, where separatists in
South Ossetia and Abkhaziz provinces often clash with the Georgian government. In
China, the world’s fastest growing energy consumer is also vulnerable to terrorist strikes
against oil. To satisfy its growing energy needs, China has decided to run pipelines
connecting the northwest district of Xinjiang with neighboring Kazakhstan. This means
China’s oil will be at the mercy of increasingly hostile Muslim Uighur minorities trying
to break away from the central regime in Beijing.
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But in no oil and gas domain could pipeline sabotage do more damage than in
Saudi Arabia, home to one-fourth of the world’s oil. Over 10,000 miles of pipeline
crisscross Saudi Arabia, mostly above ground. Were concerted pipeline attacks to spread
to Saudi Arabia, repeatedly interrupting he Saudi oil supply, the implications for the
global economy could be profound.
Whether perpetuated for political or criminal reasons, assaults on oil
infrastructure have added a “fear premium” of roughly $10 per barrel of oil. For the U.S.,
that imports more than 10 million barrels a day, the spike in oil prices due to oil terror
cost close to $40 billion in 2004.
2.2.2 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Distributed
Control Systems (DCS)
In order to supply two-thirds of the United States’ energy usage, the oil and gas industry
depends upon a vast and highly decentralized infrastructure, consisting of roughly 50
refineries, 200,000 miles of oil pipelines, and 2 million miles of gas pipelines. The long
production chain begins with exploration and drilling and ends with delivery to
consumers.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Distributed
Control Systems (DCS) form the backbone of most oil and gas industry operations
globally. Controlling this infrastructure is highly complex, requiring many pieces of
individual equipment to be monitored. A delicate balance of flows, temperatures,
pressures, and other parameters must be maintained to ensure proper refinery plant
operations and pipe distribution.
As oil and gas companies work to enhance security measures to ensure an
uninterrupted supply of these important commodities, they face a number of challenges,
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including the need to connect once isolated SCADA and DCSs with business systems and
networks; clashing organizational priorities; and no mandate to comply with cyber
security – security related standards.
Two factors have moved control system security quickly up the list of priorities
for oil and gas companies:

•

SCADA systems and DCS used within refineries and to control pipelines are
vulnerable to cyber threats, and

•

The explosive nature of these commodities makes this industry’s infrastructure
an attractive target.
Beyond malicious attacks perpetrated by both outsiders and insiders, other

sources of vulnerabilities in SCADA and DCS are: vulnerabilities caused by architectural
oversights, unaware or untrained employees, partners, and contractors can also be the
source of security risks. Common internal causes of security vulnerabilities include poor
password protection, failure to update protection software, failure to scan files,
inappropriate on - the – job Web surfing and file downloading.
These vulnerabilities leave oil and gas companies susceptible to exploration,
attack and loss of proprietary information. To effectively meet NERC CIP compliance
and to ensure uninterrupted security stance to prevent:

•

Environmental damages

•

Regulatory violations

•

Interrupted business operations

•

Costly equipment damages

•

Financial loss
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•

Potential loss of life
Adding to the pressure is heightened awareness by those outside of the industry

about the vulnerabilities of SCADA and DCS systems and the attractiveness of oil and
gas pipelines and refineries as an attack target. There is also growing recognition that
control systems used in oil and gas plant and pipeline operations are vulnerable to cyber
attacks from numerous sources, and companies struggle to address cyber security, on a
variety of levels.
Gas and oil companies have also adopted a number of practices to improve
efficiency, many of which inadvertently increase the vulnerability of control systems.
While the modern SCADA and DCS systems are built-in with much more security,
deployments remain insecure, opening these networks to security threats and
vulnerabilities.
For instance, SCADA and DCSs within the oil and gas industry are increasingly
being integrated with existing business information systems and deployed on common
operating systems to supply corporate decision-makers with information needed for real
time decision –making, such as setting commodity prices. While this interconnectedness
provides corporate decision-makers with access to critical data, it also leads to
widespread availability of information about these control systems and their
vulnerabilities.
Typically, this connectivity is enabled via the internet, leaving SCADA and DCS
systems vulnerable to threats such as automated worms. This interconnectivity also
enables hackers to access these systems through which they can deactivate alarms, start
or stop equipment, change critical system settings, and more.
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Other practices meant to improve business operations, also unintentionally expose
these systems to vulnerabilities. One of the key advantages of centralized supervision and
remote access is to automate tasks and enable real-time control of the entire system. For
instance, gas and oil companies provide remote access for company engineers,
contractors via dial-up modems and other means so that off-site personnel can
troubleshoot SCADA and DCS problems. Similarly, visiting employees from other
locations, hired contractors, and other authorized parties sometimes need to access to the
corporate network from their laptop computers.
Maintaining 24/7 operations via remote system access introduces additional
vulnerability points. This interconnection with the corporate network introduces new
access points to the SCADA and DCS system, through which viruses or malicious code
could infiltrate the network and systems. At the same time, the nonstop operational
requirements of SCADA and DCS systems, complicates security implementation and
testing because systems can never be taken offline.
Additionally, the oil and gas infrastructure is widely dispersed geographically,
further complicating efforts to secure it. Even with well-implemented intrusion detection
systems, network security staff may only recognize individual attacks, rather than
organized patterns of attacks over time.
Competing standards and regulatory guidelines intended for the oil and gas
industry only lead to the confusion. In fact, oil and gas companies are not currently
required to comply with any cyber security-related standards. Despite national policies,
encouraging a resilient infrastructure that can withstand an attack, oil and gas companies
may find it cost-prohibitive to meet those expectations.
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2.2.3 Refineries
According to Lewis (2006), five of the top ten refineries in the US fall into the
geographic clusters called the Gulf coast area, which stretches from south of Houston,
TX, to Lake Charles in LA (East), and then to Baton Rouge, LA, and constitutes a critical
node in the petroleum supply chain. They produce about 11% of the total refined
petroleum products in the US. In fact, the top ten refineries combined, produce 19.4% of
all refined products in the US.
Refineries can be shut down because of lack of power, insufficient supply of
crude, or fire damage, either by natural causes, attacks, or lack of maintenance. Though
power outages may last for only a few hours, destruction of crude oil pipelines can deny
service to a refinery for days, while explosion of fire can cause longer term damages, like
several months. Thus the cost and probability of each incident will vary without any
known certainty.
Refinery replacement can cost more than $1 billion, and the loss of production
(500,000 barrels/day), which can have severe implications on revenues as well as
shortages that will lead to price increases at the gasoline station.
According to Lewis et al, Galveston, which is the location of the largest refinery
in the US, was the site of the deadliest hurricane in U.S. history in 1900, with over 8,000
people losing their lives. In 1947, also, the largest port disaster in U.S. history wiped out
Texas City, when a ship containing fertilizer caught fire and spread throughout the port
and much of the town. Records show that over the years, the worst refinery disasters have
followed large clusters like Texas City: Whiting, IN; Texas City, Pasadena, and Amarillo,
TX; Baton Rouge, LA; Romeoville, IL; and Avon and Torrence, CA. All these show that
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refineries are highly vulnerable, and concentrations such as the Galveston Bay cluster are
both highly critical to the oil supply chain and vulnerable to damage.
According to Wikipedia, Hurricane Katrina of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season
was regarded as the costliest natural disaster, as well as one of the five deadliest
hurricanes, in the history of the United States. It formed over the Bahamas on August 23,
2005 and crossed into southern Florida as a moderate Category 1 hurricane, causing some
deaths and flooding there before strengthening rapidly in the Gulf of Mexico. It finally
weakened before making its second landfall as a Category 3 storm on the morning of
Monday, August 29 in southeast Louisiana. This category 3 hurricane caused severe
destruction on the oil and gas supply chain of the Gulf coast area of the US - from central
Florida to Texas, due mainly to storm surge.
It was recorded to have damaged or destroyed at least 30 oil platforms and caused
the closure of nine refineries, leading to approximately 24% drop in oil production from
the Gulf of Mexico in months following the storm. It also caused oil spills/leaks that
were estimated at over 200,000 barrels.
A June 2007 report into the possible causes of the high level of damages from
Katrina released by the American Society of Civil Engineers showed that the failures of
the locally built and federally funded levees in New Orleans, contributed heavily to this
disaster. The report also showed that the disaster was found to be primarily the result of
system design flaws. In addition, it pointed out that the US Army Corps of Engineers
who by federal mandate are responsible for the conception, design and construction of the
region's flood-control system failed to pay sufficient attention to public safety.
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Efforts are currently being made in order to minimize the future impact of any
successful hurricane in the Gulf coast area. The government has been reconstructing
many of the levees since the time of Katrina. In reconstructing them, precautions are
being taken to bring the levees up to the modern building code standards and to ensure
their safety. For example, in every situation possible, the Corps of Engineers are
replacing I-walls with T-walls. T-walls have a horizontal concrete base that protects
against soil erosion underneath the floodwalls, thereby minimizing the ability of the
storm to cause more damages offshore.
2.2.4 Storage
Critical nodes in the storage components of the supply chain are large capacity clusters
located in key transportation nodes, such as Perth Amboy, NJ. Most carriers like
Colonial, whose 5,500 miles long (from Texas to New York), that delivers an average of
95 million gallons/day of gasoline, kerosene, home heating oil, diesel fuels, and national
defense fuels to shipper terminals in 12 states and the District of Columbia, with an
estimated 20% market share of the national supply and boasting the largest-capacity
petroleum transmission network in the world, have their termination Perth Amboy, NJ,
where the products are stored before being distributed by Buckeye Pipeline. These high
concentrations of vast supplies in storage tanks in and around Linden Station provides an
eye-popping target, thus making Colonial and Linden Station storage facilities a critical
link and critical node, respectively in the supply chain.
A fatigue crack on January 2, 1990, in an Exxon pipeline at Linden Station
ruptured and spilled an estimated 567, 000 gallons of fuel into the Arthur Kill waterway
between New Jersey and Staten Island. The spill caused extensive environmental
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damage. In fact, Exxon did not immediately detect the spill because operating staff had
disabled the leak detection system, so pumping continued for 9 hours after the pipeline
sprung the leak. It was only when Exxon conducted a pressure test, pumping more oil
into the water, did a Coast Guard team in small boat noticed oil bubbling to the surface,
and determined that the pipeline was the source.
Based, on this fact, it can be said that it is not only feasible for major oil incidents
to happen at large storage terminals, but it has already happened.

2.3

Meaning of Vulnerability and Risk in the Context of CIP

Haimes (2004) defined the notion of vulnerability as follows: vulnerability is the
manifestation of the inherent states of a system that renders it susceptible to damage or
loss. A system is taken in the general sense to be a group of regular interacting and
interconnected items that form a unified whole (Ayyub and Klir 2006). In a later
publication, Haimes (2006) emphasized that vulnerability is a multidimensional concept
best described by a suite of state variables that describe system weaknesses and how they
interact to cause loss following a disruptive event. Numerous other researchers have
explored the meaning of vulnerability in different contexts (e.g., Villagrán de León 2006;
Hellström 2005; McEntire 2005; Agarwal et al. 2003; Paton and Johnson 2001;
Weichselgartner 2001; Einarsson and Rausand 1998), and the general consensus is that
any aspect of a system that weakens its ability to survive in a disruptive or hostile
environment contributes to its overall vulnerability.
It is widely accepted that vulnerability is an important component of risk analysis
(see Aven 2007; Haimes 2006; Pinto et al. 2003). As with vulnerability, risk is a
multidimensional concept that describes the potential for loss associated with a disruptive
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event (Ayyub 2003) where, for a given event or scenario, the risk is the pairing of its
probability of occurrence and the consequences given its occurrence (Kaplan and Garrick
1981). It can be inferred from the notions of vulnerability and risk that the weaknesses
present in a system contribute to its potential for loss following an adverse event. Thus
the quantification of risk necessarily requires meaningful ways to assess and measure
vulnerability.
Despite this apparently obvious observation, numerous methods in current use
within the critical infrastructure protection community do not assess vulnerability as a
primary variable in its broadest sense, but rather capture elements of vulnerability
implicitly through the assessment of other parameters. For example, in the Risk Analysis
and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) methodology, the parameter
“vulnerability” is equated to probability of adversary success, and other non-security
related weaknesses are melded together under the heading of consequence assessment
(Moore et al. 2007). The marginalization of vulnerability to a security issue is common in
many other qualitative and quantitative security risk assessment methods. In contrast,
many risk models for natural hazards identify vulnerability as the mapping from a state of
damage to degree of loss, though in principle whether a system can be damaged in the
first place is a question that should also fall under the heading of vulnerability
assessment. Though different methodologies are permitted to slice and dice their
expressions for risk in different ways that are all equally valid, they are consistent in their
use of inconsistent and usually narrow definitions and measures for vulnerability.
Perhaps one reason for the apparent lack of an explicit definition for vulnerability
in its broadest sense is the absence of an accepted understanding of what vulnerability
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tries to measure. Recently, Ayyub et al. (2007) developed an extensive expression for
asset and portfolio risk in an all-hazards context from which, after careful observation of
all risk contributors, emerged a mathematical expression for vulnerability that appears to
capture the multidimensional essence of vulnerability. According to the authors, this
expression explicitly identifies the major contributors to vulnerability in terms of
interventions that limit the scope of outcomes between cause and consequence.

2.4

Impact of Global Warming on future Hurricanes

Observed records of Atlantic hurricane activity (e.g. Emanuel 2007) show a strong
correlation, on multi-year time-scales, between local tropical Atlantic sea surface
temperatures (SSTs) and the Power Dissipation Index (PDI) (Figure 2.7). PDI is an
aggregate measure of Atlantic hurricane activity, combining frequency, intensity, and
duration of hurricanes in a single index. Both Atlantic SSTs and PDI have risen sharply
since the 1970s, and there is some evidence that PDI levels in recent years are higher than
in the previous active Atlantic hurricane era in the 1950s and 60s.
Model-based climate change detection/attribution studies have linked increasing
tropical Atlantic SSTs to increasing greenhouse gases, but the link between increasing
greenhouse gases and hurricane PDI or frequency has been based on statistical
correlations. The statistical linkage of Atlantic hurricane to PDI and Atlantic SST in
Figure 2.7 suggests at least the possibility of a large anthropogenic influence on Atlantic
hurricanes. When the correlation between tropical Atlantic SSTs and hurricane activity
shown in Figure 2.7 is used to infer future changes in Atlantic hurricane activity, it shows
a sobering implication. That the large increases in tropical Atlantic SSTs projected for the
late 21st century would imply very substantial increases in hurricane destructive
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potential--roughly a 300% increase in the PDI by 2100 (Figure 2.8a). Though, the
statistical relationship between the PDI and the alternative relative SST measure shown in
Figure 2.8b would imply only modest changes of Atlantic hurricane activity (PDI) with
greenhouse warming, the general consensus from studies is that if global warming is a
reality in the future, it will most likely lead to more severity in the impacts of hurricanes
in the Gulf coast region in the future.

Figure 2.7: Time series of late summer tropical Atlantic Sea Surface Temperature (blue)
and the Power Dissipation Index (green) - a measure of Hurricane activity.
Source: Emanuel (2007).
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Figure 2.8(a): Statistical model of Hurricane activity based on "local" tropical Atlantic
Sea Surface Temperature (SST).
Figure 2.8(b): Statistical model of Hurricane activity based on tropical Atlantic Sea
Surface Temperature (SST) relative to SST averaged over the remainder of the tropics.
Source: Vecchi et al. (2008).
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CHAPTER 3
EVENTS AND OIL PRICES

3.1

Introduction

Few inputs impact the world economy like the price of oil. Oil powers cars, trucks, boats,
airplanes, and even power plants that make up the backbone of the global economy. As
oil prices rise, costs go up for transportation companies, squeezing their profit margins
and forcing them to raise prices, similarly affecting all the other companies that rely on
them to transport products and people. By contrast, most energy companies benefit from
higher oil prices, either from higher revenues for oil, or because of increased demand for
substitute energy sources such as ethanol and natural gas. 2007 and the first half of 2008
were good times for many energy companies; futures prices rose tremendously, peaking
on July 3rd, 2008, at a record high of $145.85. Since then, however, futures prices have
plummeted (dropping below $50 per barrel by early December), mostly in response to the
recession caused by the 2007 Credit Crunch and 2008 Financial Crisis. It has now
stabilized between $70 and $85 per barrel between 2009 to present (2010). The extreme
volatility of this important critical infrastructure led to the study of the history of oil
prices fluctuation, and events that caused them, as shown in Figures 3.1 to 3.16, and
subsequently analyzing the risk ratings associated with these past events, and using it in
the developed model to predict, forecast and prepare for future occurrences and scenarios,
so as to minimize or eliminate its adverse impact on the worlds’ economy.
Crude Oil prices ranged between $2.50 and $3.00 from 1948 through the end of
the 1960s. The price oil rose from $2.50 in 1948 to about $3.00 in 1957. When viewed in
2006 dollars an entirely different story emerges with crude oil prices fluctuating around
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$17-$18 during the same period. The apparent 20% price increase just kept up with
inflation.
From 1958 to 1970 prices were stable at about $3.00 per barrel, but in real terms
the price of crude oil declined from above $17 to below $14 per barrel. The decline in
the price of crude when adjusted for inflation was amplified for the international producer
in 1971 and 1972 by the weakness of the US dollar.
OPEC was formed in 1960 with five founding members Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela. Two of the representatives at the initial meetings had studied the
the Texas Railroad Commission's methods of influencing price through limitations on
production. By the end of 1971 six other nations had joined the group: Qatar, Indonesia,
Libya, United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Nigeria. From the foundation of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries through 1972 member countries
experienced steady decline in the purchasing power of a barrel of oil.
Throughout the post war period exporting countries found increasing demand for
their crude oil but a 40% decline in the purchasing power of a barrel of oil. In March
1971, the balance of power shifted. That month the Texas Railroad Commission set
proration at 100 percent for the first time. This meant that Texas producers were no
longer limited in the amount of oil that they could produce. More importantly, it meant
that the power to control crude oil prices shifted from the United States (Texas,
Oklahoma and Louisiana) to OPEC. Another way to say it is that there was no more
spare capacity and therefore no tool to put an upper limit on prices. A little over two
years later OPEC would, through the unintended consequence of war, get a glimpse at the
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extent of its power to influence prices. The results are dramatically different if only post1970 data are used.

Figure 3.1 Crude oil prices 1947 – August, 2009.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10)

Figure 3.2 Crude Oil Prices 1869-2009.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).

34
In that case U.S. crude oil prices average $29.06 per barrel and the more relevant
world oil price averages $32.23 per barrel. The median oil price for that time period
is $26.50 per barrel.
If oil prices revert to the mean this period is likely the most appropriate for today's
analyst. It follows the peak in U.S. oil production eliminating the effects of the Texas
Railroad Commission and is a period when the Seven Sisters were no longer able to
dominate oil production and prices. It is an era of far more influence by OPEC oil
producers than they had in the past. As we will see in the details below influence over oil
prices is not equivalent to control.

Figure 3.3 Crude oil prices 1970-2009.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).

The U.S. petroleum industry's price has been heavily regulated through
production or price controls throughout much of the twentieth century. In the post World
War II era U.S. oil prices at the wellhead averaged $24.98 per barrel adjusted for inflation
to 2007 dollars. In the absence of price controls the U.S. price would have tracked the
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world price averaging $27.00. Over the same post war period the median for the domestic
and the adjusted world price of crude oil was $19.04 in 2007 prices. That means that only
fifty percent of the time from 1947 to 2007 have oil prices exceeded $19.04 per barrel.
Until the March 28, 2000 adoption of the $22-$28 price band for the OPEC basket
of crude, oil prices only exceeded $24.00 per barrel in response to war or conflict in the
Middle East. With limited spare production capacity OPEC abandoned its price band in
2005 and was powerless to stem a surge in oil prices which was reminiscent of the late
1970s.
3.1.1 World Price
The only very long term price series that exists is the U.S. average wellhead or first
purchase price of crude. When discussing long-term price behavior this presents a
problem since the U.S imposed price controls on domestic production from late 1973 to
January 1981. In order to present a consistent series and also reflect the difference
between international prices and U.S. prices we created a world oil price series that was
consistent with the U.S. wellhead price adjusting the wellhead price by adding the
difference between the refiner’s acquisition price of imported crude and the refiners
average acquisition price of domestic crude.
3.1.2 Spot Prices versus Futures Prices
Spot prices are the prices paid for oil here and now - as in, the amount of money you
would hand a producer in exchange for their tossing a barrel of oil into the back of your
truck. Futures prices, on the other hand, are the prices paid for contracts promising the
delivery of oil at a future date. Whether or not the prices of oil futures affect spot prices is
one of energy economics' most prevalent modern debates.
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Moreover, there really is no "true" spot market for oil, in the sense of that there is
a "true" spot market for stock or other financial assets. A "true" spot market requires, as
described above, the actual physical transfer of the goods, to the purchaser, directly at the
time of purchase, and there simply are no large scale sellers of crude oil, that operate in
such a fashion. The "spot" prices that are quoted, involve the transfer of 1000 barrels of
crude oil, not one or two. That would require literally 5 of 6 tractor-trailer rigs to carry
off back to your house: the transportation costs would approach the value of the oil itself.
When one speaks of a "spot" price for crude oil, one is meaning the current trading price,
of the next future contract that will come due.
Those that claim that futures prices (and, therefore, speculation) do not affect spot
prices argue that people who purchase futures contracts do not actually purchase any real
oil. When a fund purchases a futures contract and that contract comes due, it must sell the
oil to someone who will actually use it, because that fund has no way of actually keeping
the physical product. This means the oil must come to market - no matter what the price.
If a firm buys a $150/barrel futures contract in June for July and the spot price in July is
$140, the firm must buy the oil at $150, and then it MUST sell the oil at $140 as well,
because it can't actually hold the oil. This means there is no accumulation of oil - firms
can't hoard oil, so they can't actually affect the present market. Therefore, it is argued, the
prices of futures contracts have no affect on spot prices.
Those that believe futures speculation has an effect on spot prices (at least, those
with a sound understanding of economics) argue that when oil futures are traded, oil
purchasers, like refiners, try to buy oil at prices that will benefit their margins in both the
short and long term. If it is believed that oil prices will rise in the future (indicated by
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futures prices being higher than present prices), purchasers will want to stock up on oil at
lower prices today and put it in inventory; this drives up demand for crude in the present,
forcing oil prices up in the present. Thus, it is argued, high prices for oil futures leads to
high prices for oil in the present.
The Very Long Term View. The very long term view is much the same. Since 1869
US crude oil prices adjusted for inflation have averaged $21.05 per barrel in 2006 dollars
compared to $21.66 for world oil prices.
Fifty percent of the time U.S. and world prices were below the median oil price of
$16.71 per barrel.
If long term history is a guide, those in the upstream segment of the crude oil
industry should structure their business to be able to operate with a profit, below $16.71
per barrel half of the time. The very long term data and the post World War II data
suggest a "normal" price far below the current price.

Figure 3.4 World oil production.
Source: www.wikinvest.com (02/26/10).
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3.2

Causes of Rise or Fall of Oil Prices

Crude oil prices behave much as any other commodity with wide price swings in times of
shortage or oversupply. The crude oil price cycle may extend over several years
responding to changes in demand as well as OPEC and non-OPEC supply.
3.2.1 Demand Growth Forces Prices Up
Demand for oil, as well as demand for energy in general, is closely tied to the global
economic cycle. In periods of economic growth, new factories consume energy, shipping
companies transport more goods and consumers take more trips. This demand for
energy—or even news suggesting the economy is heating up—pushes up energy prices.
For example, the five major central banks announced in December 2007 that they
would pump money into the world economy to help mitigate the possibility of a
recession; immediately, the price of oil jumped over $4 at speculation that energy
demand would increase. Conversely, during periods of economic contraction such as
recessions, demand for oil and other types of energy tends to fall, leading to reductions in
price. In China, for example, manufacturing fell during July and August 2008, and oil
prices followed.
The Recent Drop in Oil Prices Due To Demand Destruction. Demand destruction primarily in the United States - is likely responsible for most of the drop in oil prices that
occurred during the third quarter of 2008, and the first quarter of 2010. According to an
Energy Information Administration (EIA) report, gasoline consumption in 2008 dropped
by 3.4 percent, or 320,000 bpd, from its 2007 levels, it further declined by 0.6 percent
throughout 2009, and twelve percent by January, 2010. In the first quarter of 2008,

39
trucking industry analyst Donald Broughton estimated that 42,000 trucks (over 2% of the
United States' fleet), came off the nation's highways. With nearly 1,000 trucking
companies filing for bankruptcy, the demand for diesel fuel dropped.
Much of this demand destruction was rooted in the 2007 Credit Crunch, the 2008
Financial Crisis, and the resulting recession in 2008 to 2010 - when unemployment rises,
people stop spending and start saving. When people stop spending, companies stop
producing. When companies stop producing, demand for energy falls. When demand for
energy falls, the price of oil falls. Hence, it is likely that oil prices will remain down until
the world economy recovers from its recession.
3.2.2 Production Cuts
The global oil supply is dependent on the ability of oil companies to produce and the
willingness of oil-exporting countries to export. Historically, periods of oil price spikes
have been caused by oil-exporting countries placing embargoes on certain countries. In
1973, for example, the world's largest oil cartel, OPEC, placed an embargo on oil exports
to the Netherlands and the United States, in response to the countries' support of Israel in
the Yom Kippur War; the price of oil acquired by refiners increased by approximately
100%, and the U.S. experienced widespread shortages. In 2007, however, despite a 57%
increase in prices, the amount of oil exported by the world's top exporters fell by 2.5%.
Demand for oil in the world's six largest exporters (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,
Iran, Kuwait, Iraq and Qatar) increased by more than 300,000 barrels, while their exports
fell by over half a million barrels. In this case, growing demand in each company acted as
a natural embargo, forcing them to meet their own needs before exporting to the rest of
the world.
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The Financial Crisis of 2008 - 2010 has laid waste to oil prices, by causing a
recession so deep even expectations of large supply cuts cannot force prices up. Even
with OPEC’s cut in production of 2.2 million barrels in 2008, and 4.2 million barrels in
2009 - 2010 - its largest ever - oil futures still fell, as traders ignored decreasing supply
and focused on decreasing demand.
3.2.3 Violence against Producers
Since then, oil prices have been volatile because of geopolitical events affecting the
ability of upstream oil companies to produce. Terrorist and political attacks can damage
drilling rigs or the transportation and refining networks -- including pipelines, shipping
facilities, and refineries -- that bring oil from where it is extracted to the consumer.
During the spring of 2008, for example, Nigerian rebels initiated attacks on the oil
majors' pipelines and deepwater drilling rigs in the country. Despite the fact that OPEC's
lead producer, Saudi Arabia, announced it would increase production by 2%, a rebel
attack on one of Shell's deepwater rigs sent prices to $136.
3.2.4 Weather
Strong hurricane seasons can damage offshore oil platforms, reducing the amount of oil
produced. Supply can also be artificially reduced or increased by government taxes or
subsidies on oil production.
3.2.5 Transportation Bottlenecks
When there are problems with the pipelines that transport oil, it can't get to market; this
effectively reduces the supply of crude oil to the world's refiners, causing the supply of
refined products to fall. When supplies fall, prices rise. On March 28th, 2008, the day
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after the bombing of one of Iraq's primary export charges, Brent crude rose on the
London exchange by $1.01.
3.2.6 Peak Oil and Declining Production
Peak oil refers to the "peak" on the graph of global oil production. Oil must first be
discovered, then produced, and will eventually be depleted. Peak Oil is not a theory. It is
a fact. Oil has already peaked in the USA and more than 50 other oil producing countries.
Oil has a finite supply, so, just the same as the production of any geological commodity,
oil production will graphically (mathematically) "peak" and then irreversibly decline.—
PGS analyst 00:21, March 2, 2009 (PST)
Once the halfway point "peak" has been passed, production begins to fall and oil
prices will rise. Peak Oil is sometimes misunderstood to mean that "we are running out."
However, the peak only means we are halfway and there is plenty of oil left, and even
conservative estimates are of at least 1.3 Trillion barrels left. The problem is that the oil
that is left will not be produced fast enough to meet current or projected needs!—PGS
analyst 00:21, March 2, 2009 (PST)
The timing of the peak in global oil production is highly controversial because of
the political and economic impacts expected from Peak Oil including the impact on the
stocks of all companies in the global marketplace dependent upon oil for its main source
of energy. Many analysts believe Peak Oil is imminent, even though estimates of the
exact year of the peak vary widely from 2010 to 2050 or beyond. However, some
analysts, such as Matthew Simmons, have concluded that global oil production has
already peaked and present credible evidence that it has. –PGS analyst 00:21, March 2,
2009 (PST).
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Currently being analyzed and discussed is the issue of whether Peak Oil is being
"masked" by the drop in demand due to the global economic crisis and that maybe the
Peak is being shaped into more of a plateau. This would be similar to the Peak in US oil
production that was predicted as early as 1956 and subsequently actually occurred in
1971, but was not confirmed until about 1974. The fact that the actual Peak cannot be
accurately predicted, but will only be confirmed years later suggests that aggressive
action should be taken to alleviate the economic and political impacts of Peak Oil well
before the Peak. Unfortunately, it may already be too late to plan intelligently for Peak
Oil impacts and the world now faces extreme distress, in securities markets and
otherwise.—PGS analyst 00:21, March 2, 2009 (PST)
Theories that opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and offshore drilling
sites in the U.S. to development would alleviate gasoline prices are likely misguided; Jim
Sweeney, director of the Precourt Institute for Energy Efficiency at Stanford University,
says that offshore U.S. reserves would account for just 1% of worldwide consumption,
but wouldn't be productive for 10-15 years.
3.2.7 U.S. Dollar Value Fluctuations Cause Positive Feedback on the Price of Oil
The United States imports much of its oil, and that oil is purchased abroad in U.S. dollars.
The price of oil, in fact, is pegged to the dollar. The changing value of the dollar in
comparison to other currencies impacts the price paid by end users. A strong dollar
means a lower price, in dollars, for oil, and a weak dollar means more dollars must be
spent to purchase the same amount of oil. Currency fluctuations are complex (for a more
complete discussion see currency fluctuations) but the value of a currency is impacted by
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the relative value of goods imported and exported by an economy (known as the trade
balance), its interest rates, the size of its national debt, and its economic growth.
3.2.8 Speculation
Some analysts believe that oil prices are at record highs because of speculation about the
‘future’ value of oil. Specifically, these analysts claim that the belief that oil supply is
lower than it is and the belief that future oil supply will be just as low has led traders to
inflate the prices of oil futures. When oil futures are traded, oil purchasers, like refiners,
try to buy oil at prices that will benefit their margins in both the short and long term. If it
is believed that oil prices will rise in the future (indicated by futures prices being higher
than present prices), purchasers will want to stock up on oil at lower prices today and put
it in inventory; this drives up demand for crude in the present, forcing oil prices up in the
present. Thus, high prices for futures oil leads to high prices for oil in the present.
OPEC, believes that record fuel prices are not a function of supply and demand,
but a function of Western government policy and rampant speculation, and has used this
belief as an excuse not to raise production by the amounts demanded by the West. While
much of the data shows that production has been slowing, it's likely that speculation
could account for some of the present price spikes.
When oil prices closed at record highs for five days in a row during the week of
May 5th, 2008, a House of Representatives committee announced an investigation
regarding the role of hedge funds and investment banks in pushing up prices. In June
2008, the U.S. commodities futures regulator announced new rules requiring daily large
trader reports, and position and accountability limits for foreign crude contracts traded in
the U.S.
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3.2.9 Contango Causes Some Oil Price Volatility
In early March, 2009, an April 2009 oil delivery contract traded for $38.10, while an
April 2010 contract traded for $50.26, making it $12.16 more profitable for oil companies
to hold onto their oil until April 2010. When the future price of a commodity (e.g. oil) is
higher than its present price, a situation known as "contango", it is more profitable for a
commodities producer (e.g. XOM) to store the commodity and sell it at a later date. This
causes oil price volatility through various channels: for example, storage of a commodity
causes supply to be reduced in the present, raising spot prices, while expectations
regarding future supply increase - thereby reversing the cycle, which then causes
contango all over again. The wider the spread between the present price and a future
price, the heavier the contango and the heavier the volatility.
3.2.10 Wars
There have being so many wars in history, which have had a direct cause in the
availability and prices of crude and petroleum products. Two of these wars are discussed
below.
3.2.10.1 Yom Kippur War - Arab Oil Embargo.

In 1972 the price of crude oil

was about $3.00 per barrel and by the end of 1974 the price of oil had quadrupled to over
$12.00. The Yom Kippur War started with an attack on Israel by Syria and Egypt on
October 5, 1973. The United States and many countries in the western world showed
support for Israel. As a result of this support several Arab exporting nations imposed an
embargo on the countries supporting Israel. While Arab nations curtailed production by 5
million barrels per day (MMBPD) about 1 MMBPD was made up by increased
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production in other countries. The net loss of 4 MMBPD extended through March of
1974 and represented 7 percent of the free world production.
If there was any doubt that the ability to control crude oil prices had passed from
the United States to OPEC it was removed during the Arab Oil Embargo. The extreme
sensitivity of prices to supply shortages became all too apparent when prices increased
400 percent in six short months.
From 1974 to 1978 world crude oil prices was relatively flat ranging from $12.21
per barrel to $13.55 per barrel. When adjusted for inflation the price over that period of
time world oil prices were in a period of moderate decline.
3.2.10.2 Crises in Iran and Iraq.

Events in Iran and Iraq led to another round

of crude oil price increases in 1979 and 1980. The Iranian revolution resulted in the loss
of 2 to 2.5 million barrels per day of oil production between November, 1978 and June,
1979. At one point production almost halted.
While the Iranian revolution was the proximate cause of what would be the
highest prices in post-WWII history, its impact on prices would have been limited and of
relatively short duration had it not been for subsequent events. Shortly after the
revolution production was up to 4 million barrels per day.
Iran weakened by the revolution was invaded by Iraq in September, 1980. By
November the combined production of both countries was only a million barrels per day
and 6.5 million barrels per day less than a year before. As a consequence worldwide
crude oil production was 10 percent lower than in 1979.
The combination of the Iranian revolution and the Iraq-Iran War cause crude oil
prices to more than double increasing from $14 in 1978 to $35 per barrel in 1981.
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Twenty-six years later Iran's production is only two-thirds of the level reached under the
government of Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran. Iraq's production remains about 1.5
million barrels below its peak before the Iraq-Iran War.
3.2.11 Negative Feedback on Rising Prices Offsets Some of the Increases
Rising oil prices can force major purchasers of oil to turn to other fuel types. The U.S.
Military, for example, in May of 2008 tested a jet that broke the sound barrier using
synthetic fuel. The military is the largest single consumer of oil in the U.S., at 1.5% the
country's total, and rising oil prices drove the Defense Department's energy bill up 25%
in 2007. Since estimates stated that commercial-scale synthetic-fuel refineries could sell
the fuel at just $55 a barrel, the military has started pushing away from oil - which could
actually drive oil prices down.
The Chinese government was also forced to act on rising global oil prices. On
June 20th, China announced that it had raised diesel prices by 18% and gasoline prices by
16%; oil prices on world futures markets immediately fell by $4, as higher prices in
China were expected to lead to decreased demand in China, thereby leading to decreased
world demand.
Even regular consumers were forced by soaring fuel prices to change their habits,
turning to gas-efficient cars or simply driving less; gasoline demand in the U.S. fell at the
beginning of June 2008 by 3.8% from the year before, while consumption fell 1.9%.
3.2.12 US Oil Price Controls - Bad Policy?
The rapid increase in crude prices from 1973 to 1981 would have been much less were it
not for United States energy policy during the post Embargo period. The US imposed
price controls on domestically produced oil in an attempt to lessen the impact of the
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1973-74 price increase. The obvious result of the price controls was that U.S. consumers
of crude oil paid about 50 percent more for imports than domestic production and U.S
producers received less than world market price. In effect, the domestic petroleum
industry was subsidizing the U.S. consumer.
Did the policy achieve its goal? In the short term, the recession induced by the
1973-1974 crude oil price rise was less because U.S. consumers faced lower prices than
the rest of the world. However, it had other effects as well.
In the absence of price controls U.S. exploration and production would certainly
have been significantly greater. Higher petroleum prices faced by consumers would have
resulted in lower rates of consumption: automobiles would have had higher miles per
gallon sooner, homes and commercial buildings would have been better insulated and
improvements in industrial energy efficiency would have been greater than they were
during this period. As a consequence, the United States would have been less dependent
on imports in 1979-1980 and the price increase in response to Iranian and Iraqi supply
interruptions would have been significantly less.
3.2.13 OPEC's Failure to Control Crude Oil Prices
OPEC has seldom been effective at controlling prices. While often referred to as a cartel,
OPEC does not satisfy the definition. One of the primary requirements is a mechanism to
enforce member quotas. The old joke went something like this. What is the difference
between OPEC and the Texas Railroad Commission? OPEC doesn't have any Texas
Rangers! The only enforcement mechanism that has ever existed in OPEC was Saudi
spare capacity
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With enough spare capacity at times to be able to increase production sufficiently
to offset the impact of lower prices on its own revenue, Saudi Arabia could enforce
discipline by threatening to increase production enough to crash prices. In reality even
this was not an OPEC enforcement mechanism unless OPEC's goals coincided with those
of Saudi Arabia.
During the 1979-1980 periods of rapidly increasing prices, Saudi Arabia's oil
minister Ahmed Yamani repeatedly warned other members of OPEC that high prices
would lead to a reduction in demand. His warnings fell on deaf ears.
Surging prices caused several reactions among consumers: better insulation in
new homes, increased insulation in many older homes, and more energy efficiency in
industrial processes, and automobiles with higher efficiency. These factors along with a
global recession caused a reduction in demand which led to falling crude prices.
Unfortunately for OPEC only the global recession was temporary. Nobody rushed to
remove insulation from their homes or to replace energy efficient plants and equipment -much of the reaction to the oil price increase of the end of the decade was permanent and
would never respond to lower prices with increased consumption of oil.
Higher prices also resulted in increased exploration and production outside of
OPEC. From 1980 to 1986 non-OPEC production increased 10 million barrels per day.
OPEC was faced with lower demand and higher supply from outside the organization.
From 1982 to 1985, OPEC attempted to set production quotas low enough to
stabilize prices. These attempts met with repeated failure as various members of
OPEC produced beyond their quotas. During most of this period Saudi Arabia acted as
the swing producer cutting its production in an attempt to stem the free fall in prices. In
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August of 1985, the Saudis tired of this role. They linked their oil price to the spot
market for crude and by early 1986 increased production from 2 MMBPD to 5 MMBPD.
Crude oil prices plummeted below $10 per barrel by mid-1986. Despite the fall in prices
Saudi revenue remained about the same with higher volumes compensating for lower
prices.
A December 1986 OPEC price accord set to target $18 per barrel bit it was
already breaking down by January of 1987and prices remained weak.
The price of crude oil spiked in 1990 with the lower production and uncertainty
associated with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War. The world and
particularly the Middle East had a much harsher view of Saddam Hussein invading Arab
Kuwait than they did Persian Iran. The proximity to the world's largest oil producer
helped to shape the reaction.
Following what became known as the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait crude oil
prices entered a period of steady decline until in 1994 inflation adjusted prices attained
their lowest level since 1973.
The price cycle then turned up. The United States economy was strong and the
Asian Pacific region was booming. From 1990 to 1997 world oil consumption increased
6.2 million barrels per day. Asian consumption accounted for all but 300,000 barrels per
day of that gain and contributed to a price recovery that extended into 1997. Declining
Russian production contributed to the price recovery. Between 1990 and 1996 Russian
production declined over 5 million barrels per day.
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Figure 3.5 US oil price controls, 1973 – 1981.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).

Figure 3.6 World events and crude oil prices, 1981-1998.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).
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Figure 3.7 US petroleum consumption.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).

Russian production increases dominated non-OPEC production growth from 2000
forward and was responsible for most of the non-OPEC increase since the turn of the
century.
Once again it appeared that OPEC overshot the mark. In 2001, a weakened US
economy and increases in non-OPEC production put downward pressure on prices. In
response OPEC once again entered into a series of reductions in member quotas cutting
3.5 million barrels by September 1, 2001. In the absence of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attack this would have been sufficient to moderate or even reverse the trend.
In the wake of the attack crude oil prices plummeted. Spot prices for the U.S.
benchmark West Texas Intermediate were down 35 percent by the middle of November.
Under normal circumstances a drop in price of this magnitude would have resulted in
another round of quota reductions but given the political climate OPEC delayed
additional cuts until January 2002. It then reduced its quota by 1.5 million barrels per day
and was joined by several non-OPEC producers including Russia who promised
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combined production cuts of an additional 462,500 barrels. This had the desired effect
with oil prices moving into the $25 range by March, 2002. By mid-year the non-OPEC
members were restoring their production cuts but prices continued to rise and U.S.
inventories reached a 20-year low later in the year.

Figure 3.8 Crude oil production (Non-OPEC) 1973-2009.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).
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Figure 3.9 Crude oil production (OPEC) 1973-2009.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).

Figure 3.10 Russian crude oil production.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).
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OPEC continued to have mixed success in controlling prices. There were mistakes
in timing of quota changes as well as the usual problems in maintaining production
discipline among its member countries.
The price increases came to a rapid end in 1997 and 1998 when the impact of the
economic crisis in Asia was either ignored or severely underestimated by OPEC. In
December, 1997 OPEC increased its quota by 2.5 million barrels per day (10 percent) to
27.5 MMBPD effective January 1, 1998. The rapid growth in Asian economies had come
to a halt. In 1998 Asian Pacific oil consumption declined for the first time since 1982.
The combination of lower consumption and higher OPEC production sent prices into a
downward spiral. In response, OPEC cut quotas by 1.25 million b/d in April and another
1.335 million in July. Price continued down through December 1998.
Prices began to recover in early 1999 and OPEC reduced production another
1.719 million barrels in April. As usual not all of the quotas were observed but between
early 1998 and the middle of 1999 OPEC production dropped by about 3 million barrels
per day and was sufficient to move prices above $25 per barrel.
With minimal Y2K problems and growing US and world economies the price
continued to rise throughout 2000 to a post 1981 high. Between April and October, 2000
three successive OPEC quota increases totaling 3.2 million barrels per day were not able
to stem the price increases. Prices finally started down following another quota increase
of 500,000 effective November 1, 2000.
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Figure 3.11 World events and crude oil prices 1997-2003.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).

Figure 3.12 OPEC production 1990-2007.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).

By year end oversupply was not a problem. Problems in Venezuela led to a strike
at PDVSA causing Venezuelan production to plummet. In the wake of the strike
Venezuela was never able to restore capacity to its previous level and is still about
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900,000 barrels per day below its peak capacity of 3.5 million barrels per day. OPEC
increased quotas by 2.8 million barrels per day in January and February, 2003.
On March 19, 2003, just as some Venezuelan production was beginning to return,
military action commenced in Iraq. Meanwhile, inventories remained low in the U.S. and
other OECD countries. With an improving economy U.S. demand was increasing and
Asian demand for crude oil was growing at a rapid pace.
The loss of production capacity in Iraq and Venezuela combined with increased
OPEC production to meet growing international demand led to the erosion of excess oil
production capacity. In mid 2002, there was over 6 million barrels per day of excess
production capacity and by mid-2003 the excess was below 2 million. During much of
2004 and 2005 the spare capacity to produce oil was under a million barrels per day. A
million barrels per day is not enough spare capacity to cover an interruption of supply
from most OPEC producers.
In a world that consumes over 80 million barrels per day of petroleum products
that added a significant risk premium to crude oil price and is largely responsible for
prices in excess of $40-$50 per barrel.
Other major factors contributing to the current level of prices include a weak
dollar and the continued rapid growth in Asian economies and their petroleum
consumption. The 2005 hurricanes and U.S. refinery problems associated with the
conversion from MTBE as an additive to ethanol have contributed to higher prices.
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Figure 3.13 World events and crude oil prices 2001-2007.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).

Figure 3.14 Venezuelan oil production.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).

One of the most important factors supporting a high price is the level of petroleum
inventories in the U.S. and other consuming countries. Until spare capacity became an
issue inventory levels provided an excellent tool for short-term price forecasts. Although
not well publicized OPEC has for several years depended on a policy that amounts to
world inventory management. Its primary reason for cutting back on production in
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November, 2006 and again in February, 2007 was concern about growing OECD
inventories. Their focus is on total petroleum inventories including crude oil and
petroleum products, which are a better indicator of prices that oil inventories alone.

Figure 3.15 Excess crude oil production capacity.
Source: www.wtrg.com (02/26/10).

3.3 Analysis of Events Affecting Oil Prices between July 2008 and May, 2010
•

July 14th, 2008: After oil prices reached new highs of $147 the week before,
U.S. President George W. Bush lifted the Executive Ban on Offshore Drilling in
an effort to expand domestic oil supplies; because offshore reserves will take
years to start producing, however, oil futures fell marginally, settling over $145
per barrel.

•

July 15th, 2008: After Ben Bernanke told Congress that high energy prices
were creating an inflationary environment, worries about how high energy
prices were affecting the economy caused a run on August futures, plummeting
the price of oil by 4%, to $138.74 - the greatest single-day drop in 20 years.

•

July 30th, 2008: Reports of low consumer demand for gasoline causing
suppliers to cut stocks by 3.5 million barrels drive oil prices up by $4.39, to
$127.10.

•

August 13th, 2008: Crude futures settle at $113.77 on worries about a
strengthening dollar and declining demand in industrial nations.
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•

September 2nd, 2008: Oil prices drop to just over $105 per barrel after
Hurricane Gustav doesn't do nearly as much damage to oil production as
expected.

•

September 9th, 2008: Oil prices fell to $103.26, as forecasts of impending
Hurricane Ike project it to hit land south of major Texas refineries.

•

September 15th, 2008: Oil prices fell below $97 during early trading. Causes
speculated on range from lower-than-expected damage from Hurricane Ike to
the deepening economic crisis in the U.S., fueled by the collapses of Freddie
Mac, Fannie Mae, and Lehman Brothers, the crumbling of other major banks
like Wachovia and Washington Mutual, and the growing consolidation of the
industry as seen in the acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America.

•

October 10th, 2008: Oil prices slide all week, closing at $77.70 on the
NYMEX, as fears over global recession lead to panic in the market.

•

October 13th, 2008: Oil prices rebound on fickle investor sentiment, rising
back above $80 to $81.19. Goldman, however, revises its projections for yearend oil prices down to $70 from $115.

•

November 18th, 2008: NYMEX WTI December contracts fell below
$55/barrel, to $54.50, on continued investor worries that the global economy is
entering a prolonged recession.

•

December 2nd, 2008: Prices drop to $47.36 after the National Bureau of
Economic Research announced that the U.S. is officially in a recession.

•

December 10th, 2008: Crude Oil is at $43.25.

•

January 6th, 2009: As Israel's invasion of Gaza and it's fighting with Hamas
escalates, crude prices shoot up, with February Brent crude futures rising $2.71
to $49.62 per barrel.

•

January 8th, 2009: U.S. government reports of increased crude and gas
inventories forces NYMEX WTI February contracts down by $3.24, to $45.34.

•

March 18th, 2009: Oil falls to $48.14, as government data shows inventories of
gasoline have risen by 3.2 million barrels, contradicting analyst expectations of
a decline of 2.1 million barrels.

•

May 8th, 2009: WTI rises to $58.57, its highest point in 2009, thanks to investor
expectations that the worst of the recession had passed. Other commodities
surged as well.
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•

May 12th, 2009: Oil hits $60.08 before settling back down to $58.85, rising
above $60 for the first time since November 2008. Many have explained the
surge as the result of a drop in the relative value of the dollar.

•

May 29th, 2009: Contracts for July deliveries of WTI rise to $64.65, after
OPEC announces it will maintain production, rather than cut it, because of
strengthening in global demand.

•

June 9th, 2009: July contracts for light, sweet crude settled at $70.01, breaking
$70 for the first time in 7 months; speculation about rampant speculation is
rampant.

•

June 15th, 2009: On statements by the Russian Finance Minister regarding the
stability of the dollar as the global reserve currency, the dollar appreciated,
pushing oil prices briefly below $70.

•

July 7th, 2009: Oil prices fall to $64.05 a barrel, despite attacks on oil
infrastructure by Nigerian rebels, as new unemployment numbers in the
developed world cause investor optimism to take a hit.

•

December 7th, 2009: Oil prices closed at a seven-week low at $75.47. Even
with this drop oil prices continue to stay relatively high even with increases in
production and dropping demand in the U.S. Rising inventories and production
are serving increased demand from China and India.

•

January 28th, 2010: As U.S. demand for oil products continues to slip, prices
closed at the lowest level in a month at $73.67. The EIA reported a drop in U.S.
crude inventories of 3.9 million barrels while gasoline stockpiles rose by 2
million barrels. Refining hit a 13 year low of 13.6 million b/d for the time of
year. Oil prices dropped 12 percent since January 11th on concerns about the
growth of economies for the U.S. and China.

•

February 18th, 2010: Oil prices were volatile during the week closing at $77.33
on the 17th. Prices were affected by movement of the euro and news toward a
U.S. economic recovery. The API reported that U.S. crude inventories fell by
63,000 barrels and as a potential indicator of weak demand, inventories for
gasoline and distillates increased by nearly 3 million barrels. It was reported that
U.S. gasoline demand fell to the lowest levels since the 2008 gulf hurricanes,
which could partially be attributed to record snowstorms across much of the
U.S.

•

April 20, 2010: Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico. 11 workers died in
the worst oil drilling disaster in the waters off the coast of the United States.
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3.4 Who Benefits from Rising Oil Prices and Loses from Falling Oil Prices

•

Alternative energies like wind, solar, and geothermal, as well as alternative fuels
like biofuels, ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, and fuel cells all see increases in
demand when the price of oil, their main competitor, increases.

•

Coal companies like Peabody Energy, Arch Coal, CONSOL Energy, and
Massey Energy Company see sales growth, as rising oil prices cause consumers
to demand more local sources of energy; the U.S. is the world's second largest
coal producer, after China, and there are estimates stating that U.S. coal deposits
have more energy than the world's remaining oil reserves.

•

Hybrid car manufacturers like Toyota, Honda, GM, Ford, and Nissan benefit
from higher oil prices because high oil prices lead to higher gas prices, causing
consumers to seek out ways to reduce the amount of gasoline they use. Auto
makers that have announced plans to produce electric cars also can benefit, and
will if oil prices start to rise again over the next few years; these companies
include Daimler, Renault, Toyota, General Motors, and Mitsubishi.

•

Independent Oil and Gas companies benefit the most from high oil prices, as
they can extract crude at a relatively constant cost from a reserve, but sell it at
higher and higher prices. The higher the price of oil, the larger an EandP
company's margins.

•

Oilfield services see day rates (and, thus, margins) skyrocket, as upstream oil
companies scramble to increase production, causing demand for drilling rigs and
other oilfield services go through the roof. Machine tools and accessories
companies also benefit, as they sell individual parts to oilfield services
companies that build, retrofit, and repair rigs.

•

Deepwater drilling contractors like Transocean and Diamond Offshore Drilling
are even better off than their peers in the oilfield services industry; there are far
fewer deepwater rigs in the world than normal rigs, and with conventional wells
drying up, oil companies have been willing to pay more to get at the difficult-toreach reserves. Before the oil price collapse in the middle of 2008, floating
offshore rigs could go as high as $292,000, while deepwater oil exploration rigs
were contracting at above $800,000 per day.

•

The oil majors are the very largest of the non-national oil companies, and are
vertically integrated. These companies explore for and produce crude oil and
natural gas; they transport it by pipeline and tanker; they refine crude oil into
finished petroleum products; and they also market crude oil, natural gas, and
refined petroleum products to industrial users and retail consumers. The majors
get most of their money from selling refined petroleum goods; vertical
integration allows them to sell high-priced crude to themselves at production
costs, causing the margins on these goods to go through the roof. Often,
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however, they must buy crude to supplement their own production, as their
refining capacities are greater than their upstream production capacities. This
offsets some of their profitability.
•

Industrial gases vendors such as Praxair (PX) benefit from high prices because
they sell hydrogen, which is necessary for the extraction of heavy and nonconventional oil (i.e. tar sands, shale oil), and production of these types of oil
increases as prices rise.

•

With the price of oil having been above $100 per barrel, the world's waste
management companies (like Waste Management (WMI)) are considering
"landfill mining", as high-quality polyethylene prices have doubled since the
summer of 2007, making the world's trash landfill operators' treasure.

3.5

Who Loses from Rising Oil Prices and Wins from Falling Oil Prices

Rising oil prices pose challenges for many companies as well as consumers, which is
why rising oil prices are often seen as damaging to the economy.

•

Rising oil prices increase costs for many companies. These costs may be
difficult to pass on to customers, who are loathed to pay more for the same
goods, thereby eroding profit margins.

•

Rising oil prices reduce consumer demand for products that consume oil.

•

Rising oil prices make travel and shipping more expensive.
Oil and Gas Refining and Marketing companies buy crude oil, process it, and sell

the processed product to the end market. Companies like Sunoco, Valero, and Western
Refining are all prolific U.S. refiners. When these companies must purchase crude oil at a
higher price, they then have to sell the refined product (gasoline, jet fuel, diesel, etc.) at a
higher price, which then causes demand to drop as people travel less. Furthermore,
refined goods prices rise by a smaller amount than crude price. At the end of the 1990s,
oil traded below $20/barrel, while gasoline cost under $1.50. In June 2008, crude traded
at around $121 (after rising to over $135), while gasoline averaged $4.10. Oil prices rose
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by a factor of six, while gasoline prices rose by less than a factor of three. The clear
losers, in this case, are the companies that make and sell gasoline, though when oil prices
fall, they fall further than gasoline prices, making refiners the winners.

•

Shipping companies are harmed by higher oil prices because oil is necessary to
operate the planes, trucks, and ships that transport goods around the globe.
These companies include brand-name shipping companies like FedEx and UPS,
industrial shipping companies like TNT and Con-Way Trucking, and
international shipping companies like Teekay Shipping and Frontline. LTL
trucking companies, however, are relatively shielded from fluctuations in diesel
fuel prices, as the industry generally passes on fuel price surcharges to its
customers like Wal-Mart Stores (WMT). Also, aircraft leasing companies such
as Aircastle (AYR) are hurt by rising oil prices.

•

Airlines like Delta, Northwest, United, and American Airlines are harmed by
rising oil prices; in the past, jet fuel has accounted for 10-15% of an airline's
cost, but by mid-2008 they made up 30-50% of costs, albeit before the price
collapsed below $50/barrel.

•

The lodging industry sees declines in occupancy rates and revenues when oil
prices rise, as higher travel prices cause fewer consumers to take vacations.

•

Other vacation and travel alternatives (e.g. cruise lines like Royal Caribbean
Cruises and Carnival) see higher fuel costs, forcing them to raise prices and
drive potential customers away.

•

The Chemical industry is harmed by higher oil prices because petroleum is a key
ingredient in plastics. As the price of oil rises, plastics become more expensive
to produce, causing margins to shrink.

•

The retail industry is harmed by rising oil prices because shipping companies
charge higher prices, making it more difficult for retailers to get their products to
market and forcing them to raise prices. Discount retailers, including Family
Dollar Stores, Dollar Tree Stores, Big Lots, Wal-Mart, Target and Dollar
General are especially exposed as their consumers generally have lower
incomes, making them more sensitive to rising energy prices.

•

Online retailers that subsidize the cost of shipping, like Amazon.com and
Overstock.com, are forced to pay part of the shipping price increases, causing
margins to shrink.

•

Car companies that are heavily dependent on sales of SUVs for profits, such as
General Motors and Ford, see fewer sales as consumers tend to reduce their
purchases "gas-guzzlers" when oil prices are high.
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•

Automotive parts retailers like AutoZone, Advance Auto Parts, and O'Reilly
Automotive, who depend on heavy driving and automotive wear-and-tear,
struggle when drivers conserve due to high oil prices and demand fewer repairs.

•

Automotive retailers like AutoNation and CARMAX depend on replacement
demand for new cars due to wear-and-tear, which decreases as fewer people
drive.

•

Chinese manufacturers lose their low-cost production advantage, as rising oil
prices cause the prices of whatever is being shipped from China to be artificially
inflated. Lower oil prices, at around $20/barrel, were equivalent to low tariff
rates (about 3%). With the oil that was being used in shipping during the 2nd
quarter of 2008, the equivalent tariff rate was around 9% and rising (until the
bubble burst).

3.6

Chapter Conclusion

From the above narratives it is clear that a lot of instability has occurred and is still
occurring in the oil and gas sector supply chain. In this study models which will enable
the risk ratings of the impacts of these events and activities on the supply chain to be
derived will be developed, and also try to determine its economic impact on both a
generalized and site specific supply chains.
The figures in this chapter will be analyzed, to derive the probability and
consequences of some of the events and activities on the supply chain, which will
enhance the chances of successful modeling in the succeeding chapters.
The events will be categorized as either short term or long term events. Some long
term events and activities to be analyzed are;

•

political instability (terrorism, wars)

•

demand growth

•

production cuts
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•

violence against producers

•

weather

•

transportation bottlenecks

•

peak-oil and declining production

•

dollar fluctuations

•

speculation
While the some short term events to be analyzed are:

•

Pipe leaks/breaks

•

Redundancy failures

•

Refinery fire/explosion

•

Power outage

•

Tank farm crack/leaks

CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

4.1

Research Overview

The energy sector faces a broad array of uncertainties and risks, in supply, demand,
transportation and market conditions. These uncertainties and risks that can interrupt the
supply chain operations, causing significant adverse effects in the energy sector can be
caused by natural disasters, equipment failures or terrorist attacks, political, economical
or environmental concerns, speculation or sky-rocketing demands from emerging
economies.
It is important to develop a risk based optimization model using the oil and gas/
refinery critical infrastructure supply chain operations, to predict and manage these
uncertainties in the oil and gas critical infrastructure chain.
This research will endeavor to address these uncertainties and risks in the oil and
gas critical infrastructure supply chains by developing and analyzing different models
that can be used in achieving that.
These easy-to-use models which can be easily used by executives, risk/supply
chain/production managers, transportation and logistics personnel, suppliers and
regulators, academicians and students, and can also be applied also to other critical
infrastructure supply chains, by varying the variables are highlighted below in Sections
4.2 to 4.5.
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4.2

Events and Activities Risk Rating Model Analysis

The prototypical expression for risk in the homeland security context is traditionally
written as:

Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence

(4.1)

Where the total risk is the combination or Cartesian product of all relevant threat
types, system weaknesses, and consequences resulting from when the damage-inducing
mechanisms associated with the threats interact with the vulnerabilities. Risk, as equation
4.1 would suggest, tells a series of stories of all that could go wrong from initiating threat
event to final outcome, where the heart of these stories, that is, the vulnerabilities,
describe those weaknesses that must interact to make this scenario true. As a first step
toward a quantitative expression for vulnerability, it would seem that vulnerability
provides a mapping between the set of initiating threat events and the set of outcomes,
such as is shown in Figure 4.1. In this view, any statement of vulnerability to a given
initiating threat event must always be in reference to some degree of loss or adverse
outcome, whether descriptive, qualitative, or quantitative in nature. Generic statements,
such as “my vulnerability is high,” are inherently ambiguous unless they are associated
with some particular consequence, if even expressed on an arbitrarily constructed or
vaguely defined scale (e.g., “my vulnerability to significant consequences is high”).
In their seminal paper, Kaplan and Garrick (1981) put forth a quantitative
definition of risk that is derived from the answers to three fundamental risk questions:
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•

What can go wrong? - Risk

•

How likely is it to go wrong? - Vulnerability

•

What are the ensuing consequences? - Risk
The first question establishes a complete set of risk scenarios in narrative form

and provides the basis for evaluation and quantification. As later elaborated by Kaplan et
al. (2004), the level of specificity and detail chosen to articulate each scenario greatly
affects how likelihood and consequence are assessed. Given a set of all possible scenarios
of a specified type, highly detailed scenarios are larger in number and require more
analytical effort to ascertain and assess, but provide a high resolution account and
understanding of total risk. In contrast, less specific scenarios are fewer in number, but
coincide with a greater uncertainty in the loss dimension to account for inexplicit
variations in the nature and sequence of events between cause and consequence. For
example, consider the very specific scenario “a medium-sized car bomb attack occurring
at the federal building in downtown at 9:00am next Thursday.” The details of this
scenario permit a very good assessment of vulnerability to different degrees of loss given
its occurrence, but completing the risk picture requires the decision maker to consider all
variations that account for different times, days, locations, delivery systems, and threat
types. A less specific version of this scenario is “an explosive attack occurring in the
region sometime in the next year” is inclusive of all specific scenarios of the previous
example, but as such it is difficult make an all-encompassing assessment of overall
vulnerability due to the wide variations in circumstances. Since vulnerability was defined
to be a mapping from cause to consequence, it is thus important to construct scenarios
that permit meaningful statements of vulnerability.
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Given a scenario, the risk, Rij, can be expressed mathematically as the triplet of a
scenario, ei (i = 1, 2, . . . m), the probability/vulnerability of this scenario( that is the
overall vulnerability), pij/ VT (cj,ei), and consequence, cj (j = 1, 2, . . . n), as follows:

Rij = (ei,vT,cj)

(4.2)

The equation above defines the risk triplet (Kaplan and Garrick 1981), where the
scenario provides a narrative of a situation, the consequence is a valuation on the final
outcome resulting from this situation, and the probability measures the likelihood that
scenario ei will lead to the consequence cj or the vulnerability of node/route vT. The total
risk, R, is the set of all ordered triples, i.e., R = {Rij}. The vulnerability vT of the node can
be derived from equation 4.3 below:

VT(cj,ei)= Σ Σ (1-Is(ei))(1-Ik(ei))(1-IH(ei,dk))(1-IR(cj,cp,m))(1-II(cp,m,dk))

(4.3)

In other to derive the node/route vulnerability to an event or a threat scenario in
equation 4.3 above, we will try to explain how they will be derived based on both the
protection and response mechanisms that are in place to minimize or eliminate the
successful occurance of any such event.
McGill and Ayyub (2007) explores the concept of vulnerability in the context of
critical infrastructure protection with the intent to establish an operational definition that
provides a basis for meaningful measurement, by following a systematic consideration of
the general elements of risk by observing that vulnerability as a notion provides a
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mapping between an initiating threat event and a resulting degree of loss. They proposed
a mathematical expression for overall vulnerability that divides the notion into two
categories - protection vulnerability that focuses on those aspects of a system that
influence the probability of damage or compromise given the occurrence of an initiating
threat event ( e.g., security system weaknesses, target accessibility, and fragility of
targets), and response vulnerability that focuses on those aspects of a system that
influence the probability of a specified degree of loss given damage or compromise ( e.g.,
intrinsic resistance to loss and effectiveness of response and recovery capabilities
4.2.1 Protection Vulnerability
The category protection vulnerabilities consider all contributors to overall vulnerability
between the initiating threat event and damage of targets. That is, given the occurrence of
an initiating threat event, protection vulnerability measures the probability of suffering a
specified level of damage, whether in terms of damage or compromise of affected
elements or size of an exposed human population. If damage cannot be reliably prevented
following an initiating threat event, a target is vulnerable unless the system compensates
with suitable strategies to control the ensuing losses. According to the event tree in
Figure 4.2, a simple mathematical expression for protection vulnerability, Vp (ei,dk) to a

specified level of damage, dk ∈ D, where D is a set of damage states, can be obtained as

follows:
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Vp(ei,dk)=Pr(S|ei)Pr(K|S,ei)Pr(dk|K,S,ei)

(4.4)

Where Pr(S | ei) is the probability of adversary success given the occurrence of the
initiating threat event, Pr (K | S,ei) is the probability that the target will be exposed to the
damage-inducing mechanisms of the threat given adversary success, and Pr(dk | K,S,ei) is
the probability of damage given exposure of the target. According to this equation, an
adversary must defeat a defender’s protective measures, successfully execute the
damage-inducing mechanisms of the attack, and then damage or compromise the target at
a specified level, dk, to achieve success. Equation 4.4 assumes that failure of the attacker
to overcome the security system OR failure of the attacker to successfully execute his
attack given the opportunity OR failure of the attack to cause damage dk will result in no
loss. Expressed in terms of favorable defender characteristics, Equation 4.4 can be
rewritten as:

Vp(ei,dk)=(1-Is(ei))(1-Ik(ei))(1-IH(ei,dk))

(4.5)

Where:
IS(ei)=1–Pr(S|ei) is the effectiveness of security system interventions with respect
to initiating threat event ei,
IK(ei) = 1 – Pr(K | S,ei) is the effectiveness of interventions (intrinsic and
extrinsic) that seek to deny execution of the attack against the specified target according
to ei given defeat of the defender force, and
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IH(ei, dk) = 1 – Pr(dk | K,S,ei) measures the effectiveness of hardness interventions
(intrinsic and extrinsic) of the target that minimize the ability to achieve damage state dk
given exposure to the damage-inducing mechanisms associated with ei.
Based on Equations 4.4 and 4.5, the three primary dimensions of protection
vulnerability are security system weaknesses, target accessibility, and fragility of target
elements.
In the event of no security, complete target accessibility, and fragile targets,
IS = IK = IH = 0 and VP = 1.
Note that for natural hazards, IS = 0 and IK = 0 since at the present time few
feasible interventions are available to stop natural events once they are initiated.
According to these simplifications, Equation 4.5 can be rewritten for natural hazards as:

Vp (ei,dk)=(1-IH(ei,dk))

(4.6)

4.2.2 Response Vulnerability
The category response vulnerabilities consists of all contributors to vulnerability that
influence the degree of loss that would be realized given that specified initiating threat
event ei resulted in damage state dk. That is, response vulnerability measures the
probability of a specified consequence or outcome associated with a given damage state.
If loss cannot be effectively controlled, then the asset is vulnerable unless this deficiency
is compensated for by effective protective measures that minimize probability of
adversary success. A simple mathematical expression for response vulnerability, VR (cj,
dk), for a given degree of loss, cj, resulting from damage state dk can be expressed as:
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VR(c,dk)=Σ|Pr(c | cp.m)Pr(cp,m| dk)

(4.7)

Where:
Pr (cp,m | dk) is the probability that a loss, cp,m, could result from damage state dk
(which is a measure of the intrinsic resistance of the target systems to loss).
Pr(cj | cp,m) is the probability that the actual loss is cj in light of the effectiveness
of response and recovery capabilities given that the unmitigated loss was cp,m, and the
summation is taken over all m states of unmitigated loss.
Equation 4.7 assumes that the response vulnerabilities are assessed independently
of the scenario that initiated damage state dk, which may be true for the “crisp”
consequence dimensions such as direct economic damage and number of fatalities, but
less true for the “softer,” less ascertainable dimensions such as psychological impact.
Expressed in terms of favorable defender characteristics, Equation 4.7 can be rewritten
as:

VR(cj,dk)=Σ (1-IR(cj,cp,m))(1-Ii(cp,m,dk))

(4.8)

Based on Equation 4.8, the two dimensions of response vulnerability are intrinsic
susceptibility of a system to loss following damage and the effectiveness of response and
recovery capabilities.
4.2.3 Overall Vulnerability
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Given the expressions for protection vulnerability, VP, and response vulnerability, VR, the
overall vulnerability, VT, of a target to a given degree of loss, L, resulting from initiating
threat event ei can be expressed as:

VT (cj,ei)=ΣVp(ei,dk)VR(cj,dk)

(4.9)

Using the expressions for VP in Equation 4.5 and VR in Equation 4.8, overall
vulnerability can be expressed in expanded form as:

VT(cj,ei)= Σ Σ (1-Is(ei))(1-Ik(ei))(1-IH(ei,dk))(1-IR(cj,cp,m))(1-II(cp,m,dk))

(4.10)

Where the summation is taken over all possible damage states k.
Equation 4.10 permits statements about the vulnerability of a system to a
specified degree of loss resulting from a specified initiating threat event. For example, a
team of analysts and engineers can employ Equation 4.10 to assess the overall
vulnerability of a company to 100 or more fatalities following a truck bomb attack in an
underground parking structure. To make statements about overall vulnerability of the
company to 100 or more fatalities resulting from an explosive or malicious attack in
general (considering all delivery modes, targets, and intrusion paths) requires an
aggregation of the overall vulnerability for each individual attack profile and initiating
threat event considered.
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For classes of natural hazard events, one could partition the set of initiating threat
events according to established intensity scales, such as the Saffir-Simpson scale for
tropical cyclones, Richter scale for earthquakes, or Fujita scale for tornadoes.
Given a complete set of initiating threat events, the overall vulnerability to loss
resulting from each initiating threat event is assessed by considering the effectiveness of
existing interventions for reducing protection vulnerability and response vulnerability in
light of the intensity of the damage-inducing mechanisms associated with the threat.
More specifically, the effectiveness of interventions (both extrinsic and intrinsic) to
improve security (IS), decrease target accessibility (IK), and enhance target hardness (IH)
are assessed with respect to each initiating threat event to determine the corresponding
probability of damage. Independent of an initiating threat event, the effectiveness of
interventions to improve intrinsic resistance to loss (II) and enhance response and
recovery capabilities (IR) is considered to determine the probability of realizing a
specified degree of loss given damage. That is, the assessment of protection vulnerability
considering IS, IK, and IH requires the analyst to specify a set of damage states, and the
assessment of response vulnerability considering II and IR requires the analyst to specify a
set of loss levels or ranges of interest. If it can be assumed that loss is tied strictly to
damage, then response vulnerability can be assessed independently of protection
vulnerability.
These risk ratings can either increase or decrease, based on the level of
vulnerability, critical nodes hardening, availability of redundancy, response package in
place and risk reducing mechanism inherent in each route.
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The events will be categorized as either short term or long term events. Some long
term events and activities to be analyzed are;
•

political instability (terrorism, wars)

•

demand growth

•

production cuts

•

violence against producers

•

weather

•

transportation bottlenecks

•

peak-oil and declining production

•

dollar fluctuations

•

speculation
While some short term events to be analyzed are:

•

Pipe leaks/breaks

•

Redundancy failures

•

Refinery fire/explosion

•

Power outage

•

Tank farm crack/leaks

4.3

Risk Based Network Reliability Analysis Model

A network reliability model using the risk based minimum cut-set method will be
developed to determine the impact of link failures from some of the events and threats we
analyzed their risk rating in Section 4.2 above, on the source-demand connectivity of the
oil and gas supply chain.
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The proposed model will be a modification of the work by Yang et al. (1996). In
their work they focused on the impact of link failures on source-demand connectivity,
which was used as a measure of the mechanical reliability of the network. The
mechanical reliability index was computed using the minimum cut-set method, with the
identification of these minimum cut-sets consisting of four stages:
i. For source – demand pairs.
ii. For individual demand nodes.
iii. For a group of demand nodes, and
iv. For all demand nodes in the system.
By using these multiple – stage approach, the total number of simulations
required in the analysis is greatly reduced. The minimum cut-set of all the links/chain in
the network will be determined by using the generalized network algorithm below to
solve the optimization model that will be used in the simulations.
In this work, the minimum cut-set model was modified by introducing risks into
the existing model.
The results obtained from this reliability analysis will then be used to locate
crucial links/chain in the network, whose failure will severely impair the source-demand
connectivity and proffer CIP that can be used to minimize/eliminate these vulnerabilities.
4.3.1 Network Representation
In their work, Yang et al. (1996) analyzed the interrelationship among various system
components of a water distribution system by transforming it into a network
representation of nodes and links. Water supply sources, demand points, junctions,
surface water reservoirs, and ground-water recharge basins are represented by nodes,
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while pipes, water treatment plants, pumping stations, and power plants are represented
as links.
In this study the modified model in the oil and gas sc will be applied, by first
transforming it into a network representation of nodes and links. Where the crude
sources, demand points, storage tanks, and refineries are considered as nodes, while, the
pipes, boat, ship and tankers, that is the transportation system, will be taken as links.
Then, the risk ratings of various nodes and links, based on some of the likely
events, activities, and threats from Section 4.2, that can impact the SC will be included in
trying to determine the critical nodes/links in the network which failure will affect the
overall network reliability.
The optimum resource allocation to mitigate and manage the impact of failure on
the SC network, by hardening these critical source-demand pairs will be shown using the
fault tree analysis in Section 4.5.
For this study, the focus is on whether a demand node can get petroleum products
from the available sources through the available refineries; therefore source-demand
connectivity is used as the criterion for defining system success. The results of this
research will be used to locate critical links in the network and also allocate resources to
harden and mitigate against failure, using the calculated risks of likely events or activities
that can impact the network causing failure of the supply chain network(s) (Note: failure
will be said to have occurred when the likely threat scenarios will lead to a calculated
risk that is greater than or equal to a threshold allowable risk for each source-demand
pair).
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If all intermediate nodes were assumed to be reliable, source-demand connectivity
can only be affected by the network configuration and the reliability of the links.
Connectivity between any two nodes in the oil and gas sc network will be based on two
factors, as put forward by Yang et al. (1996). That is
1. Existence, and
2. Availability of a connecting route.
It means that by design one specified node may not be reachable by another
specified node in the network. Even when there exist a connecting route between the two
nodes, their connectivity would be severed should one or more components on this route
fail.
4.3.2 Reliability of Oil and Gas Supply Chain Network
The source-demand connectivity will be evaluated at the four levels of progressive
aggregation and four respective reliability measures as defined by Yang et al. (1996).
These are
1. Source-demand pair reliability – the probability that a specified demand node is
connected to a specified source node.
2. Individual demand reliability – the probability that a specified demand node is
connected to at least one source node.
3. Group-demand reliability – the probability that each of the demand nodes in the
group is connected to at least one source node; and
4. System-demand reliability – the probability that each of the demand nodes in the
network is connected to at least one source node.
4.3.3 Minimum Cut-Set Method
The risk based minimum cut-set method will be used, to compute the network reliability
of the oil and gas sc. This involves the generation of a number of component failure
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events whose effects on the system will be determined one at a time, with its advantage
being that it can be easily programmed and implemented on a computer, in addition, that
they are directly related to the modes of system failure and, so, can be used to identify
situations in which a system might fail.
The model proposed that the network reliability of the supply chain be evaluated
at four different levels, and then went on to give the definitions of the minimum cut-set
corresponding to the different levels as follows.
1. A minimum cut-set for a source-demand pair was defined as a set of links, which,
when all links of the set fail simultaneously, will disrupt the connectivity of the
specified source node to the specified demand node, but when any one link in the
set does not fail, does not cause the disruption.
2. A minimum cut-set for an individual demand node was defined in the same
manner as above, except that the context of connectivity is between all sources to
the individual demand node.
3. While for group demand, the author stated that a failure is considered to have
occurred when one or more demand nodes of the group are disconnected from all
the sources.
4. Finally, for system demand, failure was said to have occurred if at least one
demand node in the system is disconnected from all the sources.
In general, as noted above, the set of links responsible for the failure in the
manners described above is a minimum cut-set.
It can be inferred that once the minimum cut-sets for source-demand pairs are
identified, the minimum cut-sets for individual demand, group demand, and system
demand can be obtained simply by combining the results obtained from source-demand
pairs.
These procedures are highlighted in the sub-sections below.
4.3.3.1 Minimum Cut-Set for Source-Demand Pair.

That only links in the

associated sub-network are considered in the identification of the minimum cut-sets for a
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specified source-demand pair. The associated sub-network to be examined for a sourcedemand pair is all the links connecting these two nodes and all the intermediate nodes
connected by the links.
4.3.3.2 Minimum Cut-Set for Individual Demand Pair.

That since an

individual-demand node fails only when it cannot be reached by any of its sources, only
simultaneous failures of all the connections to its sources can cause an individual demand
to fail. So, the minimum cut-sets for a demand node can be derived directly by combining
the minimum cut-sets of its source-demand pairs.
4.3.3.3 Minimum Cut-Set for Group Demand Pair.

That failure of group

demand occurs when any one of the demand nodes in the group loses connectivity to any
source. Since the failure of any demand node in the group is also a failure of group
demand, the minimum cut-sets of group demand can be derived directly from the
minimum cut-sets of the selected demand nodes.
4.3.3.4 Minimum Cut-Set for System Demand Pair.

If system demand is

of concern, all the demand nodes in the network will be selected. Therefore, the
procedure for identifying the minimum cut-sets of system demand is similar to that for
group demand except for the demand nodes considered.
4.3.4 Optimization Model for Identification of Risk Based Minimum Cut-Set for
Source Demand Pair
The optimization model that will be used in this study will be a modification of the one
proposed by Yang, et al. (1996) for the operation of water distribution network, where the
objective was to minimize the water shortage at demand nodes.
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This model that will be used for simulating the effect of the removal of a link set
on connectivity of source-demand pair, for example, (s,d), in the oil and gas supply chain
network, is described as follows:

∑

Min z =

[qk -

k∈N 1

∑

x(i, k) ]

(4.11)

∀k ∈ N 2

(4.12)

[ i:( i , k )∈ A ]

Subject to:

∑

∑

x(i,k) -

[ i:( i , k )∈ A ]

x(k,i) = 0,

[ i:( i , k )∈ A ]

∑

x(k,i) ≤ rk ∀k ∈ N 3

(4.13)

[ i:( i , k )∈ A ]

∑

x(i,k) ≤ qk ∀k ∈ N 1

(4.14)

x(i,k) ≤ qk ∀k ∈ N 1

(4.14)

r(i,k) ≤ Rk ∀ k ∈ A

(4.15)

[ i:( i , k )∈ A ]

∑
[ i:( i , k )∈ A ]

∑
[ i:( i , k )∈ A ]

In which, x(i,k) = flow volume in the link from node i to node k.
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rk = quantity supply at source node i, ( rk = ∞, if i = d and 0, if i ≠ d)
qk = quantity of demand at demand node k, ( qk = 1/∞, if k = d and 0, if k ≠ d)
r(i,k) = risk rating of events that affect each set of links
Rk = maximum allowable risk for the entire network
N1 = index set of demand nodes in the network
N2 = index set of refinery nodes in the network
N3 = index set of crude demand nodes in the network
A = set of links in the network
In identifying the minimum cut-sets of a source-demand pair, a simulation is
made for each candidate set. For each candidate set, the capacities of the links in the set
are changed from their original values to zeros to simulate the removal of this link set.
Given an assumption of infinitesimally small demand, connectivity of a given sourcedemand pair is preserved if the resultant value of the arc flow to the demand node is
greater than zero, i.e., it is a critical node if quantity demanded (qk) at the node is greater
than the supply from the link to the nodes (x(i, k) ), all subject to the allowable constraints.
4.3.5 Computation of Risk Based Network Reliability
Yang, et al. (1996), in their work stated that the associated minimum cut-sets of
individual demand, group demand, and system demand are different, and that their
reliability values are determined separately. Though, the computational procedure is the
same, except for the minimum cut-sets considered.
The authors’ definition of minimum cut-set infers that all components of a
minimum cut-set must have failed simultaneously to cause a system failure. Based on
their assumption that link failures are independent of each other, the failure probability
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and most importantly, the overall network reliability of a minimum cut-set Si, which can
be a minimum cut-set for individual demand, group demand, or system demand, that will
be used in this study, will be the modified model, which includes some of the risk ratings
from events, activities and threats that can impact the links/nodes of the network, that is:

ni

P (Zi) =

∑

Pj = P1 . P2 ……….. Pn i

(4.16)

j =1

In which,
Pj = failure probability of the jth link in Si
Zi = failure event of Si, and
ni = total number of links contained in Si
Also,

ni

(4.17)

ni

∑ ∑
R (Si) =

i =1

k =1

r (i,k)

Where:
R (Si) = risk ratings of a minimum cut-set Si , and
r(i,k) = risk rating of events that affect each set of links
The author stated that, if failure of the examined network or sub-network
(individual demand, group demand, or system demand) occurs, it implies that at least one
of its minimum cut-sets has failed.
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Based on the above, the failure probability of the network will then be computed
as follows:

M

Pf = P (Z1 U Z2 ……….. U ZM) =

∑

i =1

M

P(Zi) -

i =1

∑ ∑
i=2

P(Zi ∩ Zj) +

(4.18)

j =1

…… + (-1)M-1 P(Z1 ∩ Z2 ∩ ……. ∩ ZM )

Likewise, the risk rating of the network will be computed vas follows;

M

∑
Rf = (RS1 U RS2 ……….. U RSM) =

i =1

RSi -

(4.19)

i =1

M

∑ ∑
k =1
i=2

(RSi ∩ RSk) +

…… + (-1)M-1 (Rsi ∩ RS2 ∩ ……. ∩ RSM )

Based on the above, the upper and lower bounds of the failure probability of the
network can be obtained by truncating the higher-order terms. Where computation of the
first term in equation 4.19 will yield the upper bound (P Uf ), from which subtraction of the
second-order term will yield the lower bound (P Lf ). That is:

M

P Lf =

∑
i =1

M

P (Zi) -

i =1

∑ ∑
i=2

M

P (Zi ∩ Zj) ≤ Pf ≤

j =1

∑

P (Zi) = P Uf

(4.20)

i =1

The authors stated that if the difference between the upper and lower bounds is
insignificant, equation 4.19 can be approximated by,
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U

Pf ≈ P f =

M

∑

P (Zi)

(4.21)

i =1

The above greatly reduces the computational work.
The network reliability of the oil and gas supply chain network, its composite
probability of failure probability, as derived based by Yang, et al. (1996), is,

Rn = 1 – Pf

(4.22)

While, the modified risk based network reliability model, is,

Rnr = Rn – Rf

4.4

(4.23)

LP Supply Chain Models

The oil and gas supply chain can be broadly described through three classes of units that
are classified according to their function in the chain. These are processing, storage tanks
and pipelines units.
The developed model follows that earlier developed by Neiro et al. (2004), where
the authors modeled the oil and gas supply chain as a continuous entity for planning and
scheduling using stream flow rate. They modeled the three critical nodes units (i.e.,
refinery/processing, storage and pipelines units) separately as three independent nodes,
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while they finally connected them together to come up with one continuous supply chain
model, whose overall objective function is;

∑ ∑

Max Z =

[Cru +

∑

∑ ∑

Cpu,t · Demu,t −

u∈∪ dem t∈T

u∈∪ port

(Cvu,v · Vu,v,t)] · QFu,t−

∑
t∈T

Cinvu · Volu,t−

u∈∪ pu

∑ ∑
u∈∪ f

u∈VOu

Cinvu · Volu,t −

(4.24)

t∈T

∑
u∈∪ p

t∈T

∑ ∑
u∈∪ pipe

∑ ∑

Cpetu,t· QFu,t−

t∈T

Ctu · QFu,t

t∈T

Subject to:
•

Processing units at refineries constraints,

•

Petroleum and product tanks constraints, and

•

Pipeline of crude oil and products constraints.
The modifications that was carried out in developing the model for this study are

•

To model with demand and supply and not stream flow rates

•

To include risk ratings of threats, events and activities we calculated in Section
4.2, in the model.
The models for the three chain units i.e. processing, storage tanks and pipelines

units, were developed separately as three independent nodes, while the overall network
supply chain model was then developed by connecting these independent nodes
representing refineries, storage and pipeline networks into one continuous supply chain
model. Risk ratings calculated as explained in Section 4.2 above, will be used as one of
the constraints in running these models.
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Decision variables are the quantity of raw materials (crude) from each source and
quantity of product (petroleum products) from processing units, all subject to risk,
processing capacity, crude, storage, demand, quality and non - negativity constraints,
towards an optimum solution.
The proposed model, which is based on realistic assumptions and easy to
understand mathematical terminologies, is applied to a real world operation by analyzing
different scenarios. The next three subs - sections will present the mathematical model of
each element highlighting their particularities, while sub - Section 4.4.4 presents the
overall oil and gas supply chain model based on these three classes of elements.
4.4.1 Refinery/Processing Unit Model
Processing unit is defined as a piece of equipment that is able to physically or chemically
modify the material fed into it. According to this definition, processing units are all those
that compose the refinery topology and are modeled based on that.

•

Objective Function: maximize revenue. That is, to maximize the net revenue
(dollars) at the jth refinery’s gate on one barrel of the kth product from the ith
crude.
This net unit value is determined by crediting the yield of each product with its

refinery gate realization, debiting each product for the manufacturing expenses associated
with it, and also debiting the costs of producing, transporting, distilling and storing one
barrel of the crude.

Max Revenue: ((Σ (Sales of Products) – (Σ(Cost of Crude + Cost of
Production))

(4.25)
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i=m j =n

Max Z =

∑∑

(((0.4 xij,t + 0.15 xij,t + 0.2 xij,t + 0.24 xij,t) (rijk)) – (ci xij,t + tij

(4.26)

i=1 j =1

xij,t + mij xij,t + eijk xij,t + sij xij,t +sijk xij,t))

Where:

i=m j =n

pij =

∑∑

(ci + tij + mij + eijk + sij +sijk)

(4.27)

i=1 j =1

In order to make clear what is involved in equations 4.26 and 4.27 above, a
hypothetical calculation is carried through for an individual crude-oil-refinery
assignment. The problem is to consider the assignment of the ith crude oil to the jth
refinery, and to trace through the various cost elements involved in taking this crude from
the producing field, transporting and storing it at the refinery, processing and storing the
products there, and then disposing of the finished products at the refinery gate.
Where, volumetric yield (yk) in percent in1barrel of crude is;
Gasoline –

40%

Kerosene –

15%

Heating oil –

20%

Residual fuel oil –

24%

Volume loss in refining – 1%
That is:
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ykxij = (0.4 xij + 0.15 xij + 0.2 xij + 0.24 xij)

•

(4.28)

Constraints: If there are m refineries and n crude oil source, the problem reduces
to the following constrained-maximum form:

1) Plant constraints at each refinery.

(4.29)

i=m j =n

∑∑
xij,t ≤ Qj,t

i=1 j =1

(4.30)

i=m j =n

∑∑
i=1 j =1

ykxij,t ≤ Dj,t

2) Crude constraints from source

(4.31)

i=m j =n

∑∑
i=1 j =1

xij,t ≤ Qi,t

3) Demand constraints

(4.32)

i=m j =n

∑∑
i=1 j =1

4) Non – negativity constraints

ykxij,t ≥ Dk,t
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xij,t ≥ 0 (all i and j)

(4.33)

5) Risk constraints inherent from both crude sources and refinery vulnerabilities.
- crude sources risk constraints

i=m j =n

(4.34)

i=m j =n

∑∑

∑∑
Rixij,t/

i=1 j =1

i=1 j =1

xij,t ≤ Rt

- refinery vulnerability risk constraints

i=m j =n

∑∑
i=1 j =1

(4.35)

i=m j =n

∑∑
Rjykxij,t/

i=1 j =1

xij,t ≤ Rt

6) Quality Constraints (using a number scale from 0 to 10 to represent the quality
of crude oil – with 10 being the highest quality).

- Quality of crude constraints at each jth refinery will be

(4.36)

i=m j =n

∑∑
i=1 j =1

(ixij,t)/2 ≥ iqj,t

Note: Oil is generally classified based on its density and sulphur content.

•

Density- it can either be light crude or heavy crude. Light crude is more
expensive because it requires less refining, while heavy crude is cheaper because
it requires more refining.
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•

Sulphur content- Oil can either be sweet or sour crude. Sweet crude has a
sulphur content of less than 0.5% by weight, making it easier to refine to meet
environmental standards – so less expensive; while sour crude has sulphur
content of more than 0.5% by weight, making it more expensive to refine.
Table F.1 in Appendix F shows the quality rating that we derived for various

crude oil sources based on the above quality criteria.
4.4.2 Tank Unit Model
Tank is defined as a piece of equipment where the only two allowed operations are
mixture and storage of the different feed streams. Only physical properties can be
modified due to mixing. Tank farms for storing both crude and products are considered.
 Objective function; Minimize the total cost of storing both crude oil and products,
while noting the level of risks and vulnerabilities at each tank farm for a time period
t.

i=m j =n

Min Z =

∑∑

((ZijL xij,t) + (ZijkL ykxij,t))

(4.37)

i=1 j =1

 Constraints: If there are m refineries and n crude oil source, the problem reduces to
the following constrained-maximum form:

1) Plant constraints at each refinery

i=m j =n

∑∑

xij,t ≤ Qj,t

(4.38)

i=1 j =1

i=m j =n

∑∑
i=1 j =1

ykxij,t ≤Dj,t

(4.39)
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2) Crude constraints from source

i=m j =n

∑∑

xij,t ≤ Qi,t

(4.40)

i=1 j =1

3) Demand constraints

i=m j =n

∑∑

ykxij,t ≥ Dk,t

(4.41)

i=1 j =1

4) Non – negativity constraints

xij,t ≥ 0 (all i and j)

(4.42)

5) Risk constraints inherent from both crude and products storage points.
- crude storage points risk constraints

i=m j =n

∑∑
i=1 j =1

i=m j =n

RijL xij,t/

∑∑
i=1 j =1

- products storage points risk constraints

xij,t ≤ Rt

(4.43)
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i=m j =n

∑∑

i=m j =n

∑∑

RijkL ykxij,t/

i=1 j =1

ykxij,t ≤ Rt

(4.44)

i=1 j =1

6) Storage farms capacity constraints

i=m j =n

∑∑

xij,t ≤ Qs,t

(4.45)

i=1 j =1

i=m j =n

∑∑

ykxij,t ≤Ds,t

(4.46)

i=1 j =1

4.4.3 Pipeline Unit Model
Pipeline is defined as a piece of equipment that transports crude oil and products. Neither
physical nor chemical properties are modified during transportation. As hypothesis,
different petroleum types or products are never mixed when transported in pipelines,
because a well-defined interface is assumed to exist between two different products or
petroleum types. In other words, there is no property depletion due to direct contact
between products or petroleum types. Therefore, the general framework for modeling a
pipeline is to consider it as a group of units in parallel.
 Objective function; Minimize the total cost of transporting crude oil from sources to
refineries, and then products from refineries to storage/distribution
points/consumers. While, noting the level of risks and vulnerabilities on each route
at time period t.
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i=m j =n

Min Z =

∑∑

((Tij xij,t) – (Tijkl ykxij,t))

(4.47)

i=1 j =1

 Constraints: If there are m refineries and n crude oil source, the problem reduces to
the following constrained-maximum form:
1) Plant constraints at each refinery

i=m j =n

∑∑

xij,t ≤ Qj,t

(4.48)

i=1 j =1

i=m j =n

∑∑

ykxij,t ≤Dj,t

(4.49)

i=1 j =1

2) Crude constraints from source

i=m j =n

∑∑

xij,t ≤ Qi,t

(4.50)

i=1 j =1

3) Demand constraints

i =m j =n

∑∑
i =1 j =1

4) Non – negativity constraints

ykxij,t ≥ Dk,t

(4.51)
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xij,t ≥ 0 (all i and j)

(4.52)

5) Risk constraints inherent from both crude transportation from sources to refineries and
products transportation from refineries to storage/outlet points at time period t.
- crude sources to refineries risk constraints

i =m j =n

∑∑

i=m j =n

Rij xij,t/

i =1 j =1

∑∑

xij,t ≤ Rt

(4.53)

i=1 j =1

- refineries to storage/outlet points risk constraints

i=m j =n

∑∑

i=m j =n

RijkL ykxij,t/

i=1 j =1

∑∑

ykxij,t ≤ Rt

(4.54)

i=1 j =1

6) Pipeline capacity constraints

i=m j =n

∑∑

xij,t ≤ Qp,t

(4.55)

i=1 j =1

i=m j =n

∑∑
i=1 j =1

ykxij,t ≤Dp,t

(4.56)
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4.4.4 Oil and Gas Supply Chain Model
Models of the elements presented in the previous section take part in the set of constraints
that compose the optimization problem of the whole complex. The optimization problem
is then given as stated earlier in Section 2.1 (Oil and Gas Supply Chain). The objective
function is defined in Equation 4.57 where the maximization of the revenue obtained by
the product sales minus costs related to raw material, operation, inventory, transportation
and storage is determined. The operating cost is dependent on the refinery/processing unit
models, the transportation cost depends on the pipeline segment, while the storage cost is
dependent on the tank model.
The objective of this work is to develop a risk based optimization model using the
oil and gas refinery critical infrastructure supply chain operations (see figures 2.1, 2.2 and
2.3), to predict, manage and minimize the effects of the inherent risks and vulnerabilities
of the different oil and gas supply chain routes.

•

Objective function; Maximize the revenue obtained by the product sales minus
costs related to raw material, operation, transportation and storage at time period
t. The operation cost is dependent on the refinery/processing unit models, the
transportation cost depends on the pipeline segment, while the storage cost is
dependent on the tank model.

i=m j =n

Max Z =

∑∑

((ykxij,t rijk) – (pijxij,t) - (ZijL xij,t) + (ZijkL ykxij,t) - (Tij xij,t) –

i=1 j =1

(Tijkl ykxij,t))

Subject to:
• Equations (4.29) - (4.36) to represent processing units at refineries,
• Equations (4.38) - (4.46) to represent crude oil and products tanks,

(4.57)
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• Equations (4.48) - (4.56) to represent crude oil and products pipelines.
It must be clear that equation (4.12) is responsible for the connection between
crude oil sources and refineries; equation (4.23) responsible for the connection from
crude oil sources to storage tanks and petroleum products to storage tanks; while crude
oil to pipelines and petroleum products to pipelines are connected through equation
(4.33).
All the variables are as highlighted in the individual supply chain models above.

4.5

Model Based Vulnerability and Fault Tree Analysis (MBVA and FTA)
Models

4.5.1 MBVA Model
The MBVA model that will be used in this study will be the one developed by Lewis
(2006). There, the author defined MBVA, as a comprehensive method of analysis that
combines network, fault, event, and risk analysis into a single methodology for
quantitatively analyzing a sector component such as a hub. In MBVA, hubs are
identified, with hub vulnerabilities organized and quantified using a fault tree, all possible
events being organized as an event tree, and then an optimal investment strategy
computed that minimizes risk. MBVA gives the policy analyst a top-to-bottom tool for
achieving critical infrastructure protection (CIP) under budgetary constraints.
The steps of MBVA are as follows:
•

List assets – Take inventory

•

Perform network analysis – identify hubs

•

Model the hubs as a fault tree
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•

Analyze the fault tree model using an event tree

•

Budget analysis – compute optimal resource allocation
The MBVA will be used to evaluate the energy sector critical units/nodes – like

the crude source unit components. The reduction in vulnerability that will be obtained
from the resource allocation by using the proposed MBVA being compared with the
likely increase in cost of petroleum product as a result of the success of an imminent
threat obtained from the LP model in Section 4.2 above in other to ascertain the benefits
or otherwise of investing in the CIP.
These seems to be the most critical components, because of their concentration
and capacities, furthermore, many of these critical components are wide open, easily
accessed and therefore vulnerable to both symmetric and asymmetric attacks. Threats to
these critical components will be analyzed based on likely vulnerability of each, before
arriving at the vulnerability of the overall critical component/unit.
First, the network analysis of the chain will be carried out to determine if the
network has a scale free structure, by obeying the power law, i.e., the number of nodes
with degree K falling sharply as K is increased (i.e., high degree nodes with more than an
average number of links). This is the first requirement that the network has to obey before
we can carry out an MBVA modeling of the network.
The steps in carrying out the Network test are:

•

Get the degrees of the node by counting the number of links connecting the
nodes in the network.

•

Get the frequency of nodes with a certain number of links, by counting the
number of nodes with degree of 1, 2, 3, and so on, then divide these counts by
the number of nodes in the entire network.
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•

Plot the node frequencies as a histogram starting with the frequency of nodes
with 1 link, then 2 links, 3, and so on.

•

If the resulting histogram has a shape, that shows the frequency counts declining
as the number of links increases. The rate of decline approximates the curve,
(1/k)p, where p is greater than one, the network is a scale free network.
The vulnerabilities and damage/consequences, with the likelihood of an event

scenario make up the risk triplets that will be analyzed to obtain the weighted risk/risk
ratings in Section 4.2 above. So as the CIP are implemented, the vulnerability of the
sector component will decrease, so also the consequences/damages and subsequently the
risks associated with that sector component.
Vulnerability analysis (VA), involves complicated factors, such as the nature of
the threat, the likelihood of successful attacks, and the interplay among components that
make up the critical infrastructure sector. This sophistication requires a sophisticated
approach involving probability, logic, and modeling. The predominant tool for
constructing such models is the fault tree – logic and probability model of the
infrastructure’s critical nodes, Figure (4.1) below shows the complete fault tree for the
crude supply component of the energy sector.
A standard fault tree has three layers: the root representing the sector
component/critical node; the intermediate component layer; and the threat. It is simply a
model of the components of a critical node or sector organized as a hierarchy or treestructured graph. The nodes in the tree are called components, logic gates (AND/OR),
and threats. The intermediate component is any major asset of the sector, such as crude
drilling, crude storage and crude shipment/transmission. The root of the fault tree is a
special component/unit of that sector, e.g. crude supply; while a threat is any physical
threat to a sector component. Threats are represented as terminal nodes in the tree-
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structured fault tree. A fault occurs when a threat is activated – an attack- and
successfully damages one or more components of the sector. The purpose of the fault tree
is to model what happens to the sector component when a threat turns into a fault. A logic
gate is a node in the fault tree that determines how faults propagate up the tree. They are
diamond-shaped nodes in the fault tree, and can be an OR gate/an AND gate. In the case
of an OR gate, the occurrence of one or more faults causes a fault to propagate up the
tree, while in the case of an AND gate, all threats connected to the AND gate must occur
for the fault to propagate up the tree. Faults initiated by one or more threat, work their
way up the fault tree according to the branches and logic gates, with the sector
component failure occurring, only when a fault reaches the root of the fault tree.
Therefore, a sector component failure is defined as or more faults that propagate
all the way up to the root of the fault tree. The fault tree will be populated with
vulnerability estimates, which are derived from records of past attacks or forced
disruption of operations, maintenance history, component failure data, human errors,
operation and engineering experience, and plant design documentation, e.t.c., to derive
the overall sector component vulnerability.
MBVA is called “model-based” because we build a simple model of the sector
components of interest. It, specifically, combines network analysis with fault tree
modeling to derive vulnerability, risk, and resource allocation strategies that tell the
decision maker how best to allocate resources.
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Figure 4.1 Crude source failure Fault Tree.
4.5.1.1 Crude Source Structure.

Some important tit bits that will play a major

part in subsequent analysis are enumerated below:
•

US crude source come from both overseas and domestic sources.

•

Crude vary in their quality and quantity.

•

These crude sources component of the energy sector have varieties of risks and
vulnerabilities inherent in their exploration/ drilling, shipping/transportation and
storage.

•

Its intermediate components are wellheads, transmission pipelines/ships and
storage tanks.

•

They are characterized by heavy concentrations-clusters-of these intermediate
components.

•

Its major vulnerabilities exist because of these clusters.

•

These vulnerabilities are concentrated in three (3) intermediate components of
the crude source component: drilling/exploration heads, large transmission
pipelines, and large centralized storage facilities.

•

Critical nodes of the wellheads intermediate components are vulnerable to these
physical threats – fire damage, power outage and attacks; transmission pipelines
are large volume clusters of pipelines that are vulnerable to such threats as bomb
and SCADA attacks, and power outage; while that of the storage component are
also large capacity storage farms located at both offshore and onshore points that
are vulnerable to such threats like bomb attacks on pipes, pumps and tanks.
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4.5.2 FTA Model
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is another technique for reliability and safety analysis. It is
one of many symbolic "analytical logic techniques" found in operations research and in
system reliability.
Fault Tree Diagram (FTD). Fault tree diagrams (or negative analytical trees) are logic
block diagrams that display the state of a system (top event) in terms of the states of its
components (basic events).
A FTD is built top-down and in term of events rather than blocks. It uses a
graphic model of the pathways within a system that can lead to a foreseeable, undesirable
loss event (or a failure). The pathways interconnect contributory events and conditions,
using standard logic symbols (AND, OR etc). The basic constructs in a fault tree diagram
are gates and events.
In this research, FTD was developed to analyze each source-demand pair and
subsequently the entire supply chain risk using the calculated risk from likely
events/activities that can likely affect the link, to determine whether any particular pair
has failed or not. These calculated risks can either increase or decrease depending on the
variation in the unfixed variables (i.e., the threat and probability of events scenarios) of
our developed risk equation.
The AND/OR logic gates was used between any two source-demand pair,
depending on whether respective pair has failed or not (OR for failure and AND for no
failure). Any pair will be categorized as ‘FAILED’, if the analyzed fault tree risk for any
pair is greater than a set threshold allowable risk.
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Resource ($$) allocation were also apportioned from top to bottom of the
developed FTD to each pair based on the analyzed fault tree risk to harden them against
any threat scenario.

CHAPTER 5
SIMULATIONS AND ANALYSIS

5.1

Introduction

The risks based models in Chapter 4 will be used to simulate and analyze different
scenarios in a real world oil and gas supply chain critical infrastructure system. The result
will help to deduce and predict the impact of different risks and events in the sector,
which will give professionals in this sector a better understanding of the effects of some
of these analyzed events and activities, towards minimizing/eliminating instability in the
oil and gas critical infrastructure by making the industry more resilient.

5.2

Events and Activities Risk Ratings Model Analysis

The risk, Rij, of some events and activities that have impacted the oil and gas sector over
the past century will be analyzed using the risk triplet, highlighted in Section 4.2.
5.2.1 Analysis
The threat scenario, ei (i = 1, 2… m), will be derived by assessing the protection
vulnerability that is in place to prevent these events and activities taking place. For this
analysis a minimal level of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in place will be
assumed, as it is always better to assume a worst case scenario. Also, another
consideration here will be the political climate – for cases of war or crisis in any region
that has one of the source-demand nodes. For instance, since the average political
condition in Nigeria over the past four decades is somewhat unstable, on the average, a
high percentage of threat scenarios will be assumed, i.e., crisis in Nigeria, of 90%. While
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the average threat of Hurricane in the Gulf coast area will be rated at 50% per hurricane
season. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below show the threat scenarios assumed for the rest events
and activities.
The probability/vulnerability of this scenario (that is the overall vulnerability), pij/
VT (cj,ei), measures the likelihood that a threat scenario will lead to consequences or
damage. These figures are obtained by reviewing the figures in Chapter 3 to ascertain the
frequency of occurrence of such event leading to those consequences. For instance, the
Isreal – Arab war from history usually occurs every 1:20 years, therefore the probability
will be 0.05. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the other analysis.
The damages/consequence, cj (j = 1, 2, . . . n), which measures the degree of loss
that would be realized given that the specified initiating threat event resulted in a damage
to the supply chain, will be derived by analyzing the effect of any event on the price of
crude and products. These figures are obtained by analyzing Figures 3.1 – 3.16 in chapter
3 to ascertain the changes that occurred in the oil and gas network/chains from successful
events/activities on their nodes/links in the past. For instance it was seen from Figure 3.1
that successful Israel-Arab war in the ‘70s led to a 400%!! Rise in crude prices, while a
50% successful hurricane (i.e., 50% knock down in production activity based on a
hurricane) in the Gulf coast area of the US (a very critical node and link) will lead to a
20% increase in the price.
The three threat scenarios were then multiplied together to derive their risk, which
was compared to the overall risk of all the analyzed events and activities at any one time,
so as to derive the weighted risk, which will give their respective ratings. For instance, a
successful hurricane in the Gulf coast area which has 20% damage and 50% likelihood of
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threat scenario, but with a very high probability of occurrence of at least, 1:1year, ended
up with the same rating-7, as that of a successful Israel-Arab war, despite the fact that it
has a high consequences of 400% increase in the price of crude, but with a low
probability of occurrence of 1:20years. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below show the rest simulated
results of the risk rating obtained with the developed risk model and spreadsheet.
Table 5.1 Some Analyzed Long Term Events and Activities and their Calculated Risk
Ratings using our Developed Spreadsheet and Risk Models
No.
(1)

Events
(2)

Consequences(%)
(3)

Prob.(Yrs)
(4)

Prob.(Yrs) Threat (%)
in Decimal (5)
(4)

Calculated Risk Weighted Risk (7) Risk Ratings = (7)
(6) = {(3)(4)(5)} = {((6)/(∑ of
on scale of 1-10
6))*10}

1
2
3

Hurricane
Demand growth
Production
increase/decrease
Crisis in Nigeria
Crisis in Iraq
Crisis in Iran
Crisis in Russia
Crisis in Venezuela
Economic crisis
Pipeline attacks
Israel - Arab war
Offshore drilling
Speculation
Opening U.S.
reserve.

20
12
20

1/1
1/5
1/1

1.00
0.20
1.00

50%
40%
50%

10.00
0.96
10.00

1.44
0.14
1.44

7
3
7

7
50
67
20
37
30
1
400
2
7
5

1/1
1/3
1/5.5
1/10
1/10
1/8
1/1
1/20
1/25
2/1
1/10

1.00
0.33
0.18
0.10
0.10
0.13
1.00
0.05
0.04
2.00
0.10

90%
50%
70%
50%
50%
85%
70%
50%
70%
60%
10%

6.30
8.33
8.53
1.00
1.85
3.19
0.70
10.00
0.06
8.40
0.05

0.91
1.20
1.23
0.14
0.27
0.46
0.10
1.44
0.01
1.21
0.01

5.5
6
6
3
4
4
2
7
1
6
1

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

∑ of Calculated
Risk

69
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Figure 5.1 Bar chart showing some analyzed long term events vs. the calculated average
risk ratings.
Table 5.2 Some Analyzed Short Term Events and Activities and their Calculated Risk
Ratings using our Developed Spreadsheet and Risk Models
No.
(1)

Events
(2)

Consequences(%)
(3)

Prob.(Yrs)
(4)

Prob.(Yrs) Threat (%)
in Decimal (5)
(4)

Calculated Risk Weighted Risk (7) Risk Ratings = (7)
(6) = {(3)(4)(5)} = {((6)/(∑ of
on scale of 1-10
6))*10}

1
2

Pipe leaks/breaks
Redundancy
failures
Refinery
fire/explosion
Power outage
Tank farms
cracks/leaks

167
20

1/10
1/20

0.10
0.05

80%
50%

13.36
0.50

8.20
0.31

5
3

50

1/15

0.07

50%

1.67

1.02

4

20
10

1/25
1/15

0.04
0.07

30%
80%

0.24
0.53

0.15
0.33

2
3

3
4
5

∑ of Calculated
Risk

16

109

Figure 5.2 Bar chart showing some analyzed short term events Vs the calculated average
risk ratings.
5.2.2 Summary and Conclusion
The analysis used to derive the risk ratings, which will be used in the analysis and
simulations for the risk based models in this work, was derived using the prototypical
expression for risk in the homeland security context, traditionally called the risk triplet
scenarios. It can be deduced that the risk ratings were successfully derived by reviewing
and analyzing the consequences and probability of occurrence of the events and activities
in the nodes and links of the oil and gas supply chain/network. While the likelihood of
the threat occurring, which can either go up or down, depends on the CIPs in place to
prevent or protect these events, and, also the political or economic climate that exist at
any one instance.
One of the limitations of this analysis is the tendency to base the analysis on the
economical consequences of these events and activities, a future study might also try to
look at other consequences as well.
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5.3

Network Reliability Analysis Model Simulation

The case study to be simulated and analyzed using the network reliability model will be
based on the real-world petroleum supply chain planning problem of Petrobas (Brazil),
which was analyzed by Neiro et al. (2004) for the general modeling framework for the
operational planning of petroleum supply chains. The study showed that Petrobras has 59
petroleum exploration sites among which 43 are offshore, 11 refineries that are located
along the country’s territory and a large number of facilities such as terminals and
pipeline networks. Refinery sites are concentrated mainly in southern Brazil where seven
sites are found, four of which represent 47% of the company’s processing capacity. These
refineries are located in the most important and strategic consumer markets. Therefore,
the study addressed the supply chain of these four refineries, namely: REVAP, RPBC,
REPLAN and RECAP (Figure 5.3). Five terminals compose the storage facilities,
namely: SEBAT, SEGUA, CUBATAO, SCS and OSBRA; and a pipeline network for
crude oil supply and another for product distribution compose the transportation facilities.
The petroleum and product storage and distribution facilities were considered to be
organized as detailed in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. Refineries are supplied with
petroleum by two main pipeline branches. The OSVAT segment connects refineries
REVAP and REPLAN to the SEBAT terminal, whereas the OSBAT segment connects
refineries RPBC and RECAP to the same terminal. Terminals between extreme nodes are
required in case intermediate storage is needed or pumping capacity is limited. Crude oil
is acquired from a variety of suppliers and its properties strongly depend on supplier
origin, which result in different petroleum types. Twenty petroleum types are considered
to supply the complex.
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Figure 5.3 Supply chain—case study.
Source: Neiro et al. (2004).

Figure 5.4 Crude oil supply—case study.
Source: Neiro et al. (2004).

Figure 5.5 Products storage and distribution—case study.
Source: Neiro et al (2004).

The overall charge is supplied through SEBAT whereby it is then distributed to
the terminals and refineries as described in the previous paragraph. Since petroleum types
from different suppliers present distinct properties, every petroleum type is stored at an
assigned petroleum tank that is also dedicated. Therefore, SEBAT holds twenty
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petroleum tanks as shown in Figure 5.4. Ten oil types are potentially supplied to RECAP
and the remaining ten are potential suppliers to REVAP, RPBC and REPLAN. Refineries
and terminals also contain tank farm that store each of the petroleum types, according to
Figure 5.4. The whole complex is able to provide 32 products to local markets. Six
products may be also transferred to supply the demand from other regions. Transfer is
accomplished by either vessels or pipelines. In case the former is selected, products are
sent to the SEBAT or CUBATAO terminals, whereby products are shipped. In case of
transfer through pipeline, products are sent to the OSBRA terminal, whereby they are
pumped. Demands from other regions are imposed at the tanks of the transshipment
terminals. In analogy to petroleum types, different products are also stored at dedicated
tanks, so that every refinery and terminal contains a set of storage tanks for products.
Figure 5.5 presents the two types of product tanks. The black tanks represent products
that supply only the local market, whereas the gray tanks represent products that supply
either market, local and from other regions.
5.3.1 Analysis
The supply chain is broken up into two chains for the analysis. The first is the crude oil
supply, Figure 5.4, and the second is the products storage and distribution, Figure 5.5.
For convenience, in the first chain, the supply node, SEBAT, will henceforth be
denoted as S1, while the demand nodes, REVAP, REPLAN, RPBC and RECAP will be
denoted by D1, D2, D3 and D4. For the links, OSVAT I, OSVAT II, OSVAT III,
OSBAT I (between S1 and D3), OSBAT I (between D3 and CUBATAO) and OSBAT II,
will be denoted as P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 and P6 respectively.
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In the case of the product storage and distribution, the supply nodes REPLAN,
REVAP, RECAP and RPBC, will be denoted as S1, S2, S3 and S4, the demand nodes
SEBAT, SEGUA, CUBATAO, SCS and OSBRA will be denoted as D1, D2, D3, D4 and
D5, and for the links between S2 → D2, D2 → D1, S2 → D4, D2 → D4, D5 → others,
S1 → D5, D5 → D4, D4 → D5, D2 → D5, D4 → D2, S3 → D2, S3 → D4, D4 → D3,
D3 → D4, S4 → D3, will be denoted as P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12,
P13, P14 and P15 hereinafter respectively.
For convenience also, assume that in the first chain only short term events and
activities will likely affect them. Therefore, for OSVAT crude, assume that there is a
major pipeline explosion, that normally takes weeks to repair, which from Table 5.2, has
a risk rating of 2 on a1 - 10 rating scale (i.e., 0.2), while for the OSBAT crude, the
assumption is that there is a major fire at the storage farm, which normally takes months
to repair. The rating for this from Table 5.2 is 5 (i.e., 0.5)
In the case of the product storage and distribution chain, the assumption is a long
term event, like, sudden demand growth. Which carries a risk rating of 3 (0.3) on the risk
ratings table, Table 5.1.
5.3.1.1 Minimum Cut-Set Analysis.

Table 5.3 shows the demand, production/

availability of the source-demand nodes of the crude oil SC network (Neiro et al. (2004)).
While Table 5.4 shows the simulated arc flows of each link that connects a source
demand pair, obtained using the optimization model for identification of the minimum
cut-set of a source-demand pair, Equation 4.11 developed in Section 4.3, subject to
constraints in Equations 4.12 to 4.15. Recall, that any link with a resultant arc flow
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greater than zero is considered a minimum cut-set/critical link and must be preserved to
maintain the network flow.
Table 5.3 Demands, Production/Availability at the Source-Demand nodes of the Crude
Oil SC
Number

Nodes

Demand (m3)

Production/ Availability(m3)

1

REVAP

36,000

8,980

2

RBPC

35,500

6,763

3

RECAP

8,500

2,330

4

REPLAN

54,200

21,950

5

SEBAT

17,700

17,700

6

CUBATAO

26,563

10,600

7

SEGUA

36,000

35,403

Table 5.4 Arc Flow and Minimum Cut-Set Links Descriptions for the Crude oil SC
Source-Demand Pairs
No.

Links

Arc Flows

Link Descriptions

1

P1

+10,200

Critical

2

P2

- 27,200

Non-Critical

3

P3

0

Neither

4

P4

+26,563

Critical

5

P5

-437

6

P6

0

Non-Critical
Neither
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5.3.1.2 Reliability Analysis.

The results of the reliability analysis without risks

for crude oil supply chain in Table 5.5, show that aside from the (S1, D4) source –
demand node pair, the three others are all critical nodes, with critical links too. (S1, D1)
and (S1, D2) have a somewhat not too high reliability of 0.75, while, (S1, D3) have 0
reliability. This difference in reliability between these two critical nodes pair is because
of the existence of a storage farm at SEGUA that can reduce the impact of failure in the
critical links or nodes between the source and demand points. When risk is incorporated
into the chain, the results in Table 5.8 shows a reduction in the reliability of the
chains/links, with a 12% decrease in the reliability of (S1, D4) source – demand node
pair.
The results of the reliability analysis without risks for the products storage and
distribution supply chain in Table 5.6 shows that the existence of storage farms and many
links between source-demand pairs not only increased the reliability, but will be crucial
for oil and gas supply chain. In the case of pipe or critical nodes failure, the availability
of these redundancies will preserve the supply chain. All the demand nodes are
considered important so group demand and system demand reliability is not considered
for the Petrobas supply chain. Fifteen of the twenty source-demand pair has a reliability
value of over 0.9. The high reliability is a result of high redundancy and storage farms in
the chain. When risks are incorporated in the chain, the reliabilities decreased, with five
of the source-demand pair having a reliability of less than 0.8, Table 5.9.
The results of the reliability analysis without risks for individual demand nodes in
Table 5.7 shows that D4 with the smallest reliability of 0.7220, followed by D1, with
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0.7413. While with risks, D3 and D5 reliability dropped by 70%! While D1 and D2
dropped by approximately 10%, and D4 by 35%.
Table 5.5 Minimum Cut-Sets and Reliability Values for Source-Demand Pair for Crude
Oil Supply Chain without Risks
Number

Node Pair

Minimum Cut Set

Reliability

(1)

(2)

Quantity

Link Identification

(5)

(3)

(4)

1

(S1,D1)

2

P1,P2

0.7500

2

(S1,D2)

2

P1,P3

0.7500

3

(S1,D3)

1

P4

0.0

4

(S1,D4)

3

P4,P5,P6

0.9630
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Table 5.6 Minimum Cut-Sets and Reliability Value for Source-Demand Pair for Product
Storage and Distribution Supply Chain without Risks
Number

Node

Minimum Cut Set

Reliability

(1)

Pair

Quantity Link Identification

(5)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1

(S1,D1) 4

P6,P7,P10,P2

0.9961

2

(S1,D2) 3

P6,P7,P10

0.9630

3

(S1,D3) 3

P6,P7,P13

0.9630

4

(S1,D4) 2

P6,P7

0.7500

5

(S1,D5) 1

P6

0.0

6

(S2,D1) 4

P1,P3,P10,P2

0.9961

7

(S2,D2) 3

P1,P3,P10

0.9630

8

(S2,D3) 6

P1,P3,P4,P9,P7,P13 0.9999

9

(S2,D4) 5

P1,P3,P4,P9,P7

0.9997

10

(S2,D5) 5

P1,P3,P9,P4,P8

0.9997

11

(S3,D1) 2

P11,P2

0.7500

12

(S3,D2) 3

P11,P12,P10

0.9630

13

(S3,D3) 4

P12,P8,P7,P13

0.9961

14

(S3,D4) 3

P12,P11,P4

0.9630

15

(S3,D5) 5

P12,P11,P4,P9,P8

0.9997

16

(S4,D1) 4

P15,P14,P10,P2

0.9961

17

(S4,D2) 3

P15,P14,P10

0.9630

18

(S4,D3) 1

P15

0.0

19

(S4,D4) 2

P15,P14

0.7500

20

(S4,D5) 5

P15,P14,P8,P10,P9

0.9997
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Table 5.7 Minimum Cut-Sets and Reliability Value for Individual Demand Nodes for
Product Storage and Distribution Supply Chain with and without Risks
Demand Node

Minimum Cut Set

Reliability without risk

Reliability with risk

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

D1

P1,P2,P3,P6,P7,P10,

0.7413

0.6848

0.8600

0.7675

0.9592

0.2772

0.7220

0.4706

0.9991

0.2976

P11,P14,P15
D2

P1,P3,P6,P7,P10,
P11,P12,P14,P15

D3

P1,P3,P4,P6,P7,P8,
P9,P12,P13,P15

D4

P1,P3P4,P6,P7,P9,
P11,P12,P14,P15

D5

P1,P3,P4,P8,P9,P10,
P11,P12,P14,P15

Table 5.8 Minimum Cut-Sets and Reliability Values for Source-Demand Pair for Crude
Oil Supply Chain with Risks
Number Node Pair

Minimum Cut Set

Reliability

(1)

Quantity

Link Identification

(5)

(3)

(4)

(2)

1

(S1,D1)

2

P1,P2

0.7100

2

(S1,D2)

2

P1,P3

0.7100

3

(S1,D3)

1

P4

-0.2

4

(S1,D4)

3

P4,P5,P6

0.8380
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Table 5.9 Minimum Cut-Sets and Reliability Value for Source-Demand Pair for Product
Storage and Distribution Supply Chain with risks
Number

Node Pair

(1)

(2)

Minimum Cut Set
Quantity (3)

Link Identification (4)

Reliability
(5)

1

(S1,D1)

4

P6,P7,P10,P2

0.9880

2

(S1,D2)

3

P6,P7,P10

0.9360

3

(S1,D3)

3

P6,P7,P13

0.9360

4

(S1,D4)

2

P6,P7

0.7100

5

(S1,D5)

1

P6

-0.3

6

(S2,D1)

4

P1,P3,P10,P2

0.9880

7

(S2,D2)

3

P1,P3,P10

0.9360

8

(S2,D3)

6

P1,P3,P4,P9,P7,P13

0.9992

9

(S2,D4)

5

P1,P3,P4,P9,P7

0.9973

10

(S2,D5)

5

P1,P3,P9,P4,P8

0.9973

11

(S3,D1)

2

P11,P2

0.7100

12

(S3,D2)

3

P11,P12,P10

0.9360

13

(S3,D3)

4

P12,P8,P7,P13

0.9880

14

(S3,D4)

3

P12,P11,P4

0.9360

15

(S3,D5)

5

P12,P11,P4,P9,P8

0.9973

16

(S4,D1)

4

P15,P14,P10,P2

0.9880

17

(S4,D2)

3

P15,P14,P10

0.9360

18

(S4,D3)

1

P15

-0.3

19

(S4,D4)

2

P15,P14

0.7100

20

(S4,D5)

5

P15,P14,P8,P10,P9

0.9973

5.3.2 Summary and Conclusion
A methodology to analyze the reliability of the oil and gas networks/supply chains
connectivity using the minimum cut-set method, and associated algorithms and
simulation, to determine the impact of link failures as a result of risks associated with
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certain events activities that affect the networks/supply chains was presented. The results
of this analysis show that critical nodes/links in the network, which failure (i.e., its
inability to meet up their output) will severely affect the supply chain network(s) can be
identified using this method, and associated algorithms and simulation. The proposed
algorithm for the identification of minimum cut-sets consists of the following four levels:
(1) For source-demand pairs in the system; (2) for individual demand nodes; (3) for a
group of demand nodes; and (4) for all demand nodes in the system. While the risk
ratings are obtained using the risk triplet scenario: (1) the threat scenario; (2) the
probability of the event scenario; and (3) consequences/ damages of a successful event
scenario on the network. Though only the first level in the minimum cut-set method
requires simulations, the remaining stages are achieved by combination of the result from
the first stage. This ensures a reduction in the number of simulations needed to analyze
the chain/network.
While the combination of the risk triplet scenario will yield the risk, from which
the risk ratings from the weighted average was derived.
The Petrobas supply chain network reliability analyses results have shown that the
method is applicable for analyzing an oil and gas networks/supply chain. Despite the fact
that useful information on network reliability is obtained using connectivity analysis, it is
worth noting that other useful analysis for the evaluation of the source-demand
connectivity and reliability of the oil and gas networks/supply chain need to be studied,
since this method is not sufficient.
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5.4

LP Supply Chain Models Simulation

The real world supply chain of the Gulf coast area of the US petroleum supply chain will
be simulated and analyzed here using our risk based LP model.
The petroleum supply chain in the US is divided into five (5) regions called
Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts (PADDS). For our simulation, we will
carry out several case studies using the five (5) largest refineries in the US that is located
along the critical Gulf coast area of the US, which falls within the PADD 3 regions. The
critical nature of this node makes it very important to simulate and analyze, in other to
deduce the impacts of various risks and event scenarios on it.
These refineries are:
1. Exxon Mobil Corporation refinery, Baytown, TX. Refining capacity – 0.5mb/d
2. Exxon Mobil Corporation refinery, Baton Rouge, LA. Refining capacity –
0.44mb/d
3. BP PLC Corporation refinery, Texas city, TX. Refining capacity – 0.39mb/d
4. Exxon Mobil Corporation refinery, Beaumont, TX. Refining capacity – 0.3mb/d
5. PDV America Corporation (CITGO) refinery, Baytown, TX. Refining capacity–
0.29mb/d
Source: Lewis (2006)

This area forms a major network of refineries, pipelines and a major import port
called LOOP i.e. Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, which accounts for almost 13% of the US
total import of crude. Figure 5.6 below shows network of Gulf of Mexico oil fields
refineries.
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Figure 5.6 Gulf of Mexico Oil field and refineries (PADD 3) Network.
Source: Lewis (2006)

The Gulf of Mexico oil field region is made up of 152 refineries and the top five
refineries in the US that is located along this critical region accounts for 11% of refined
petroleum product in the US.
Information obtained from: EIA; Annual Refinery Report (April 25, 2010)
indicates the following:
1. US Petroleum consumption: 19.5mb/d-top 5 accounts for 11% of these i.e.
2.1mb/d=Dk,t .
2. US crude oil imports: 9.7mb/ –top 5 refineries in Gulf coast gets 11% => about
1.1mb/d = Qj,t.
3. Refineries capacity in the Gulf coast accounts for 8.1mb/d = Dj,t.
4. Average storage capacity at the Gulf coast area of the US => 3.9mb/d = Qs,t and Ds,t.
5. Cost of storage: $0.50/barrel = Zijl and Zijkl.
6. Average pipeline (like the Transco pipeline) delivers: 2.2mb/d, also modest size
Pipeline carries 720 tanker shipload/ day= 720 X 3,000b/d =2.2mb/d => Qp,t and Dp,t.
7. Cost of transporting oil through a pipeline: $0.85/barrel = Tij and Tijkl.
8. Realization ($/barrel) at jth refinery’s gate (i.e top 5 refineries in Gulf coast region) of
the kth product from the ith crude i.e. rijk:
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Gasoline -

$68.04/barrel

Kerosene -

$71.03/barrel

Heating oil -

$70.40/barrel

Residual fuel oil - $60.97/barrel
∑ rijk: $270.44/barrel
9. Net unit cost incurred in distilling 1barrel of the ith crude at the jth refinery, i.e. pij:
Gasoline -

$47.63/barrel

Kerosene -

$49.72/barrel

Heating oil -

$49.28/barrel

Residual fuel oil - $42.68/barrel
∑ pij: $189.31/barrel
10. For our illustrative example, we will consider only six (6) sources of crude to the top
five refineries in the Gulf coast area:
Table 5.10 Quantity of Crude from some Sources to Refineries in the Gulf
Source to Refineries
source):Qi

Qty of crude from source (b/d) (11% of the total crude from

i. Canada (X1)

215,160

ii. Iraq (X2)

57,090

iii. Gulf coast (Local) (X3)

296,890

iv. Other local sources (X4)

247,610

v. Nigeria (X5)

50,270

vi. Other international sources (X6)

456,720

∑ Qj: 1,076,130bpd
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5.4.1 Analysis
A number of case studies were conducted to illustrate the main features and performance
of the proposed optimization models. The case studies selected for analysis and
discussion are listed in Tables 5.13 and 5.14. Results are compared to a base-case (Case0), shown below, which is the solution of the LP model without the risk constraints.
These case studies were carried out using the LINDO software for LP model simulations.
LINDO is a comprehensive tool designed to make building and solving Linear,
Nonlinear (convex and nonconvex/Global), Quadratic, Quadratically Constrained,
Second Order Cone, Stochastic, and Integer optimization models faster, easier and more
efficient. It provides a completely integrated package that includes a powerful language
for expressing optimization models, a full featured environment for building and editing
problems, and a set of fast built-in solvers. It enables the easy creation of individual
optimization applications, by allowing for easy plug-in and simulation of any developed
mathematical programs using the power of the LINDO solvers. It also includes a number
of significant enhancements and features that allows for more flexibility and functionality
required in solving big or small, and simple or complex LP formulations. It includes
dozens of routines to formulate, solve, query, and modify your LP problems.
The software helps in simulating the optimum objective function value of any LP
model, while giving the programmer the values of its variables and the range of values at
which optimum objective value will not be altered. This range of values allows for
flexibility in carrying out the sensitivity analysis of the LP model, as was demonstrated in
this study to achieve the best possible combination of the variables, subject to, demand,
supply, capacity, quality, and risk and vulnerability constraints.
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In a nutshell, LINDO is an interactive linear, quadratic, and integer programming
system useful to a wide range of users. It can be used for the following:
•

To solve interactive linear, quadratic, general integer and zero-one integer
programming programs up to 500 rows and 1,000 columns.

•

To perform sensitivity analysis and parametric programming.
See Appendixes A to D for the output of the simulation of the case studies, and

also Tables 5.14 to 5.16 for the summary of the input and output obtained from the
simulation, and the sensitivity analysis of different alternatives using LINDO solver.
The case studies will try to analyze the likely impact on the SC of scenarios like
1. Likely impact of multiple long term events (crisis in Nigeria and Iraq, and
50% successful hurricane in the Gulf coast), at different seasons of the year
(i.e. Spring, Summer, Fall and Winter) with regards to their storage capacity
for strategic and long term planning. See Tables 5.11 and 5.12 and Figures 5.7
and 5.8 for the average storage capacity in the Gulf coast region at different
periods of the year.
2. Likely impacts of various short term events at the most critical season (i.e., the
worst case scenario) of the year in regards to the average storage capacity at
the Refineries; Storage farms; and Pipelines nodes of the SC, for tactical and
short term planning. The critical season of the year with respect to the average
daily storage capacity in the Gulf coast area from Figures 5.7 and 5.8, and
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 is the fall season, with an average daily storage capacity
of 3.7mb/d
Case-0 (Base Case): The chain is modeled with the average daily storage capacity, and,
without the risk constraints to obtain the optimum value based on demand and supply
forces by using the analyzed data from EIA (April 25, 2010).
Max Z = (((Σ(ykxij) (rijk)) – (Σpijxij)) - ((Σ(ZijL xij)) + (ΣZijkL ykxij)) - ((Σ(Tij xij)) – (ΣTijkl
ykxij)))
i.e., Z = 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to;
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1) Plant constraints at the refinery
Σxij ≤ Qj
i.e., X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 ≤ 1,076,130
Σykxij≤Dj
i.e., 0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 ≤ 8,100,000
2) Crude constraints from sources
Σxij ≤ Qi
i.e., X1 ≤ 215,160
X2 ≤ 57,090
X3 ≤ 296,890
X4 ≤ 247,610
X5 ≤ 50,270
X6 ≤ 456,720
3) Demand constraints
Σykxij ≥ Dk
i.e., 0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 ≤ 2,144,780
4) Storage farms capacity constraints
Σxij ≤ Qs
i.e., X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 ≤ 3,940,067
Σykxij ≤Ds
i.e., 0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 ≤ 3,940,067
5) Pipeline capacity constraints
Σxij ≤ Qp
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i.e. X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 ≤ 2,261,905
Σykxij ≤Dp
i.e. 0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 ≤ 2,261,905
6) Quality of the crude constraints
Σ(ixij)/2 ≥ iqj
Note: The quality ratings obtained from our crude quality analysis in Table F.1 of
Appendix F was used, which are Nigeria and Iraq - 8; Canada and other international
sources - 7; Gulf coast area and other local sources - 5. While using 7 as the minimum
allowable quality ratings for all the nodes.
Substituting and simplifying the equation will give:
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 ≥ 14
7) Non – negativity constraints
xij ≥ 0
i.e. X1,X2,X3,X4,X5,X6 ≥ 0

Each of the rest cases (Case-1 to Case-3) represents different scenarios
highlighted above. The case studies are compared in terms of percentage drop/rise in
petroleum products production as a result of the various scenarios, with respect to the
base case (Case-0), as shown in Table 5.13 below.
Case-1: Here, the chain is modeled for strategic and long term planning, by using all the
data in Case-0, with the daily average storage capacity and assuming a multiple long term
threat scenario from crisis in Nigeria, Iraq, and 50% successful hurricane in the Gulf
coast area. The average expected risk ratings of these events on the supply chain obtained
in Section 5.1, and highlighted in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 will be used in simulating the
likely impact on the energy sector. A risk rating of 1 for Canada was also used, because
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of its low vulnerability; and ratings of 2 and 3 for other local and international sources.
While the maximum allowable risk ratings for all nodes was 5.
Case-2: Here, the chain is modeled for strategic and long term planning, by using all the
data in Case-1, but with different average daily storing capacity across the four seasons of
the year. First, it will be modeled with the average daily storing capacity, and
subsequently by varying the storing capacity, based on the data in Table 5.12 and Figure
5.7 showing the average daily storage capacity in the Gulf coast area across the four (4)
seasons of the year, in other to simulate the impact of multiple threat scenarios across
various seasons of the year. The cases to be considered here are:
•

Case 2(a): during the spring season

•

Case 2(b): during the summer season

•

Case 2(c): during the fall season, and

•

Case 2(d): during the winter season

Case-3: Here, the chain is modeled for tactical and short term planning, by using all the
data in Case-1, but varying the short term events risks on the three critical nodes of the
SC during the most critical season of the year in terms of average daily storage capacity
(which was identified as Fall, based on the data obtained from EIA website). That is,
modeling with the daily average storage capacity during the fall season of the year and
assuming a short term threat scenario on the three critical nodes of the supply chain (i.e.
Refining, Transportation/Pipeline and Storage units). The average expected risk ratings of
these short term events on the supply chain obtained in Section 5.1, and highlighted in
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2, which shows refinery fire explosion having a rating of 4 (in a
scale of 1-10, with 10 being the maximum), tank farm leaks/cracks with a rating of 3,
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while pipeline leaks/breaks has a risk rating of 5, will be used in simulating the likely
impact on the energy sector. While the maximum allowable risk ratings for all nodes was
5, except when analyzing threat scenarios in the pipeline units, where a maximum
allowable risk rating of 6 will be used. The cases to be considered here are:
•

Case 3(a): refinery fire explosion during the fall season

•

Case 3(b): tank farm cracks/leaks during the fall season

•

Case 3(c): pipeline leaks/breaks during the fall season, and

Case-4: The worst case scenarios for long term and short term risk scenarios obtained in
cases 2 and 3 by introducing some capacity expansion and redundancies, in other to show
what if scenarios will be simulated and analyzed.
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Table 5.11 5yrs Average Monthly Stocks at Storage Tanks(X 1,000 Barrels) in the Gulf
Coast Area (PADD III Region) of the US
Month

5yrs Average Monthly Stocks at Storage Tanks (X 1,000 Barrels)

January

3,974,483

February

4,345,857

March

4,142,387

April

4,459,567

May

4,169,839

June

4,129,767

July

3,915,097

August

3,717,097

September

3,878,600

October

3,661,323

November

3,592,367

December

3,294,065

Source: EIA; Annual Refinery Report (04/25/10)
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Figure 5.7 5yrs average monthly stocks at storage tanks (X 1,000 barrels) in the Gulf
coast area (PADD III Region) of the US.
Source: EIA; Annual Refinery Report (04/25/10)

Table 5.12 5yrs Average Seasonal Stocks at Storage Tanks(X 1,000 Barrels) in the Gulf
Coast Area (PADD III Region) of the US
Month

5yrs Average Seasonal Stocks at Storage Tanks(X 1,000 Barrels)

Spring

4,257,264

Summer 3,920,772
Fall

3,710,763

Winter

3,871,468

Source: EIA; Annual Refinery Report (04/25/10)
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Figure 5.8 5yrs average seasonal stocks at storage tanks (X 1,000 barrels) in the Gulf
coast area (PADD III Region) of the US.
Source: EIA; Annual Refinery Report (04/25/10).

Table 5.13 Likely Impact of various Long and Short Term Risk Scenarios on Prices of
Petroleum Products
Cases

Case-0 (Base case – no risk)
Case-1 (all data in Case-0 + average risk ratings of all nodes)
Case-2 Long term risk scenarios at various seasons average
daily storage capacities:
(a) Spring
(b) Summer
(c) Fall
(d) Winter
Case-3 Short term risk scenarios on the critical units of the SC
during the most critical season(w.r.t. average storing capacity)

Loss/Drop in
Production
(%)
0
30
18
30
35
30
35

(a) Refineries (fall)
(b) Tanks (fall)
(c) Pipelines (fall)
Cases

Case-4 worst case long and short term risk scenario with an
added capacity expansion and redundancies in the SC
network).
(a) Tank capacity expansion - Long term (Fall season)
(b) Redundancy in pipeline – Short term (Fall season)

38
39
Increase/Rise in
production (%)
18

17
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See also Appendixes A to D for the LP models formulation and LINDO output for
the simulated and analyzed cases above.
Sensitivity analysis of the risk based LP output was also carried out in this study
as enumerated in Tables 5 to 5, in other to show the decisions and managerial insights
that a policy maker can make based on the current output, Allowable Increase/Decrease
(AI/AD), expected output based on risks and crude quality, and the required output for
stability. Some of these observations and insights were:
•

A consistent decline in the AI in output from other international sources below its
current output. This observation supports our earlier analyzed risk rating, which
showed crude sources like Nigeria and Iraq being classified as critical, based on
their risk ratings.

•

A consistent increase towards INFINITY for the AI for other local sources above
its current output. This can be translated as showing that there are needs to not
only explore other local sources of crude oil within the US, but to also encourage
investment into alternative sources of energy. This is presently being put forward
by the Obama administration, which studies has shown will reduce the
dependence on foreign oil by at least 35% by year 2030, in addition to creating
seventeen thousand jobs, while also reducing carbon emission by 80% in 2050.

•

In all the five cases analyzed, only in one instant-case 2(a), that there was an AI in
the supply of about 50% in the Gulf coast, with the rest cases showing a
consistent in AI below the present output. This can be used to support the
argument against exploring more deep water drilling because of the catastrophic
nature of any threat situation, as highlighted in the BP oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico that occurred from 20th of April – 15th of July, 2010.

•

That despite showing a consistent drop in the expected output from the crisis
prone crude sources (Iraq and Nigeria) used in this study, the AI also shows an
allowance of at least double of the present supply. This can be interpreted as
showing that achieving more political stability in these countries will help in
minimizing the instability in the oil and gas SC.

•

That due to stability political stability in Canada, there is an allowance to increase
the crude supply from this source to almost INFINITY, but despite this, the
required output for stability keep showing a sharp decline. This can be surmised
as being a result of low quality rating of Canadian crude.
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Table 5.14 Sensitivity Analysis Summary for Case 2(a) – Spring Season
Variables

Risk

Quality Current Expected Allowable

Allowable Required

Rating

Rating

Decrease

Output

Output

Increase

Drop

Output
for
Stability

X1-Canada

1

7

2.98

0.00

INFINITY 2.98

1.29

X2-Iraq

6

8

0.40

0.40

2.14

0.36

0.40

X3-Gulf

7

5

1.80

1.80

2.14

0.36

1.80

X4-Local

2

5

2.50

2.14

INFINITY 0.36

2.50

X5-Nigeria

5.5

8

0.22

0.22

2.14

0.22

0.22

X6-Abroad

3

7

4.60

4.60

2.14

0.36

4.60

Table 5.15 Sensitivity Analysis Summary for Cases 2(b) and (d) – Summer and Winter
Seasons.
Variables

Risk

Quality Current Expected Allowable

Allowable Required

Rating

Rating

Decrease

Output

Output

Increase

Drop

Output
for
Stability

X1-Canada

1

7

2.20

0.00

INFINITY 2.20

0.00

X2-Iraq

6

8

0.40

0.40

1.36

0.40

0.60

X3-Gulf

7

5

1.80

1.80

1.36

1.14

3.00

X4-Local

2

5

2.50

1.36

INFINITY 1.14

2.19

X5-Nigeria

5.50

8

0.22

0.22

1.36

0.22

0.50

X6-Abroad

3

7

4.60

4.60

1.36

1.14

4.60
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Table 5.16 Sensitivity Analysis Summary for Case 2(c) – Fall Season
Variables

Risk

Quality Current Expected Allowable

Allowable Required

Rating

Rating

Decrease

Output

Output

Increase

Drop

Output
for
Stability

X1-Canada

1

7

2.62

0.00

INFINITY 2.62

1.63

X2-Iraq

6

8

0.40

0.00

0.94

0.40

0.00

X3-Gulf

7

5

1.80

1.80

0.94

1.56

1.80

X4-Local

2

5

2.50

2.50

INFINITY 1.56

2.50

X5-Nigeria

5.5

8

0.22

0.22

0.94

0.22

0.22

X6-Abroad

3

7

4.60

3.44

0.94

1.56

4.60

See also Appendix B for the LINDO output of the sensitivity analysis.
5.4.2 Summary and Conclusion
A methodology to analyze the effects of certain risk scenarios on the oil and gas
networks/supply chains connectivity using the LP models, and associated simulations
was presented. The results of this analysis show that crisis or events that successfully
impact the critical nodes/links in the network, which can lead to failure (i.e. its inability
to meet up their output) of the chain, can be modeled to know the dollar cost of their
impact on the consumers using the LP models, and associated simulations.
Some of the limitations of this study is in the assumptions that most times the
causes of price increase in the oil and gas sector to be as a result of one event, while in
some instances it could be as a result of multiple events that were not included in the risk
analysis.
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5.5

MBVA and FTA Model Simulation

5.5.1 MBVA Model Simulation
MBVA gives the policy analyst a top-to-bottom tool for achieving critical infrastructure
protection (CIP) under budgetary constraints. For this simulation, the Gulf of Mexico
refineries, which fall within the highly critical PADD 3 regions of the US will be used.
The critical nature of this node makes it very important to simulate and analyze optimum
reduction in risk and vulnerabilities of this critical node, at an optimum cost. Optimum
here means that point where further investment or allocation of money for any CIP will
not be wise based on the Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) of Budget vs. Risk Reduction, and
Budget vs. Vulnerability Reduction.
The reduction in vulnerability and subsequently risk that will be obtained from the
resource allocation at the Gulf coast refineries using the proposed MBVA will also be
compared with the likely drop in petroleum product production based on various
simulations of the Gulf coast refineries using the LP model in Section 5.4 above in other
to ascertain the benefits or otherwise of investing in the CIP.
Network analysis of these oil field network shows that it has a scale free structure
[see figure 5.9] below. It obeys a near-perfect power law with p = 1.179.
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Figure 5.9 Node frequency histogram and power law (p=1.79) fit for the network of the
Gulf of Mexico oil fields and refineries.
The fault tree to be used in this analysis will be a standard fault tree – i.e. having
three layers: the root of the fault tree will be Energy failure; while the components will
be; Transmission/Pipeline, Refinery and Storage; and the threats will be: for
Transmission/Pipelines – bomb pipes, SCADA attack and power outage; for Refinery –
fire damage, power outage and crude shortage; for Storage – bomb pipes, bomb pumps
and bomb tanks. The logic gates to be used will be the OR logic gates. The reason for
using this logic gate is that failure of any component of this Gulf coast refinery fault tree
will lead to the failure of the entire system.
MBVA Analysis and Results. For the refinery at Gulf Coast Region.
i. Refineries - Processing
•

Potential causes of damage

•

Fire Damage – assume 80% vulnerability

•

Crude Shortage – assume 50% vulnerability

•

Power Outage – assume 30% vulnerability

•

Cost of refinery is about = $1B
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•

PADD 3 Region Produces 11% of national refined product, approximately
2.2M bpd X 42 = 92.4Mgpd

•

1 barrel = 42 gallons

•

Profit => $2.04 -$1.50 = $0.54

•

Damage => 92M barrels X $0.54 = $48 M

•

Break even

•

5 years at an estimated inflow of $290M/yr. X 5 = over $1B

•

Most refineries are already running on a positive NPV since they are older than
5 years.

•

Assumption: Only cost of damage is that of lost revenue.

•

Damage (D) for refinery = $48M

•

Cost to protect refinery => 70% of D = $34M

ii. Pipelines- Transmissions
•

Potential causes for damage

•

Bomb Pipes - assume 80% vulnerability

•

SCADA attack - assume 20% vulnerability

•

Power Outage - assume 50% vulnerability

•

Pipeline repair near Phoenix, AZ took approx. 29 days to repair.

•

5500 mile Transcontinental Pipeline (Transco) delivers 95M gallons per day to
the East Coast.

•

A spill in March 28, 1993 led to an estimated cost to Colonial Oil Pipeline
owners of Transcontinental, $34M and cost for environmental protection of
approx. $30M.

•

D (pipeline)= $64M

•

C (pipeline) = 70% x D = $45M
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iii. Storage
•

Potential causes for damage

•

Bomb Pipes - assume 80% vulnerability

•

Bomb Pumps - assume 80% vulnerability

•

Bomb Tanks - assume 50% vulnerability

•

Average storing capacity of a storage tank is 823,850 barrels of petroleum

•

823,850 x $2.04 x 17 = $28,571,118

•

D (pipeline) = $28M

•

C (pipeline) = 70% x D = $20M

iv. Assumptions
•

For this simulation a high vulnerability (80%) will be assumed, because it is
rather easy to damage the Gulf coast energy supply chain because of its obvious
concentrations and open access of its components.

•

The result of the fault tree failure analysis using the above computations,
indicate that the Gulf coast area refineries have a very high vulnerability of 99%,
see Figure 5.6 below.

Figure 5.10 Gulf coast refineries energy failure fault tree.
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The energy failure risk summary using the fault tree analysis indicates thus:
•

Top 3, Max. Risk Events

•

Risk Max1 = $8.831

•

Transmission Bomb Pipe + Transmission Power Outage + Refinery Fire
Damage + Refinery Crude Shortage + Storage Bomb Pipes + Storage Bomb
Pumps + Storage Bomb Tanks.

•

Risk Max2 = $8.028

•

Transmission Bomb Pipe + Transmission Power Outage + Refinery Fire
Damage + Refinery Crude Shortage + Storage Bomb Pipes + Storage Bomb
Pumps.

•

Risk Max3 = $7.455

•

Transmission Bomb Pipe + Transmission Power Outage + Refinery Fire
Damage + Storage Bomb Pipes + Storage Bomb Pumps + Storage Bomb Tanks.

•

Bottom 3, Min. Risk Events

•

Risk Min1 = $0.000

•

No Faults

•

Risk Min2 = $0.001

•

Transmission SCADA Attack + Refinery Power Outage

•

Risk Min3 = $0.002

•

7 Events
FTplus software for budget/resource allocation using MBVA was used to simulate

the Gulf coast area refineries. The allocation can be done with three different strategies:
1. Manual allocation strategy
2. Rank order allocation strategy, and
3. Apportioned allocation strategy
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100%
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85%
71%
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58%
49%
41%
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29%
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16%

11%

0%
$29

$58

$87

$116

$145

$174

$203

$232
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$261

0%
$290
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Figure 5.11 Vulnerability vs. Budget.
The results obtained were analyzed below:
Table 5.17 Budget vs. Vulnerability Reduction
Budget

229

558 887 1116 1145

1174

2203

2232

2261

2290

771 558 449

229

116

111

44

00

(x $1m)
Vulnerability 885

441

(% )
See also Appendix E for the various results obtained using the FT plus software
for the three different resource allocation strategies.
5.5.2 FTA Model Simulation
In this research, a Fault Tree Diagram (FTD) to analyze each source-demand pair and
subsequently the entire supply chain risk of the Petrobas (Brazil) crude oil supply chain,
which was already studied in Section 5.3, using the calculated risk from likely short term
events/activities that can likely affect the link, to determine whether any particular pair
has failed or not was developed. These calculated risks can either increase or decrease
depending on the variation in the unfixed variables (i.e., the threat and probability of
events scenarios) of the developed risk equation.
The AND/OR logic gates was used between any two source-demand pair,
depending on whether respective pair has failed or not (OR for failure, and, AND for no -
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failure). Any pair is categorized as ‘FAILED’, if the analyzed fault tree risk for any pair
is greater than a set threshold allowable risk.
Resource ($$) allocation were also apportioned from top to bottom of the
developed FTD to each pair based on the analyzed fault tree risk to harden them against
any threat scenario.
Let the assumptions be, that in this crude oil SC chain, only short term events and
activities will likely affect them. Therefore, for OSVAT crude, let the assumption be that
there is a major pipeline explosion, that normally takes weeks to repair, which from Table
5.2, has a risk rating of 2 on a1 - 10 rating scale (i.e., 0.2), while for the OSBAT crude,
let it be assumed that there is a major fire at the storage farm, which normally takes
months to repair. The rating for this from Table 5.2 is 5 (i.e., 0.5)
5.5.2.1 FTD Analysis.

The FTD analysis for the crude oil SC network

using the calculated risk of the likely events that was assumed to affect each sourcedemand pair in the case study, shows that if the threshold allowable risk for failure of
each source-demand pair was set not to be less than 1 (i.e., <1, on a scale of 1 to 10, with
10 being the highest). From the FT analysis in Figure 5.12, it was found out that the pairs
S1,D3, and, S1,D2, are the critical pairs that will be in a failure mode if the events where
to occur without adequate hardening/protection mechanism in place. So in analyzing the
whole SC network FTD, the OR logic will be used for these two source-demand pairs.
The total network failure percentage was obtained as 60%, but note that in Figure 5.13, it
shows that the failure percentage will drop to less than 1% if an extra transportation
redundancy was introduced for the S1, D3 pair, which will switch these pair from a
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failure mode to a safe mode, and so, the AND logic for analyzing the pair in the Fault
Tree Analysis of the entire network will be used.
5.5.2.2 Resource Point Allocation Analysis.

If a budget of 100 available

Resource points is assumed, and this is to be allocated by Network Analysis(NA) (Lewis,
2006), using the developed FTD ( Figure 5.12), working from top to bottom of the tree,
the result of the resource allocation shown in Table 5.15 and 5.16 below will be obtained.
The results show that the highest allocation of 70 Resource points will be allocated to S1,
D3 pair. This coincides with the earlier analysis that introducing a redundancy in this pair
will lower the failure probability of the entire network.
Note: that despite the fact that the impending analyzed threat scenarios does not put the
earlier simulated critical links in Section 5.3 using the min. cut-set equations (i.e., P1 and
P4) the resource allocation using the Network Analysis (NA) from Table 5.15 below,
allows for more resources to be allocated by default to these two pairs.
Table 5.18 Resource Points Allocation for each Source-Demand Pair in the Crude oil SC
using Network Analysis.
No

Pair

Analyzed Risk

Sharing Percentage (%)

Resource Point Allocation

1

S1,D1

0.04

6

6

2

S1,D2

0.04

6

6

3

S1,D3

0.5

70

70

4

S1,D4

0.125

18

18

∑ = 0.705

∑ = 100
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Table 5.19 Resource Points Allocation for each link of a Source-Demand Pair in the
Crude oil SC using Network Analysis.
Pair
S1,D1

Available Resource
Point
6

S1,D2

6

S1,D3
S1,D4

70
18

Link
P1
P2
P1
P3
P4
P4
P5
P6

Analyzed
Risk
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

Sharing (%)
50
50
50
50
100
33
33
33

Resource
Allocation
3
3
3
3
70
6
6
6

∑ = 100

Figure 5.12 Petrobas (Brazil) crude oil network SC Fault Tree Analysis without
redundancy using our developed tree.
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Figure 5.13 Petrobas (Brazil) crude oil network SC Fault Tree Analysis with a
redundancy pipeline for (S1, D4) using our developed tree.
5.5.3 Summary and Conclusion
A methodology to analyze the vulnerability and reliability of a typical oil and gas
network supply chain when impacted by likely threat scenarios was presented. These
threat scenarios that affect the supply chain network often lead to a negative impact on
the entire energy sector. These analyses will help stakeholders in the sector to predict,
plan, manage and mitigate against any likely threat scenarios which will likely impact the
SC network.
5.5.3.1 MBVA.

The result of the simulation and analysis of the Gulf coast area SC

shows that the optimum budget allocation for any CIP in a typical oil and gas SC will be
in the region of $203million. Based on Table 5.14 and figure 5.11, the study deduced that
at that point of investment the CBA shows an appreciable increase, while beyond that the
increase in CBA is somewhat minimal.
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5.5.3.2 FTA.

The combination of the risk triplet scenario will yield the risk,

from which the risk and the risk ratings for short term events were derived. These
calculated risk, together with the developed FTD will successfully enable anyone to
determine whether each source-demand pair can be said to have failed or not from the
likely impact of these threat scenarios, and also to obtain the optimum resource allocation
to harden any source-demand pair in the network.
5.5.4 Limitations
•

Lack of sector expertise

•

Since there are no major incidences of failure in the energy SC, most of the
assumptions of cost and damage are not quite precise and might lead to
misleading assumptions.

•

These FTA and MBVA only focused on damage from the sector failure from
economic perspective, whereas a more accurate damage would have involved
other losses.

•

Historically accidental incidents in the Energy SC have taken only a few lives
and cost a mere $33million per year.

•

The Question then is: Why be concerned?

•

Answer: Given that it is easy to damage the energy SC, and very difficult to fix,
what damage might a clever and malicious attacker do? It may be time to change
strategies!
5.6

Comparisons of Models Performances

In this study, three risk based models were developed and simulated. The models are:

•

The risk rating model.

•

The risk based Supply Chain Model – these models comprises of two models:
o Risk based network reliability analysis SCM.
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o Risk based Linear Programming SCM.
•

The Model Based Vulnerability Analysis (MBVA) and The Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) models.

Table 5.20 Comparisons of Models Performances.
Risk based Supply Chain Models
Reliability Analysis SC LP SC Model
Model
This model is used
This model enabled us
This model is
to derive the risk
to determine the critical used to
ratings from some
nodes/links in the
determine the
events, activities
network, which if
loss of
and threats that will impacted by any of the
production and
most likely impact
events and activities we subsequently
the oil and gas SC.
derived their ratings
increase in price
The results we
above will lead to failure of petroleum
obtained showed
(i.e., its inability to meet products
that events like
up their output) of the
because of any
Israel-Arab war,
supply chain. The model successful
successful hurricane went further to help us
threat on the
in the Gulf coast
to not only determine
critical nodes of
area of the US, and these critical
the SC
production increase nodes/links, but also
or decrease have a
helped us to derive the
risk rating of 7 on a drop in the overall
scale of 10.
network reliability,
based on the successful
impact of any of these
threats.
Risk rating Model

5.7

MBVA and FTA
Models
These models which
we proposed in this
study will help to
determine the
optimum investment
in any CIP, i.e., to
see what $X
investment will lead
to a cost beneficial
reduction in the risk
and vulnerability of
the sector, side-byside, the loss of
reliability of the SC,
and also the increase
in product prices as
a result of any
successful threat
impacting the SC.

Limitations of the Models

Though the models developed in this study has shown that; the risk ratings of some
events, activities and threats that can affect the oil and gas SCM can be derived using the
risk rating models; while, the risk based LP SCM will enable experts to forecast, manage
and minimize the likely impacts of different risk scenarios on the SC; then, the risk based
network reliability analysis model using the minimum cut-set method, and its associated
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algorithms and simulations have shown that the impact of link failures as a result of risks
associated with certain events, activities, and threats that can affect the SC can be
determined, while also determining the critical nodes/links in the network; and lastly, the
MBVA has shown that the possible CIP that can be used to protect the SC, viz-a-viz, the
reduction of the risks and vulnerabilities, and subsequently the CBA of the Resource
allocation vs. the risks and vulnerability reduction can be obtained. There are also some
inherent limitations to these models which we will discuss below:
The major limitation to the events and activities risk ratings model is that the
analysis was based on the economical consequences of these events and activities. A
future study might also try to look at other consequences as well.
The limitation for the risk based LP SCM, is in the assumptions that most times
the causes of price fluctuations in the industry to be as a result of one or two events,
while in some instances it could be as result of multiple events that were not included in
the risk analysis.
Despite the fact that useful information on network reliability was obtained using
the risk based reliability analysis model, it is worth noting that an amendment to the
model to look at cost that is involved when these identified critical nodes/links fail will
also be encouraged. Though, in this research, the trend of analyzing the cost benefits of
either protecting or including redundancies to the chain was initiated, or, simply do
nothing, it is recommended that more studies in this area need to be encouraged.
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Some of the limitations of the MBVA and FTA models are:

•

Lack of sector expertise.

•

Since there are no major incidences of failure in the energy SC, most of the
assumptions of cost and damage are not quite precise and might lead to
misleading assumptions.

•

The models only focused on damage to the sector from economic perspective,
whereas a more accurate damage would involve other losses.

•

Historically accidental incidents in the energy SC have taken only a few lives
and cost a mere $33million per year. So, why be concerned? Given that it is easy
to damage the energy SC, the question is, ‘what damage might a clever and
malicious attacker do? It may be time to change strategies.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1

Conclusion

In conclusion, this research has helped to develop various risk based models, which were
used to simulate and analyze different threat scenarios that can impact the oil and gas
supply chain critical infrastructure. This will enable scholars, researchers, government
and private stakeholders in the industry to better understand and plan for the protection
and response action that could be taken in tackling some of the risks that could impact the
industry, viz-a-viz, their optimum goal. It also went further to look at the cost benefits of
some of the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) that can be used to minimize the
effect of various risk scenarios on the energy sector in particular and the economy in
general.
First a risk model was developed and used to derive the risk rating for events,
activities or threats that will most likely impact the oil and gas supply chain (SC). The
events were categorized as either short term or long term events (with short term events
lasting only a few days, while long term events last weeks).
The study showed that for any events, activities or threats that will likely impact
the oil and gas SC critical infrastructure, the following risk rating categorization, on a
scale of 1-10 (with 10 being the maximum), will be followed after analysis:
•

A risk rating of 7-10 will be categorized as very critical.

•

A risk rating of 3-7 will be categorized as critical.

•

A

risk

rating

of

1-3

will
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be

categorized

as

less

critical.
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While, the following categorization will be used for analyzing the duration of
occurrence of events, threats, or activities:
For long term events, threats, or activities (with duration in weeks):
•

Duration of 7-10 weeks will be categorized as very severe.

•

Duration of 3-7 weeks will be categorized as severe.

•

Duration of 1-3 weeks will be categorized as less severe.
For short term events, threats, or activities (with duration in days):

•

Duration of 7-10 days will be categorized as very severe.

•

Duration of 3-7 days will be categorized as severe.

•

Duration of 1-3 days will be categorized as less severe.
The study also showed that events like the Israel-Arab war, successful hurricanes

in the Gulf coast area of the US, and the increase or decrease in production have a risk
rating of 7.
With these risk ratings, a risk based network reliability analysis model using the
minimum cut-set method and its associated risk based algorithms and simulations was
developed. The model enabled the study to determine the critical nodes/links in the
network, which if impacted by any of the events and activities analyzed above, will lead
to failure of the supply chain (i.e., its inability to meet up to its output). The model went
further to not only determine the critical nodes/links, but also to derive the drop in the
overall network reliability, based on the successful impact of any of these threats. Some
of the results obtained showed that if a short term event, like a major pipeline explosion
that will affect the transportation of crude to the RECAP and CUBATAO refineries in the
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Petrobas of Brazil SC, with an assumed risk rating of 2 occurs, it will lead to a 12% drop
in production.
The risk based LP Supply Chain Model (SCM) which was developed and used in
this study, to analyze the supply chain (SC) for strategic/long term and tactical/short term
planning, was able to establish likely impacts of different risk scenarios on a generalized
oil and gas SC network, like the Gulf coast area SC. The average expected risk ratings
obtained above was used as one of the constraints in simulating the different risk
scenarios, and to forecast their likely impacts, in other to come up with alternative ways
that can be used to manage/minimize risks. The study showed that for a generalized oil
and gas SC, a very critical (in terms of long term/globalised risk ratings), and a very
severe (in terms of duration in weeks) event/threat/activity - like crisis in the crude source
points, will likely cause the following:
•

18% drop/loss in the production at this SC, with a likely price increase of 15% in
product prices. This will occur in the regions that are dependent on the supply
from this SC during the spring season, with an average daily stock of about 4.2
million (x 1,000 bpd).

•

30% drop/loss in production at this SC, with a likely price increase of 22.4% in
product prices. This will occur in the regions that are dependent on the supply
from this SC during the summer season, with an average daily stock of about 3.9
million (x1, 000 bpd).

•

35% drop/loss in production at this SC, with a likely price increase of 26% in
product prices. This will occur in the regions that are dependent on the supply
from this SC during the fall season (the most critical season) with an average
daily stock of about 3.7 million (x 1,000 bpd).

•

30% drop/loss in production at this SC, with a likely price increase of 22.4% in
product prices. This will occur in the regions that are dependent on the supply
from this SC during the winter season, with an average daily stock of about 3.9
million (x 1,000 bpd).
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The study also showed that a very critical and very severe short term/localized
event/threat/activity - like a refinery explosion/fire, tank leak/crack, or pipeline
fire/attack, occurring on this SC during the fall season (most critical in terms of average
daily stock), will likely cause the following:
•

In an event like a refinery explosion, a 35% loss/drop in productivity, with a
likely product price increase of about 26% will occur in the areas that are
dependent on this SC.

•

In an event like a tank farm leak/crack, a 38% loss/drop in productivity, with a
likely product price increase of about 28% will occur in the areas that are
dependent on this SC.

•

In an event like a pipeline leak/break, a 39% loss/drop in productivity, with a
likely product price increase of about 29% will occur in the areas that are
dependent on this SC.
Introducing a 15% tank capacity expansion and a 15% redundancy in pipeline will

lead to an 18% and 17% rise in productivity respectively, during the fall season, and will
go a long way in buffering any risk scenario.
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Model Based Vulnerability Analysis (MBVA)
were carried out on the SC in this study, to determine whether each source-demand pair
analyzed, failed or not, due to the likely impact of any event, activity or threat scenario
analyzed above. The analysis was also carried out to show how scarce resources can be
allocated for optimum result in protecting the oil and gas SC nodes/links from failure.
Using the SC of the Gulf coast area as a case study, the result showed that investing $29,
$58, $87, $116, $145, $174, and, $203 (optimum budget), and $232 million, towards a
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in the area, will likely lower the vulnerability to
85%, 71%, 58%, 49%, 41%, 29%, 16%, and, 11% respectively, and prevent the potential
for a huge price increase on the consumers in particular, and the economy in general.
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This study was able to show that both the risk based minimum cut-set model and
its associated algorithms and simulation, and the risk based LP SC model developed in
this study to derive the reliability or the critical nodes/links in the network, with the
associated drop in production, will enable experts in the industry to determine the
optimum investment that is needed to provide CIP to the SC network. This optimum
investment is obtained by using the MBVA and FTA models that was proposed in this
study to see what investment in dollars will lead to a cost beneficial reduction in the risk
and vulnerability of the sector. This will be compared side-by-side, the loss of reliability,
reduction in vulnerabilities and risks, and the drop in the production of the SC.
The impact of various threat scenarios using the developed model was analyzed
on a real world oil and gas supply chain. First, as a generalized SC, using the risk based
LP SC model to simulate the Gulf coast area SC, because of its critical nature. Then, on a
site specific SC, using the risk based network reliability model to simulate the Petrobas of
Brazil SC. Thereafter, the Gulf coast area SC using the MBVA, and also the Petrobas
(Brazil) SC using the FTA, were simulated, to determine the optimum budget allocation
for any proposed CIP. This was done side-by-side the CBA of any reduction in risk and
vulnerability, and the likely loss in revenue from a drop in production of the SC.
A recent practical case that highlights the importance of this study which aims at
minimizing and managing risks in the oil and gas SC critical infrastructure was the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill (also referred to as the BP oil spill/the BP oil disaster/the
Macondo blow out). This occurred from the 20th of April – 15th of July, 2010, due to a
wellhead blow out at the Gulf of Mexico near Mississippi River Delta of the US. The
explosion which led to thirteen deaths, and a spill of almost 5 million barrels, with a total
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economic loss that was put at over $30 billion, clearly demonstrates the need for an
adequate, and cost beneficial CIP to be put in place in the oil and gas SC. This can be
done by using the models and steps highlighted in this study.

6.2

Recommendations

There are many recommendations that can be put forward in this research that will enable
experts to manage, minimize/eliminate instability in the oil and gas critical infrastructure
SC, and make them more resilient. However, whatever choice is made, these research
have developed an easy-to-use risk based SC models that will enable executives,
risk/supply chain/production managers, transportation and logistics personnel, suppliers
and regulators, academicians and students, and the general public determine the
economic implications of their decisions.
Some of the Critical Infrastructure Protection techniques which will be
recommended for the protection of the critical nodes and links of the oil and gas SC
critical infrastructure include:
•

Increasing system redundancy.

•

Deploying state - of – the – art surveillance equipment.

•

Deploying aerial and ground patrols.

•

Fortifying supply chain systems against cyber-security breaches.
The most effective way however, to address the scourge of sabotage is to confront

terrorists wherever they are. This is already being done by most countries as part of the
global war on terror.
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The most obvious way to increase supply chain nodes/links security is the use of
patrols and the creation of buffer zones along the critical nodes/links into which
unauthorized personnel are prohibited from entering. In Iraq, close to 14,000 security
guards have been deployed along the pipelines and other critical nodes. But ground
patrols are only effective to a certain degree, especially in areas of inclement weather and
forbidding terrain.
Another way that will be recommended to reduce supply chain sabotage is by
paying tribes and powerful warlords to protect the critical nodes/links on their territory.
This method was tried in Iraq with limited success, and is also being implemented right
now in Nigeria – where the leader of the most powerful ethnic militia group was recently
released from detention as a bargain for a halt in the oil and gas supply chain network
vandalization.
Technology could also play an important role in the effort to secure critical
nodes/links. Sophisticated surveillance systems to enhance infrastructure security can be
deployed in critical locations. New technologies for seismic sensing of underground
vibrations can provide early warning when saboteurs approach the protected area. Such
systems may be expensive, but by making possible the remote monitoring of much of the
supply chain network, governments can eliminate the need for large numbers of troops
and instead rely on smaller numbers of rapid – response teams.
Such systems can also be complemented by air surveillance. As a result of
progress in high - resolution remote sensing and image processing technology, it is now
possible to deploy small and medium – size Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and
unmanned helicopters for nodes/links inspection purposes. These UAVs can stay in the
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air up to 30 hours at medium – to – low altitudes, and can send images to a central control
station where they can be reviewed by security teams. Some defense contractors are
developing UAVs mounted with automatic weapons to be used against saboteurs.
Unfortunately, many of the countries where such technologies would be most
effective, like Nigeria, are too poor to afford them. Under such circumstances
governments and pipeline operators that cannot prevent attacks altogether should invest
in mechanisms to minimize the damage attacks can cause. The cheapest and most
effective way to protect an existing nodes/links is to prevent easy access by surrounding
it with walls and fences. New pipelines should be buried. While this may substantially
increase construction cost, in areas where saboteurs are known to operate the investment
will quickly pay for itself.
New technologies can fortify pipes with external carbon fiber wrap that can
mitigate the effects of explosive devices. Equally important is to shorten the lead time
between the attack and the repair. The quicker it takes to repair the damage, the lower the
cost of the disruption. Pipeline saboteurs often target pipelines at critical junctions or hit
custom – made parts that take longer to replace. To reduce the lead time, pipeline
operators should be equipped with sufficient inventories of spare parts.
It is important to also realize that none of the approaches discussed here is likely
to put an end to the problem. As long as oil and gas continue to be essential to the
functioning of the world’s economy, its nodes/links sabotage is likely to remain one of
the industry’s risks. No matter what remedy is applied; it will add a surcharge to the price
of a barrel. So, it is important that experts use the work that was done in this research as a
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guide in making the most economic and beneficial decision in making the industry more
resilient.

APPENDIX A
LINDO SOFTWARE OUTPUT FOR BASE CASE
Simulations of the gulf coast oil sc using the average daily storage capacity of their tank
farms and without any risk constraints using the developed risk based LP models and
Lindo software to obtain the base optimum value.
Note: that the description of the variables and constraints are shown and described in
Section 4.4, while the values and their derivations are shown and explained in Section 5.4
also. While the summary of the inputs and outputs are shown in the sensitivity analysis
summary of the cases in Tables 5.14 to 5.16.
(1) Base Case – Case 0 LP model.
Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to:
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 10.8
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 2.2
X2 < 0.6
X3 < 3
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.5
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 39
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 39
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 < 14

•

Lindo output for Base Case (showing an objective function value of 810 x
105).

LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

5

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
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160

1)

810.0000

VARIABLE
VALUE
X1
0.000000
X2
0.600000
X3
3.000000
X4
2.100000
X5
0.500000
X6
4.600000

ROW
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)

REDUCED COST
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

SLACK OR SURPLUS DUAL PRICES
0.000000
75.000000
70.307999
0.000000
2.200000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.400000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
10.808000
0.000000
28.200001
0.000000
28.308001
0.000000
11.800000
0.000000
11.908000
0.000000
52.500000
0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

5

APPENDIX B
LINDO OUTPUT FOR LONG TERM EVENTS

Simulations of multiple long term events on the gulf coast oil sc across various storing
capacities for the four (4) seasons of the year using the developed risk based LP models
and Lindo software.
Note: that the description of the variables and constraints are shown and described in
Section 4.4, while the values and their derivations are shown and explained in Section 5.4
also. While the summary of the inputs and outputs are shown in the sensitivity analysis
summary of the cases in Tables 5.14 to 5.16.
(2) Cases 1 and 2 (b and d) LP – average storage of 3.9mb/d (same with summer
and winter Storage, i.e. cases (2(b) and 2(d)).
Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to:
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 8.38
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 2.2
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 39
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 39
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
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LINDO output for cases 1 and 2 (b and d) (showing approximately 22.4%
drop in objective function in comparison with the base case).

•

LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

7

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

628.5000

VARIABLE
VALUE
X1
0.000000
X2
0.400000
X3
1.800000
X4
1.360000
X5
0.220000
X6
4.600000

ROW
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)

REDUCED COST
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

SLACK OR SURPLUS DUAL PRICES
0.000000
75.000000
72.703796
0.000000
2.200000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
1.140000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
13.203800
0.000000
30.620001
0.000000
30.703800
0.000000
14.220000
0.000000
14.303800
0.000000
38.959999
0.000000
18.170000
0.000000
24.888599
0.000000
33.520000
0.000000
33.184799
0.000000
18.170000
0.000000
33.184799
0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

7

Cases 2 (b) & (d) (Summer & Winter) Sensitivity Analysis
RANGES IN WHICH THE BASIS IS UNCHANGED:
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OBJ COEFFICIENT RANGES
VARIABLE
CURRENT
ALLOWABLE
ALLOWABLE
COEF
INCREASE
DECREASE
X1
75.000000
0.000000
INFINITY
X2
75.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
X3
75.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
X4
75.000000
0.000000
0.000000
X5
75.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
X6
75.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
RIGHTHAND SIDE RANGES
ROW
CURRENT
ALLOWABLE
ALLOWABLE
RHS
INCREASE
DECREASE
2
8.380000
1.140000
1.360000
3
81.000000
INFINITY
72.703796
4
2.200000
INFINITY
2.200000
5
0.400000
1.360000
0.400000
6
1.800000
1.360000
1.140000
7
2.500000
INFINITY
1.140000
8
0.220000
1.360000
0.220000
9
4.600000
1.360000
1.140000
10
21.500000
INFINITY
13.203800
11
39.000000
INFINITY
30.620001
12
39.000000
INFINITY
30.703800
13
22.600000
INFINITY
14.220000
14
22.600000
INFINITY
14.303800
15
14.000000
38.959999
INFINITY
16
0.000000
INFINITY
18.170000
17
0.000000
INFINITY
24.888599
18
0.000000
INFINITY
33.520000
19
0.000000
INFINITY
33.184799
20
0.000000
INFINITY
18.170000
21
0.000000
INFINITY
33.184799
• Amended LP for cases 1 and 2 (b and d) (with 30% increase in projected
output).
Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to:
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 10.89
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 4.71
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X2 < 0.6
X3 < 3
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.5
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 39
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 39
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
LP output for cases 1 and 2 (b and d) amended (showing same objective
function with base case when output is increased by approx. 30%).

•

LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

0

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

816.7500

VARIABLE
VALUE
X1
0.000000
X2
0.600000
X3
3.000000
X4
2.190000
X5
0.500000
X6
4.600000

ROW
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

REDUCED COST
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

SLACK OR SURPLUS DUAL PRICES
0.000000
75.000000
70.218903
0.000000
4.710000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.310000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
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10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)

10.718900
28.110001
28.218901
11.710000
11.818900
52.950001
23.920000
32.343300
43.560001
43.124401
23.920000
43.124401

NO. ITERATIONS=

0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0

(3) Case 2(a) LP – spring season (with average daily storage capacity of
4.3mb/d).
Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to:
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 9.16
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 2.98
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 43
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 43
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
Case 2(a) LINDO output (showing about 15% drop in the objective function).
LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

0
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OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

687.0000

VARIABLE
VALUE
X1
0.000000
X2
0.400000
X3
1.800000
X4
2.140000
X5
0.220000
X6
4.600000

ROW
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)

REDUCED COST
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

SLACK OR SURPLUS DUAL PRICES
0.000000
75.000000
71.931602
0.000000
2.980000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.360000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
12.431600
0.000000
33.840000
0.000000
33.931599
0.000000
13.440000
0.000000
13.531600
0.000000
42.860001
0.000000
20.510000
0.000000
27.205200
0.000000
36.639999
0.000000
36.273602
0.000000
20.510000
0.000000
36.273602
0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

0

Case 2 (a) (spring season) Sensitivity Analysis
RANGES IN WHICH THE BASIS IS UNCHANGED:
OBJ COEFFICIENT RANGES
VARIABLE
CURRENT
ALLOWABLE
ALLOWABLE
COEF
INCREASE
DECREASE
X1
75.000000
0.000000
INFINITY
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X2
X3
X4
X5
X6

75.000000
75.000000
75.000000
75.000000
75.000000

ROW
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

•

INFINITY
INFINITY
0.000000
INFINITY
INFINITY

0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

RIGHTHAND SIDE RANGES
CURRENT
ALLOWABLE
ALLOWABLE
RHS
INCREASE
DECREASE
9.160000
0.360000
2.140000
81.000000
INFINITY
71.931602
2.980000
INFINITY
2.980000
0.400000
2.140000
0.360000
1.800000
2.140000
0.360000
2.500000
INFINITY
0.360000
0.220000
2.140000
0.220000
4.600000
2.140000
0.360000
21.500000
INFINITY
12.431600
43.000000
INFINITY
33.840000
43.000000
INFINITY
33.931599
22.600000
INFINITY
13.440000
22.600000
INFINITY
13.531600
14.000000
42.860001
INFINITY
0.000000
INFINITY
20.510000
0.000000
INFINITY
27.205200
0.000000
INFINITY
36.639999
0.000000
INFINITY
36.273602
0.000000
INFINITY
20.510000
0.000000
INFINITY
36.273602

Amended LP for case 2(a) (with 18% increase in projected output).

Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to:
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 10.81
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 4.63
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
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X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 43
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 43
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
LP output for case 2(a) amended (showing same objective function with base
case when output is increased by approximately 18%).

•

LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

0

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

810.7500

VARIABLE
VALUE
X1
1.290000
X2
0.400000
X3
1.800000
X4
2.500000
X5
0.220000
X6
4.600000

ROW
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)

REDUCED COST
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

SLACK OR SURPLUS DUAL PRICES
0.000000
75.000000
70.298103
0.000000
3.340000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
10.798100
0.000000
32.189999
0.000000
32.298100
0.000000
11.790000
0.000000
11.898100
0.000000
53.689999
0.000000
26.750000
0.000000
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17)
18)
19)
20)
21)

32.105701
43.240002
42.807598
26.750000
42.807598

NO. ITERATIONS=

0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0

(4) Case 2(c) LP – fall season (with average daily storage capacity of 3.7mb/d).
Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 7.96
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 2.62
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 43
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 43
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
Case 2(c) LINDO output (showing about 26% drop in the objective function
value).

•

LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

2

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

597.0000

VARIABLE
VALUE
REDUCED COST
X1
0.000000
0.000000
X2
0.000000
0.000000
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X3
X4
X5
X6
ROW
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)

1.800000
2.500000
0.220000
3.440000

0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

SLACK OR SURPLUS DUAL PRICES
0.000000
75.000000
73.119598
0.000000
2.620000
0.000000
0.400000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
1.160000
0.000000
13.619600
0.000000
35.040001
0.000000
35.119598
0.000000
14.640000
0.000000
14.719600
0.000000
33.340000
0.000000
19.670000
0.000000
23.641199
0.000000
31.840000
0.000000
31.521601
0.000000
19.670000
0.000000
31.521601
0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

2

Case 2(c) (Fall Season) Sensitivity Analysis
RANGES IN WHICH THE BASIS IS UNCHANGED:
OBJ COEFFICIENT RANGES
VARIABLE
CURRENT
ALLOWABLE
ALLOWABLE
COEF
INCREASE
DECREASE
X1
75.000000
0.000000
INFINITY
X2
75.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
X3
75.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
X4
75.000000
0.000000
0.000000
X5
75.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
X6
75.000000
INFINITY
0.000000

ROW

RIGHTHAND SIDE RANGES
CURRENT
ALLOWABLE

ALLOWABLE
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

•

RHS
INCREASE
7.960000
1.560000
81.000000
INFINITY
2.620000
INFINITY
0.400000
0.940000
1.800000
0.940000
2.500000
INFINITY
0.220000
0.940000
4.600000
0.940000
21.500000
INFINITY
43.000000
INFINITY
43.000000
INFINITY
22.600000
INFINITY
22.600000
INFINITY
14.000000
36.860001
0.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
INFINITY
0.000000
INFINITY

DECREASE
0.940000
73.119598
2.620000
0.400000
1.560000
1.560000
0.220000
1.560000
13.619600
35.040001
35.119598
14.640000
14.719600
INFINITY
16.910000
23.641199
31.840000
31.521601
16.910000
31.521601

Amended LP for case 2(c) (with 35% increase in projected output).

Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to:
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 10.75
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 5.41
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 43
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 43
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
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-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
LP output for case 2(c) amended (showing same objective function with base
case when output is increased by approximately 35%).

•

LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

0

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

806.2500

VARIABLE
VALUE
X1
1.630000
X2
0.000000
X3
1.800000
X4
2.500000
X5
0.220000
X6
4.600000
ROW
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)

REDUCED COST
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

SLACK OR SURPLUS DUAL PRICES
0.000000
75.000000
70.357498
0.000000
3.780000
0.000000
0.400000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
10.857500
0.000000
32.250000
0.000000
32.357498
0.000000
11.850000
0.000000
11.957500
0.000000
52.869999
0.000000
28.510000
0.000000
31.927500
0.000000
43.000000
0.000000
42.570000
0.000000
28.510000
0.000000
42.570000
0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

0

APPENDIX C
LINDO OUTPUT FOR SHORT TERM EVENTS

Simulations of short term events on the gulf coast area sc during the most critical storage
time of the year (i.e. the fall season): using the developed risk based LP models and
Lindo software.
Note: that the description of the variables and constraints are shown and described in
Section 4.4, while the values and their derivations are shown and explained in Section 5.4
also. While the summary of the inputs and outputs are shown in the sensitivity analysis
summary of the cases in Tables 5.14 to 5.16.
(1) Case 3(a): LP model for a refinery fire/explosion in the Gulf coast area SC
during the fall season (the most critical storage capacity season of the year).
Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to:
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 7.96
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 2.62
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 37
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 37
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-0.99X1 - 0.99X2 - 0.99X3 - 0.99X4 - 0.99X5 - 0.99X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
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LINDO output for case 3(a) – showing 26% drop in objective function in comparison
with the base case.
LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

7

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

597.0000

VARIABLE

VALUE

REDUCED COST

X1

0.000000

0.000000

X2

0.400000

0.000000

X3

1.800000

0.000000

X4

0.940000

0.000000

X5

0.220000

0.000000

X6

4.600000

0.000000

ROW SLACK OR SURPLUS
2)

0.000000

75.000000

3)

73.119598

0.000000

4)

2.620000

0.000000

5)

0.000000

0.000000

6)

0.000000

0.000000

7)

1.560000

0.000000

8)

0.000000

0.000000

9)

0.000000

0.000000

DUAL PRICES
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10)

13.619600

0.000000

11)

35.040001

0.000000

12)

35.119598

0.000000

13)

14.640000

0.000000

14)

14.719600

0.000000

15)

36.860001

0.000000

16)

16.910000

0.000000

17)

7.880400

0.000000

18)

31.840000

0.000000

19)

31.521601

0.000000

20)

16.910000

0.000000

21)

31.521601

0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

•

7

Amended LP for case 3(a) (with 35% increase in projected output).

Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 10.75
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 5.41
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22

176
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 37
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 37
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-0.99X1 - 0.99X2 - 0.99X3 - 0.99X4 - 0.99X5 - 0.99X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
LINDO output for case 3(a) amended (shows same objective function with base case
when production is increased by 35%).
LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

1

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE

1)

806.2500

VARIABLE
X1

VALUE

1.230000

REDUCED COST
0.000000
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X2

0.400000

0.000000

X3

1.800000

0.000000

X4

2.500000

0.000000

X5

0.220000

0.000000

X6

4.600000

0.000000

ROW SLACK OR SURPLUS
2)

0.000000

75.000000

3)

70.357498

0.000000

4)

4.180000

0.000000

5)

0.000000

0.000000

6)

0.000000

0.000000

7)

0.000000

0.000000

8)

0.000000

0.000000

9)

0.000000

0.000000

10)

10.857500

0.000000

11)

32.250000

0.000000

12)

32.357498

0.000000

13)

11.850000

0.000000

14)

11.957500

0.000000

15)

53.270000

0.000000

16)

26.510000

0.000000

17)

10.642500

0.000000

18)

43.000000

0.000000

DUAL PRICES

178
19)

42.570000

0.000000

20)

26.510000

0.000000

21)

42.570000

0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

1

(2) Case 3(b): LP model for a tank farm leak/crack in the Gulf coast area SC
during the fall season (the most critical storage capacity season of the year).
Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 7.96
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 2.62
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 37
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 37
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-1.98X1 - 1.98X2 - 1.98X3 - 1.98X4 - 1.98X5 - 1.98X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0

LINDO output for case 3(b) – showing 28% drop in objective function in comparison
with the base case.
LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

0

179

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE

1)

585.0000

VARIABLE

VALUE

REDUCED COST

X1

0.000000

0.000000

X2

0.400000

0.000000

X3

1.800000

0.000000

X4

0.780000

0.000000

X5

0.220000

0.000000

X6

4.600000

0.000000

ROW SLACK OR SURPLUS
2)

0.000000

75.000000

3)

73.278000

0.000000

4)

2.460000

0.000000

5)

0.000000

0.000000

6)

0.000000

0.000000

7)

1.720000

0.000000

8)

0.000000

0.000000

9)

0.000000

0.000000

10)

13.778000

0.000000

11)

29.200001

0.000000

DUAL PRICES
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12)

29.278000

0.000000

13)

14.800000

0.000000

14)

14.878000

0.000000

15)

36.060001

0.000000

16)

16.430000

0.000000

17)

23.166000

0.000000

18)

31.200001

0.000000

19)

15.444000

0.000000

20)

16.430000

0.000000

21)

30.888000

0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

•

0

Amended LP for Case 3(b) (with 38% increase in projected output).

Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6

Subject to
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 10.92
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 5.58
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
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0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 37
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 37
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-1.98X1 - 1.98X2 - 1.98X3 - 1.98X4 - 1.98X5 - 1.98X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0

LINDO output for case 3(b) amended (shows same objective function with base case
when production is increased by 38%).
LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

1

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

807.0000

VARIABLE

VALUE

REDUCED COST

X1

1.240000

0.000000

X2

0.400000

0.000000

X3

1.800000

0.000000
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X4

2.500000

0.000000

X5

0.220000

0.000000

X6

4.600000

0.000000

ROW SLACK OR SURPLUS
2)

0.000000

75.000000

3)

70.347603

0.000000

4)

4.180000

0.000000

5)

0.000000

0.000000

6)

0.000000

0.000000

7)

0.000000

0.000000

8)

0.000000

0.000000

9)

0.000000

0.000000

10)

10.847600

0.000000

11)

26.240000

0.000000

12)

26.347601

0.000000

13)

11.840000

0.000000

14)

11.947600

0.000000

15)

53.340000

0.000000

16)

26.549999

0.000000

17)

31.957199

0.000000

18)

43.040001

0.000000

19)

21.304800

0.000000

20)

26.549999

0.000000

DUAL PRICES

183
21)

42.609600

NO. ITERATIONS=

0.000000
1

(3) Case 3(c): LP model for a pipe leak/break in the Gulf coast area SC during
the fall season (the most critical storage capacity season of the year).
Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 7.96
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 2.62
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 37
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 37
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-0.99X1 - 0.99X2 - 0.99X3 - 0.99X4 - 0.99X5 - 0.99X6 < 0

LINDO output for case 3(c) – showing 29% drop in objective function in comparison
with the base case.
LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

7

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

573.0000
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VARIABLE

VALUE

REDUCED COST

X1

0.000000

0.000000

X2

0.400000

0.000000

X3

1.800000

0.000000

X4

0.620000

0.000000

X5

0.220000

0.000000

X6

4.600000

0.000000

ROW SLACK OR SURPLUS
2)

0.000000

75.000000

3)

73.436401

0.000000

4)

2.300000

0.000000

5)

0.000000

0.000000

6)

0.000000

0.000000

7)

1.880000

0.000000

8)

0.000000

0.000000

9)

0.000000

0.000000

10)

13.936400

0.000000

11)

35.360001

0.000000

12)

35.436401

0.000000

13)

14.960000

0.000000

14)

15.036400

0.000000

15)

35.259998

0.000000

DUAL PRICES
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16)

15.950000

0.000000

17)

22.690800

0.000000

18)

30.559999

0.000000

19)

30.254400

0.000000

20)

15.950000

0.000000

21)

7.563600

0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=
•

7

Amended LP for Case 3(c) (with 39% increase in projected output).
Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 10.62
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 5.28
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 37
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 37
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-0.99X1 - 0.99X2 - 0.99X3 - 0.99X4 - 0.99X5 - 0.99X6 < 0

186
LINDO output for case 3(c) amended (shows same objective function with base case
when production is increased by 39.5%).
LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

1

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE

1)

806.5000

VARIABLE

VALUE

REDUCED COST

X1

1.100000

0.000000

X2

0.400000

0.000000

X3

1.800000

0.000000

X4

2.500000

0.000000

X5

0.220000

0.000000

X6

4.600000

0.000000

ROW SLACK OR SURPLUS
2)

0.000000

75.000000

3)

70.486198

0.000000

4)

4.180000

0.000000

5)

0.000000

0.000000

6)

0.000000

0.000000

7)

0.000000

0.000000

8)

0.000000

0.000000

9)

0.000000

0.000000

DUAL PRICES
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10)

10.986200

0.000000

11)

32.380001

0.000000

12)

32.486198

0.000000

13)

11.980000

0.000000

14)

12.086200

0.000000

15)

52.360001

0.000000

16)

25.990000

0.000000

17)

31.541401

0.000000

18)

42.480000

0.000000

19)

42.055199

0.000000

20)

25.990000

0.000000

21)

10.513800

0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

1

APPENDIX D
LINDO OUTPUT FOR LONG and SHORT TERM EVENTS WITH CIPs
Simulations of long term and short term events on the gulf coast area sc after
incorporating capacity expansion and redundancies as a means of minimizing the impact
of threats on the sc network: using the developed risk based LP models and Lindo
software.
Note: the description of the variables and constraints are shown and described in Section
4.4, while the values and their derivations are shown and explained in Section 5.4 also.
(1) Case 4(a) LP – 16% capacity expansion of the daily average storage capacity
during the fall season (most critical-based on initial results) to minimize the
impact of multiple long term risk scenarios on the SC network.
Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 9.16
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 2.98
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 43
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 43
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-1.98X1 - 1.98X2 - 1.98X3 - 1.98X4 - 1.98X5 - 1.98X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
Case 4(a) LINDO output (showing about 15% drop in the objective function in
comparison to the Base case).
LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP
0
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OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1) 687.0000
VARIABLE
VALUE
X1
0.000000
X2
0.400000
X3
1.800000
X4
2.140000
X5
0.220000
X6
4.600000

ROW
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)

SLACK OR SURPLUS DUAL PRICES
0.000000
75.000000
71.931602
0.000000
2.980000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.360000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
12.431600
0.000000
33.840000
0.000000
33.931599
0.000000
13.440000
0.000000
13.531600
0.000000
42.860001
0.000000
20.510000
0.000000
27.205200
0.000000
36.639999
0.000000
36.273602
0.000000
20.510000
0.000000
36.273602
0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

•

REDUCED COST
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

0

Amended LP for Case 4(a) (with 18% increase in projected output).

Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 10.81
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 4.63
X2 < 0.4
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X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 43
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 43
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 22.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 22.6
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-1.98X1 - 1.98X2 - 1.98X3 - 1.98X4 - 1.98X5 - 1.98X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
LINDO output for case 4(a) amended (showing same objective function with
base case when output is increased by approximately 18%).

•

LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

0

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

810.7500

VARIABLE
VALUE
X1
1.290000
X2
0.400000
X3
1.800000
X4
2.500000
X5
0.220000
X6
4.600000

ROW
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

REDUCED COST
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

SLACK OR SURPLUS DUAL PRICES
0.000000
75.000000
70.298103
0.000000
3.340000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
10.798100
0.000000
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11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)

32.189999
32.298100
11.790000
11.898100
53.689999
26.750000
32.105701
43.240002
42.807598
26.750000
42.807598

NO. ITERATIONS=

0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0

(2) Case 4(b) LP – 20% Redundancy on the daily average pipeline capacity in
the Gulf coast area pipelines to minimize the impact of short term risk
scenario (leaks/cracks) on the SC network.
Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
Subject to
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 9.17
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 3.83
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 37
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 37
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 27.12
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 27.12
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-0.99X1 - 0.99X2 - 0.99X3 - 0.99X4 - 0.99X5 - 0.99X6 < 0
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Case 4(b) LINDO output (showing about 15% drop in the objective function in
comparison to the base case).
LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

1

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

687.7500

VARIABLE
VALUE
X1
0.050000
X2
0.000000
X3
1.800000
X4
2.500000
X5
0.220000
X6
4.600000
ROW
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)

SLACK OR SURPLUS DUAL PRICES
0.000000
75.000000
71.921700
0.000000
3.780000
0.000000
0.400000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
12.421700
0.000000
27.830000
0.000000
27.921700
0.000000
17.950001
0.000000
18.041700
0.000000
41.810001
0.000000
22.190001
0.000000
27.234900
0.000000
36.680000
0.000000
36.313202
0.000000
22.190001
0.000000
9.078300
0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

•

REDUCED COST
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

1

Amended LP for Case 4(b) (with 17% increase in projected output).

Max 75X1 + 75X2 + 75X3 + 75X4 + 75X5 + 75X6
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Subject to
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 10.73
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 81
X1 < 5.39
X2 < 0.4
X3 < 1.8
X4 < 2.5
X5 < 0.22
X6 < 4.6
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 21.5
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 37
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 37
X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 < 31.73
0.99X1 + 0.99X2 + 0.99X3 + 0.99X4 + 0.99X5 + 0.99X6 < 31.73
7X1 + 8X2 + 5X3 + 5X4 + 8X5 + 7X6 > 14
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-2.97X1 - 2.97X2 - 2.97X3 - 2.97X4 - 2.97X5 - 2.97X6 < 0
-4X1 - 4X2 - 4X3 - 4X4 - 4X5 - 4X6 < 0
-3.96X1 - 3.96X2 - 3.96X3 - 3.96X4 - 3.96X5 - 3.96X6 < 0
-4X1 + X2 - 3X3 - 3X4 + 0.5X5 - 2X6 < 0
-0.99X1 - 0.99X2 - 0.99X3 - 0.99X4 - 0.99X5 - 0.99X6 < 0
LINDO output for Case 4(b) Amended (Showing same objective function
with Base case when output is increased by approximately 17%).

•

LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP

0

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
1)

804.7500

VARIABLE

VALUE

REDUCED COST

X1

1.610000

0.000000

X2

0.000000

0.000000

X3

1.800000

0.000000

X4

2.500000

0.000000

X5

0.220000

0.000000

X6

4.600000

0.000000
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ROW SLACK OR SURPLUS

DUAL PRICES

2)

0.000000

75.000000

3)

70.377296

0.000000

4)

3.780000

0.000000

5)

0.400000

0.000000

6)

0.000000

0.000000

7)

0.000000

0.000000

8)

0.000000

0.000000

9)

0.000000

0.000000

10)

10.877300

0.000000

11)

26.270000

0.000000

12)

26.377300

0.000000

13)

21.000000

0.000000

14)

21.107300

0.000000

15)

52.730000

0.000000

16)

28.430000

0.000000

17)

31.868099

0.000000

18)

42.919998

0.000000

19)

42.490799

0.000000

20)

28.430000

0.000000

21)

10.622700

0.000000

NO. ITERATIONS=

0

APPENDIX E

FTPLUS SOFTWARE RESULTS FOR MBVA RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Note: the description of the vulnerabilities and damages used are shown and described in
Section 4.5, while the values and their derivations are shown and explained in Section 5.5
also.
Figures E.1 to E.3 show resource/allocation strategies using FT Plus.

Figure E.1 Resource allocation for Gulf coast area oil and gas SC using manual
allocation strategy.

Figure E.2 Resource allocation for Gulf coast area oil and gas SC using rank order
allocation. strategy.
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Figure E.3 Resource allocation for Gulf coast area oil and gas SC using apportioned
allocation strategy.

APPENDIX F

ANALYZED QUALITY RATINGS OF CRUDE OIL IMPORTS TO THE US
Table F.1 show the quality rating obtained for crude oil imported into the US, using both
density and sulphur content criterias. It is in a number scale of 1 – 10, with 10 being the
highest).
Note: Oil is generally classified based on its density and sulphur content.

•

Density- it can either be light crude or heavy crude. Light crude is more
expensive because it requires less refining, while heavy crude is cheaper because
it requires more refining.

•

Sulphur content- Oil can either be sweet or sour crude. Sweet crude has a
sulphur content of less than 0.5% by weight, making it easier to refine to meet
environmental standards – so less expensive; while sour crude has sulphur
content of more than 0.5% by weight, making it more expensive to refine.
Table F.1 below shows the quality ratings that were derived for various crude oil

sources based on the above quality criteria.
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Table F.1 US Crude Oil Imports (in 1,000 BPD) and their Quality Ratings

Country

Feb-09

Jan - 09

YTD 2009

Feb - 08

YTD 2008

Qlty. Ratings

CANADA

1,913

1,946

1,930

1,920

1,933

7

MEXICO

1,219

1,299

1,261

1,231

1,214

7

S/ARABIA

1,135

1,337

1,241

1,614

1,544

8

VENEZUELA

962

1,172

1,072

945

1,043

8

ANGOLA

671

527

595

341

458

8

IRAQ

519

568

545

780

658

8

NIGERIA

457

488

473

982

1,075

8

BRAZIL

365

397

382

169

169

7

KUWAIT

251

225

237

261

249

8

ECUADOR

243

272

258

169

209

8

COLOMBIA

225

225

225

220
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7

EQ. GUINEA

167

118

141

69

53

8

ALGERIA

142

359

256

191

281

8

RUSSIA

139

157

149

80

47

6

CHAD

101

79

90

89

103

6

TOTAL

8,509

9,169

8,854

9,061

9,230
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